Mehri Madarshahi｜“新的战争外交”：为何现代冲突不再终结——而只是暂停

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【导读】美伊签署停战谅解备忘录不到一个月，双方重燃战火。伊朗宣布关闭霍尔木兹海峡，美国则宣布恢复对伊朗实施海上封锁。随着空袭、导弹与无人机攻击不断升级，美伊对抗正显现出反复化、长期化的迹象。

近年来，类似情形已在多场冲突中反复出现。从俄乌战场到加沙、苏丹，停火安排与外交斡旋屡屡启动，却始终难以转化为持久的政治解决：有的停而未止，长期徘徊于低烈度冲突之中；有的和而未定，在短暂平静后再起兵戎。为何当下越来越多的冲突难以通过一纸协议终结？在战争与和平之间，外交努力是否正在扮演一种不同以往的角色？

在IPP荣誉教授梅赫里·马达尔沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）看来，二十一世纪的外交正在从终结战争的工具，逐渐演变为管理战争、控制冲突节奏的机制；所谓“暂时和平”，并非真正消除战略对抗，而是在暂停暴力、遏制升级和保留政治解决可能性的同时，为各方重新评估风险、恢复战略能力并决定下一步行动争取时间。她指出，现代外交谈判的不仅是和平，也是时间，其成效不仅应以是否实现持久和平来衡量，也应以是否成功控制冲突、防止下一轮战争过早爆发来衡量。

战争的新外交为何现代冲突不再终结——而只是暂停

The New Diplomacy of War
Why Modern Conflicts No Longer End—They Pause

本文作者：Mehri Madarshahi（梅赫里·马达尔沙希）

IPP荣誉教授、联合国教科文组织下属国际创意和可持续发展中心（ICCSD）顾问委员会成员

炮声余音未散，便又再次轰鸣。

The guns had barely fallen silent before they spoke again.

美国与伊朗于2026年6月17日签署《伊斯兰堡谅解备忘录》仅数周后，敌对行动便重新开始。这份文件曾被许多人视为一项重大的外交突破，本来有望终结近年来最危险的对抗之一。然而，空袭随即升级，军事威胁再度出现，政治指责取代了外交上的乐观情绪。那份原本承诺为局势降级开辟道路的协议，最终似乎只是在一场尚未结束的冲突中，划出了一段短暂的间歇。

Only weeks after the United States and Iran signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (17 June 2026), a document welcomed by many as a diplomatic breakthrough capable of ending one of the most dangerous confrontations in recent years, hostilities resumed. Air strikes intensified. Military threats returned. Political accusations replaced diplomatic optimism. The agreement that had promised to open a path toward de-escalation appeared instead to have marked only a brief interruption in an unfinished conflict.

美国中央司令部公布的行动记录显示，本轮连续对伊打击自7月11日晚展开；至美国东部时间7月19日晚，美军已完成连续第九个夜间行动。美方称，打击目标包括伊朗军事指挥中心、防空与沿海监视设施、导弹和无人机储存及发射地点、海上军事能力、通信网络和军事后勤设施。图源：路透社

乍看之下，原因似乎并不复杂。备忘录本身并不完整：部分条款缺乏明确性，另一些条款则在很大程度上依赖政治善意，而若干关键问题仍未得到解决。尤其是第五条，其基础是若干特定假设；然而，一旦战略互不信任重新浮现，这些假设很快便被证明难以维系。

At first glance, the explanation seems straightforward. The memorandum was incomplete. Some of its provisions lacked precision, others relied heavily on political goodwill, and key issues remained unresolved. Article 5, in particular, rested on assumptions that quickly proved difficult to sustain once strategic mistrust resurfaced.

然而，也许我们提出了错误的问题。

Yet perhaps we are asking the wrong question.

与其追问这项协议为何失败，我们或许更应当问：为什么它从一开始所带来的，就只是一种暂时和平？

Instead of asking why this agreement failed, we might ask why it produced only a temporary peace in the first place.

