武大华科最新学术讲座信息预告！7月11日

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7月11日

星期五

1

疫苗费用补贴与信息干预措施对老年人疫苗接种行为与健康影响的异质性研究

时间：2025年 7月11日10:30

地点：城市设计学院专教楼516

主讲：夏一鸣（西南财经大学 副教授）

主持：武文杰（武汉大学 教授）

2

2025年第51期(总第1092期)

演讲主题：Opinion Shopping and Auditor Demand: A Novel Framework

主讲人：郭强 南丹麦大学副教授

主持人：高茹 会计与财税系教授

活动时间：2025年7月11日（周五） 10:30-12:30

活动地点：华中科技大学管院大楼119室

主讲人简介：

郭强，现任南丹麦大学（University of Southern Denmark）商学院副教授、博士生导师，2014年于德国曼海姆大学获得会计学博士学位。其研究兴趣主要聚焦于审计市场结构、监管经济学、会计信息质量，以及结构性方法在会计与审计研究中的应用。近年来，他特别关注结构估计方法在审计市场竞争与效率分析中的运用，同时也从事有关贸易信用和贸易信用保险等企业金融领域的研究。其研究成果发表于The Accounting Review和Review of Accounting Studies。其研究工作曾获得德国科学基金会、德国学术交流中心,以及丹麦注册会计师协会的项目资助。他同时担任过The Accounting Review，Management Science等国际学术期刊的匿名审稿人。

活动简介：

This study proposes a novel framework for empirically identifying opinion shopping. We modify the widely used Lennox (2000) model by incorporating a discrete choice approach. Our modification relaxes the assumption that all audit firms use the same audit technology, allows for a more nuanced consideration of client preferences, and enables policy evaluations. We apply this framework to the U.S. audit market in the post-SOX era and use going concern modifications as a proxy for unfavorable audit opinions. First, we find that clients exhibit preferences consistent with opinion shopping, favoring audit firms that are less likely to issue going concern modifications. However, clients also value audit firms with a reputation for being strict, suggesting a complex trade-off between leniency and credibility. Second, clients perceive a reputation for strictness as a positive attribute only for Big 4 auditors and industry specialists. Third, our analysis reveals that large clients are more likely to prioritize audit accuracy. Finally, we evaluate the effects of multiple-period contracts and mandatory rotation, highlighting their unintended consequences. While such policies have limited effects on opinion shopping, they impose significant economic costs, particularly by disrupting client-auditor matching efficiency.

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