这个问题所涉及的，远不止华盛顿与德黑兰之间的对抗。纵观当今地缘政治格局，越来越多的战争似乎都在遵循一种惊人相似的模式：战事升级至危险程度，国际压力不断加大，外交官展开谈判，随后宣布停火、人道主义暂停，或签署某项备忘录。世界短暂地开始谈论和平。数周或数月之后，军事行动再次展开，其手段往往比此前更加精密，有时烈度也更为惊人。

This question extends far beyond the confrontation between Washington and Tehran. Across today's geopolitical landscape, an increasing number of wars appear to follow a remarkably similar pattern. Fighting reaches a dangerous intensity. International pressure mounts. Diplomats negotiate. A ceasefire, humanitarian pause, or memorandum is announced. The world briefly speaks of peace. Weeks or months later, military operations resume, often with greater sophistication and sometimes with greater intensity than before.

乌克兰、加沙、黎巴嫩、也门、美国与伊朗。冲突各不相同，参与者各不相同，政治环境也各不相同，外交节奏却呈现出惊人的相似性。

Ukraine. Gaza. Lebanon. Yemen. The United States and Iran. Different conflicts, different actors, different political circumstances, but a strikingly similar diplomatic rhythm.

俄总统新闻秘书佩斯科夫近期表示，俄罗斯最初发动的“特别军事行动”（SVO）已因西方国家的深度介入而演变为“真正的战争”。图源：路透社

几代人以来，外交一直被视为连接战争与和平的桥梁。谈判旨在通过处理冲突背后的政治根源，并建立持久的解决方案来终结战争。衡量外交是否成功，取决于它能否将战场转化为谈判桌，将停火转化为持久协议。

For generations, diplomacy was understood as the bridge between war and peace. Negotiations sought to terminate conflicts by addressing their political causes and creating durable settlements. The success of diplomacy was measured by its ability to transform battlefields into negotiating tables and ceasefires into lasting agreements.

然而，二十一世纪或许正在见证一种不同的现象。外交也许已不再主要是终结战争的工具。它或许正日益成为管理战争的机制。

The twenty-first century may be witnessing a different phenomenon.Perhaps diplomacy is no longer functioning primarily as the instrument through which wars end. Perhaps it is increasingly becoming the mechanism through which wars are managed.

这种可能性进一步引出了一个更具挑战性的问题：临时性外交协议的作用，是否可能超越政治妥协本身？它们是否也为各国政府提供了所需的战略时间，使其得以补充导弹库存、恢复军事战备、扩大工业生产、重新评估作战计划、巩固联盟，并为下一阶段的对抗做好准备？

This possibility raises a more provocative question. What if temporary diplomatic agreements serve purposes beyond political compromise? What if they also provide governments with the strategic time required to replenish missile inventories, restore military readiness, expand industrial production, reassess operational plans, strengthen alliances, and prepare for the next phase of confrontation?

如果事实果真如此，那么外交便获得了一种在传统国际关系理论中鲜少得到承认的功能。外交不再仅仅作为战争的解药而置身于战争之外，而是可能日益进入战争本身——它所调节的是战争的节奏，而不是决定战争的终局。

If so, diplomacy has acquired a function rarely acknowledged in traditional international relations. Rather than standing outside war as its antidote, diplomacy may increasingly operate within war itself-regulating its tempo rather than determining its conclusion.

本文并非主张每一次停火谈判都是为了便利重新武装，也不是说人道主义或政治考量已经退居次要地位。这样的论断只会将远为复杂的现实过度简单化。本文真正要追问的是：二十一世纪战争在经济与工业层面发生的变化，是否已悄然改变了外交最古老的职能之一？在一个高技术冲突消耗先进武器的速度往往快于其补充速度的时代，谈判本身是否已经成为现代战争作战节奏的一部分？

This article does not argue that every ceasefire is negotiated to facilitate rearmament, nor that humanitarian or political considerations have become secondary. Such claims would oversimplify a far more complex reality. It asks instead whether the changing economics and industrial realities of twenty-first-century warfare have quietly transformed one of diplomacy's oldest purposes. In an age where technologically advanced conflicts consume sophisticated weapons faster than they can often be replaced, have negotiations themselves become part of the operational rhythm of modern war?

如果这个问题令人不安，那是因为它挑战了国际政治中一个最为持久的基本假设：和平是战争的对立面。

If that question seems unsettling, it is because it challenges one of the most enduring assumptions of international politics: that peace represents the opposite of war.

也许在今天，和平已经成为另一种存在。也许，它已经成为一段间歇。

Perhaps today, peace has become something else.Perhaps it has become an interval.

7月3日到9日，伊朗为已故最高领袖哈梅内伊安排了长达一周的悼念仪式。国葬期间，数百万哀悼者涌上德黑兰街头，为已故伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊送行。图源：Getty Images

无法维系的协议

The Agreement That Could Not Hold

美国与伊朗之间重新爆发的对抗，引出了一个远远超出这场冲突本身的问题：一项曾被国际社会誉为重大外交突破的协议，为何连一段相对短暂的战略稳定都无法维持？

The renewed confrontation between the United States and Iran raises a question that extends well beyond the conflict itself. Why did an agreement welcomed internationally as a significant diplomatic breakthrough prove incapable of sustaining even a relatively short period of strategic stability?

乍看之下，答案似乎十分明确。《伊斯兰堡谅解备忘录》从来就不是一项旨在发挥全面和平条约作用的文件。它是在军事局势极度紧张的条件下谈判达成的，其直接目标是停止敌对行动、降低局势进一步升级的风险，并为继续谈判创造政治空间。若以这些近期目标来衡量，该备忘录无疑是一项重要的外交成果。它表明，即使在对抗最激烈之际，两个长期敌对的国家之间仍然存在对话的可能；同时，它也成功地——至少是暂时地——遏止了军事局势的迅速恶化。

At first sight, the answer appears straightforward. The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding was never intended to serve as a comprehensive peace treaty. It was negotiated under conditions of extreme military tension with the immediate objective of halting hostilities, reducing the risks of further escalation, and creating political space for continued negotiations. Judged against those immediate objectives, the Memorandum represented an important diplomatic achievement. It demonstrated that dialogue between two long-standing adversaries remained possible even at the height of confrontation and succeeded, at least temporarily, in interrupting a rapidly deteriorating military situation.

然而，敌对行动的重新爆发说明，中止暴力与化解战略对抗，并不一定是同一回事。

Yet the renewed outbreak of hostilities suggests that interrupting violence and resolving strategic rivalry are not necessarily the same thing.

在审视第五条的主要内容时，这一区别显得尤为重要。该条涉及伊朗同意实行60天免收费通行、在30天内完成排雷和障碍清除，并与阿曼举行双边行政磋商，以管理海上交通。《谅解备忘录》所采用的措辞既无争议，也合乎情理，体现了外交一贯追求的目标：保持克制、作出相互承诺，并期待双方共同维持局势降级的势头。无论是其目标还是其意图，恐怕都很少有观察者会提出质疑。

This distinction becomes particularly relevant when examining the key takeaways of Article 5 refering to Iran’s agreements to toll-free transit for 60 days, demining and obstacle removal within 30 days and bilateral administrative talks with Oman to manage maitime traffic. The MOU used a language which is neither controversial nor unreasonable, reflecting the traditional aspirations of diplomacy: restraint, reciprocal commitments, and the expectation that both parties will preserve the momentum towards de-escalation. Few observers would question either its objectives or its intentions.

近段时间，美军连续空袭伊朗多地，尤其是伊朗南部沿海省份。其中，霍尔木兹海峡沿岸的霍尔木兹甘省遭空袭尤为密集。图源：路透社

然而，该条款能否发挥实效，不仅取决于其文字表述，也取决于它所处并预期发挥作用的战略环境。

Its effectiveness, however, depended not only upon its language but also upon the strategic environment in which it is expected to operate.

因此，有四个问题值得认真思考。

Four questions therefore deserve careful consideration.

第一，第五条是否预设了双方之间已经具备某种程度的战略互信，而这种互信事实上尚未形成？

First, does Article 5 assume a level of strategic trust that does not yet exist between the parties?

第二，它是否只是推迟了引发冲突的根本分歧，而非真正加以解决？

Second, does it postpone rather than resolve the fundamental sources of disagreement that produced the conflict?

第三，它是否主要依赖各方自愿履行，却缺乏足够有力的核查与执行机制？

Third, does it rely primarily upon voluntary compliance without sufficiently robust mechanisms for verification or enforcement?

最后，它是否能够适应迅速变化的军事与战略环境？在这样的环境中，政治现实与作战态势的演变速度，可能远远快于外交承诺所能跟进的速度。

Finally, is it capable of adapting to rapidly changing military and strategic conditions in which political and operational realities may evolve far more rapidly than diplomatic commitments?

这些问题不应被理解为对第五条本身的批评。它们所反映的，是任何由战略对手谈判达成的外交协议都会面临的更广泛挑战，尤其是在各方根本政治目标并未发生实质变化的情况下。事实上，这份备忘录似乎确实实现了它原本希望达到的目标：降低局势立即升级的危险，重新开启沟通渠道，并为外交取代军事对抗创造机会——尽管这种取代仅仅维持了很短时间。

These questions should not be understood as criticisms of Article 5 itself. They reflected the broader challenges confronting any diplomatic agreement negotiated between strategic rivals whose underlying political objectives remain fundamentally unchanged. Indeed, the Memorandum appears to have achieved precisely what it was designed to accomplish: it reduced the immediate danger of escalation, reopened channels of communication, and created an opportunity for diplomacy to replace military confrontation, however only briefly.

更困难的问题在于：人们是否本就不应合理期待此类协议能够取得更多成果？

The more difficult question is whether any agreement of this nature could reasonably have been expected to accomplish more.

这份备忘录的首要目的，究竟是化解美国与伊朗之间的战略对抗？还是在稳定一场危险危机的同时，将更为棘手的政治问题留待今后的谈判解决？

Was the primary purpose of the Memorandum to resolve the strategic rivalry between the United States and Iran? Or was its more immediate objective to stabilize a dangerous crisis while postponing the more difficult political questions for future negotiation?

这一区别并非纯粹的学术问题。它指向了对外交本身的两种不同理解。

The distinction is not merely academic. It points to two different understandings of diplomacy itself.

一种理解，是通过处理冲突背后的政治根源并达成持久解决方案来化解冲突。另一种理解，则是在根本性对抗仍未解决的情况下，通过降低眼前风险、遏制局势升级并保留继续对话的机会来管理冲突。

One seeks to resolve conflict by addressing its political causes and producing a durable settlement. The other seeks to manage conflict by reducing immediate risks, containing escalation, and preserving opportunities for continued dialogue even when the underlying rivalry remains unresolved.

《伊斯兰堡谅解备忘录》的经历本身并不足以证明外交正在发生变化，也不会削弱外交接触在防止冲突进一步扩大方面的价值。然而，它确实引出了一个更为广泛的问题：如果此类协议越来越多地能够暂停暴力，却无法解决导致暴力产生的战略竞争，那么，我们是否仍应仅仅将它们视为迈向和平但尚未完成的步骤？还是说，它们实际上反映了一种正在形成的外交实践——一种为适应不同地缘政治现实而出现的外交实践？

The experience of the Islamabad Memorandum does not, by itself, establish that diplomacy is changing. Nor does it diminish the value of diplomatic engagement in preventing wider conflict. It does, however, invite a broader inquiry. If agreements of this kind increasingly succeed in suspending violence without resolving the strategic competition that produced it, should they be regarded simply as incomplete steps towards peace, or do they reflect an emerging diplomatic practice adapted to a different geopolitical reality?

美伊备忘录并没有回答这个问题。它只是迫使我们不得不提出这个问题。要判断这一经历究竟只是一个孤立案例，还是更广泛趋势的一部分，就有必要把目光投向伊朗之外。

The U.S.-Iran Memorandum does not answer that question.It simply compels us to ask it.To determine whether this experience represents an isolated case or part of a wider pattern, it is necessary to look beyond Iran.

伊朗之外Beyond Iran

如果《伊斯兰堡谅解备忘录》的失效只是一起孤立事件，那么或许可以将其归因于华盛顿与德黑兰之间特殊而漫长的互不信任历史。然而，在截然不同的地区，外交一次又一次地限制了暴力，却未能彻底解决引发这些暴力的争端。

If the collapse of the Islamabad Memorandum were an isolated episode, it might be explained by the particular history of mistrust between Washington and Tehran. Yet across very different regions, diplomacy has repeatedly limited violence without fully resolving the disputes from which it emerged.

在苏丹，区域和国际社会先后开展了多轮调解，提出人道主义休战、停火以及政治过渡方案。这些努力有时确实开启了谈判渠道，但主要交战方在军事控制权、政治权力以及国家未来架构等问题上仍存在严重分歧。即使新的和平倡议正在讨论之中，战斗也从未真正停止。

In Sudan, successive regional and international mediation efforts have proposed humanitarian truces, ceasefires and political transitions. They have occasionally opened channels for negotiation, but the principal belligerents remain divided over military control, political authority and the future structure of the state. Fighting has continued even while new peace initiatives have been under discussion.

近日，联合国儿童基金会就苏丹局势发布最新报告指出，苏丹中西部达尔富尔地区和科尔多凡地区局势持续严峻，儿童伤亡情况最为严重。其中，无人机袭击造成了约60%的儿童伤亡。图源：CNN

柬埔寨与泰国之间的边境争端提供了另一个不同的例子。外交介入和停火安排有助于遏制武装冲突，防止对抗进一步扩大。然而，双方在领土问题上的分歧、历史积怨，以及对争端解决方式的不同主张始终悬而未决，使一轮又一轮的安排始终容易受到紧张局势再度升级的冲击。

The border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand offers a different example. Diplomatic intervention and ceasefire arrangements have helped contain armed clashes and prevent a wider confrontation. Yet the territorial disagreements, historical grievances and competing approaches to their resolution have remained unsettled, leaving successive arrangements vulnerable to renewed tension.

2025年7月24日，泰国和柬埔寨爆发了十多年来最血腥的军事冲突，双方动用坦克、火炮和地面部队在争议边界地区交战。图源：法新社

哥伦比亚则提供了一个更为复杂，也更具启示意义的案例。2016年，哥伦比亚政府与“哥伦比亚革命武装力量”达成和平协议，结束了该国长期内部冲突中的一个重要阶段，并使暴力水平实现了显著而持久的下降。因此，不应将其描述为一次外交失败。然而，协议落实不充分、其他武装团体持续存在、非法经济活动延续，以及国家权力薄弱地区的暴力问题，都说明一项协议可以解决某一场冲突，却未必能够消除维系更广泛不安全局势的深层条件。

Colombia presents a more complex and instructive case. The 2016 peace agreement with the FARC ended a major chapter of the country’s long internal conflict and produced important, durable reductions in violence. It should therefore not be portrayed as a diplomatic failure. Nevertheless, incomplete implementation, the persistence of other armed groups, illicit economies and violence in territories where state authority remains weak demonstrate that an agreement can resolve one conflict without eliminating the wider conditions that sustain insecurity.

朝鲜半岛或许为“停止战争”与“解决战争”之间的区别提供了最清晰的历史例证。1953年的停战协定结束了大规模敌对行动，并在七十多年间避免了全面战争再次爆发。然而，它始终未被正式和平条约所取代，潜藏其下的政治与战略对抗至今仍未解决。这些案例之间存在根本差异。苏丹经历的是内战；柬埔寨与泰国面对的是领土争端；哥伦比亚在和平建设取得成功的同时，武装暴力仍在持续；朝鲜半岛则长期处于一项表现出惊人持久性的停战安排之下。我们既不应将它们等同视之，也不应强行用一种单一解释来概括它们。

The Korean Peninsula provides perhaps the clearest historical illustration of the distinction between stopping a war and settling it. The 1953 Armistice ended large-scale hostilities and has prevented a return to full-scale war for more than seven decades. Yet it was never replaced by a formal peace treaty, and the underlying political and strategic confrontation remains unresolved. These cases differ profoundly. Sudan is a civil war; Cambodia and Thailand confront a territorial dispute; Colombia has combined successful peacebuilding with continuing armed violence; Korea remains governed by an armistice that has proved remarkably durable. They should neither be equated nor forced into a single explanation.

据朝鲜官方媒体日前报道，金正恩表示，朝鲜正在“为海军配备核武器”，同时他还公布了建造1万吨级战舰的计划。自2019年金正恩与特朗普在河内举行的峰会因无核化范围和解除制裁问题破裂以来，平壤已多次宣称自己是“不可逆转的”核国家。

然而，它们仍然揭示了一个共同的外交困境。

They nevertheless reveal a common diplomatic dilemma.

谈判可以停止战斗、减少苦难，并防止冲突蔓延。它甚至可能带来持久的改善。但它并不总能解决那些可能再次引发对抗的政治、领土或战略条件。

Negotiations may stop fighting, reduce suffering and prevent a conflict from spreading. They may even produce lasting improvements. But they do not alwaysresolve the political, territorial or strategic conditions capable of generating renewed confrontation.

这并不意味着外交通常只能产生暂时性结果。它更可能说明，当对抗已经根深蒂固时，外交成功可以呈现出多种形式：在一些情况下实现问题的解决，在另一些情况下形成长期遏制，而在双方都尚未准备好、或无力解决根本争端时，则实现暂时稳定。

This does not mean that diplomacy generally produces only temporary outcomes. It suggests instead that where rivalries are deeply entrenched, diplomatic success may assume several forms: resolution in some cases, prolonged containment in others, and temporary stabilization where neither side is prepared or able to settle the underlying dispute.

因此，问题并不仅仅是：为什么外交有时无法带来和平？更重要的问题是：为什么在某些冲突中，暂停本身竟会成为外交所能取得的主要成果？

The question is, therefore, not simply why diplomacy sometimes fails to produce peace. It is why, in certain conflicts, the pause itself becomes the principal diplomatic achievement.

另一个问题

A Different Question

让我再次强调，本文所要关注的，并不是当代战争为何如此难以终结，而是另一个因素是否同样值得我们认真思考。

Let me emphasis once more that this article does not seek to focus on why contemporary wars are difficult to end but It asks whether a different factor may also deserve consideration.

毋庸置疑，在过去二十年间，战争形态经历了深刻转变。如今，现代冲突的走向日益不仅取决于战场表现，也取决于一个国家能否在技术复杂性不断提高、经济约束日益加剧的条件下，维持长期军事行动。精确制导武器、先进防空系统、无人机、网络能力、情报网络、卫星支援以及复杂的后勤体系，都已成为现代战争不可或缺的组成部分。然而，这些能力不仅成本高昂、技术要求严苛，其消耗速度往往也超过短期内所能补充的速度。

Needless to say that over the past two decades, warfare has undergone a profound transformation. Modern conflicts now a days, increasingly depend not only upon battlefield performance but upon the ability of a state to sustain prolonged military operations under conditions of growing technological complexity and economic constraint. Precision-guided munitions, sophisticated air-defence systems, drones, cyber capabilities, intelligence networks, satellite support and complex logistical systems have become indispensable components of modern warfare. They are also costly, technologically demanding and consumed at a pace that often exceeds immediate replacement.

近期乌克兰明显扩大了使用远程无人机袭击俄罗斯境内目标的规模、频率和纵深。图源：路透社

因此，今天的军事力量不仅取决于一个国家拥有什么，也取决于它能够恢复什么。

Military power today, therefore, depends not only upon what a state possesses, but also upon what it is capable of restoring.

为便于本文讨论，我们可以将这种更广泛的能力称为“战略能力”。它不仅包括军事装备与武器库存，也包括工业生产、后勤保障、作战准备、情报能力、技术适应、联盟协调，以及维持长期战略竞争所必需的政治与经济资源。

For the purposes of this discussion, that broader capability may be described asstrategic capacity. It encompasses not only military inventories but also industrial production, logistics, operational readiness, intelligence, technological adaptation, alliance coordination and the political and economic resources required to sustain prolonged strategic competition.

从这一角度来看，临时性外交安排可能同时发挥不止一种作用。它们可以降低局势立即升级的风险，为人道主义救援创造条件，并重新开启政治对话。与此同时，它们也可能为政府提供机会，使其在决定下一步行动之前，恢复自身战略能力的某些组成部分。

Viewed from this perspective, temporary diplomatic arrangements may perform more than one function. They reduce the immediate risks of escalation, create opportunities for humanitarian relief and reopen political dialogue. At the same time, they may also provide governments with an opportunity to restore elements of their strategic capacity before deciding upon their next course of action.

不过，有必要在此作出说明：这一观察不应被理解为各国进行停火谈判，就是为了准备重新开战；也不意味着每一次外交暂停背后都隐藏着军事算计。这样的结论既无法反映当代冲突的多样性，也忽视了外交在实现持久政治解决方面依然具有的重要意义。

A point of caution: This observation should not be interpreted as suggesting that states negotiate ceasefires in order to prepare for renewed war, nor that every diplomatic pause conceals a military calculation. Such a conclusion would neither reflect the diversity of contemporary conflicts nor the continued importance of diplomacy in achieving lasting settlements.

本文提出的观点要有限得多。

The proposition advanced here is more limited.

在主要战略对手参与的冲突中，临时性外交安排可能创造一种条件，使外交与战略得以同时运作。一方面，谈判试图遏制局势升级；另一方面，各国政府则重新评估军事选项、巩固联盟、补充关键能力、调整作战规划，并判断不断变化的政治形势。

In conflicts involving major strategic rivals, temporary diplomatic arrangements may create conditions under which both diplomacy and strategy operate simultaneously. Negotiations seek to contain escalation while governments reassess military options, strengthen alliances, replenish critical capabilities, adapt operational planning and evaluate changing political circumstances.

在这种条件下，外交并不取代战略竞争。它与战略竞争并存。

Under such conditions, diplomacy does not replace strategic competition. It coexists with it.

这种并存究竟只是对一个异常动荡的地缘政治时期所作出的临时调整，还是反映了国际事务中一种更为持久的演变，仍有待进一步思考。

Whether this coexistence represents a temporary adaptation to an exceptionally turbulent geopolitical period or reflects a more enduring evolution in international affairs needs also further reflections.

尽管如此，它至少说明，暂时和平所代表的，可能不仅仅是两个冲突阶段之间的间歇。

It nevertheless suggests that temporary peace may represent more than the interval between two phases of conflict.

这种可能性也促使我们在长期战略竞争的背景下，以一种更为宽广的方式理解外交。

This possibility invites possibly a broader understanding of diplomacy in periods of sustained strategic rivalry.

因此，暂时和平不应仅仅被视为两个冲突阶段之间的间隔。它也可能代表这样一段时期：外交与战略同时展开，各自追求不同、但未必相互矛盾的目标。外交致力于降低战争的即时风险；政府则力求保存或恢复必要的战略能力，以便在对抗持续的情况下保护本国利益。

Temporary peace therefore need not be understood merely as the interval between two phases of conflict. It may also represent a period during which diplomacy and strategy operate simultaneously, each pursuing different, though not necessarily contradictory, objectives. Diplomacy seeks to reduce the immediate risks of war; governments seek to preserve or restore the strategic capacity required to protect their interests should confrontation continue.

如果事实果真如此，那么外交所谈判的，就不仅仅是和平。它也在谈判时间。

If so, diplomacy is not merely negotiating peace. It is also negotiating time.

4月11日星期六，在巴基斯坦伊斯兰堡的一个媒体协调中心外，一名警察走过一块关于美国和伊朗谈判的广告牌。

暂时和平的外交

The Diplomacy of Temporary Peace

几个世纪以来，衡量外交成败的首要标准始终只有一个：终结战争。和平协议标志着冲突的结束，使政治争端取代军事对抗。

For centuries, diplomacy was judged by one overriding ambition: to end wars. Peace agreements marked the conclusion of conflict, allowing political disputes to replace military confrontation.

然而，这一传统认识已无法充分反映二十一世纪的战略现实。

That assumption no longer fully reflects the strategic realities of the twenty-first century.

外交正日益被要求完成一种不同的使命。在一个长期地缘政治竞争不断延续的国际体系中，谈判往往并不终结战略竞争，而只是将其暂时中断。外交的目标已不再总是达成一项最终和平，而是在保留未来政治解决可能性的同时，防止对抗越过门槛，演变为失控的升级。

Increasingly, diplomacy is being asked to accomplish something different. In an international system marked by enduring geopolitical rivalries, negotiations often do not terminate strategic competition; they interrupt it. The objective is no longer always to produce a definitive peace, but to prevent confrontation from crossing the threshold into uncontrolled escalation while keeping open the possibility of a future political settlement.

这就是我所说的“暂时和平的外交”。

This is what I describe asthe diplomacy of temporary peace.

按照传统意义，暂时和平既不能被简单视为外交失败，也不能被视为外交成功。它是一种不同的战略状态：暴力暂停了，但竞争依然存在；导弹或许停止发射，军事规划却仍在继续；停火开始生效，与此同时，联盟得到巩固，国防工业持续扩张，情报行动并未停止，各国政府既为谈判作准备，也为谈判可能失败的局面作准备。

Temporary peace is neither diplomatic failure nor diplomatic success in its traditional sense. It is a different strategic condition. Violence is suspended, but rivalry survives. Missiles may stop flying, yet military planning continues. Ceasefires take hold, while alliances are strengthened, defence industries expand, intelligence operations continue and governments prepare simultaneously for negotiation and for the possibility that negotiations may fail.

在这一背景下，和平不再意味着战略竞争的终结。它成为战略竞争中的一个阶段。

Peace, in this context, is no longer the end of strategic competition.It becomes one phase within it.

因此，暂时和平的目的未必是消除冲突，而可能是管理冲突。它所争取的，不仅是外交所需要的时间，也是政府所需要的时间——用于沟通、遏制人道主义灾难、安抚盟友、恢复战略能力、重新评估风险，并最终判断：重新展开对抗，还是重新启动谈判，更符合本国利益。

The purpose of temporary peace is therefore not necessarily to eliminate conflict, but to manage it. It buys time—not simply for diplomacy, but for governments. Time to communicate, to contain humanitarian catastrophe, to reassure allies, to restore strategic capacity, to reassess risks and, ultimately, to decide whether renewed confrontation or renewed negotiation better serves their national interests.

2026年7月8日，美国总统特朗普在土耳其安卡拉与乌克兰总统泽连斯基举行双边会晤，此次会晤与北约领导人峰会同期举行。图源：路透社

从这一角度来看，许多当代外交行动便具有了不同的意义。它们的重要性不仅在于解决了什么，也在于推迟了什么、遏制了什么，以及阻止了什么。衡量其成功与否，不能始终只看它们所带来的和平能否永久维持，还应考察它们是否降低了冲突扩大并造成更大破坏的可能性。

Viewed in this light, many contemporary diplomatic initiatives acquire a different meaning. Their significance lies not only in what they resolve, but also in what they postpone, contain and prevent. Their success cannot always be measured by the permanence of the peace they produce, but by their ability to reduce the probability of a wider and more destructive conflict.

这并不意味着外交已经放弃对持久和平的追求。恰恰相反，达成持久的政治解决仍然是外交的最高目标。然而，当地缘政治竞争变得根深蒂固时，外交所能发挥作用的政治空间也日益狭窄。它一边管理不稳定，一边寻找稳定；它一边推迟灾难，一边期待政治条件最终能够允许各方达成更为持久的解决方案。

This does not mean that diplomacy has abandoned the search for lasting peace. On the contrary, durable political settlements remain its highest objective. But when geopolitical rivalry becomes deeply entrenched, diplomacy increasingly operates within narrower political margins. It manages instability while searching for stability. It postpones catastrophe while hoping that political conditions will eventually permit a more durable settlement.

暂时和平究竟会成为通向和解的桥梁，还是仅仅成为新一轮对抗之前的间歇，事先无法确定。这将取决于各方作出的政治选择，而任何协议，无论起草得多么周密，都无法对此作出保证。

Whether temporary peace becomes a bridge to reconciliation or merely an interval before renewed confrontation cannot be known in advance. That will depend upon political choices that no agreement, however carefully drafted, can guarantee.

然而，越来越明显的一点是，外交本身正在发生演变。在战略竞争的时代，衡量外交的标准已不再只是它最终促成了怎样的和平，还包括它成功遏制了哪些冲突。

What does appear increasingly evident, however, is that diplomacy itself is evolving. In an era of strategic competition, it is no longer judged solely by the peace it concludes, but also by the conflicts it succeeds in containing.

因此，二十一世纪的外交或许正面临一个以往世代未曾经历的悖论：它最伟大的成就，未必总是终结战争，而可能是防止下一场战争过早开始。

The diplomacy of the twenty-first century may therefore face a paradox unknown to earlier generations: its greatest achievement may not always be to end wars, but to prevent the next one from beginning too soon.

梅赫里·马达尔沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）荣誉教授、联合国教科文组织下属国际创意和可持续发展中心（ICCSD）顾问委员会成员

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ;

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