Mehri Madarshahi｜能源安全、中美地缘政治竞争与气候承诺的弱化

IPP评论是国家高端智库华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平台

导语：随着伊朗战争引发的石油危机导致众多国家和地区的能源安全受到威胁，全球正愈发清晰地意识到：能源问题早已深深嵌入地缘政治逻辑之中。

IPP荣誉教授梅赫里·马达尔沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）发文指出，全球能源转型正日益受到地缘政治竞争和能源安全担忧的制约。虽然《巴黎协定》为去碳化创造了动力，但乌克兰、波斯湾和霍尔木兹海峡的战事与动荡，重新唤起了化石燃料的战略重要性。随着各国政府将确保供应安全和经济稳定列为优先事项，气候方面的承诺在实际操作中遭到了削弱。

文章将这一转变与美国与中国的竞争联系起来，指出在能源控制领域，化石燃料的主导地位与可再生能源的领导地位构成了两种相互竞争的权力来源。欧洲的能源脆弱性表明，气候方面的雄心壮志有可能被重新导向对化石燃料的依赖。文章最后警告称，如果这一过渡过程沦为大国角力的又一舞台，那么它很可能会遭到拖延和扭曲。

Energy Security, U.S.–China Geopolitical Rivalry, and the Erosion of Climate Commitments

能源安全、中美地缘政治竞争与气候承诺的弱化

本文作者：Mehri Madarshahi（梅赫里·马达尔沙希）

IPP荣誉教授、联合国教科文组织下属国际创意和可持续发展中心（ICCSD）顾问委员会成员

Phil Noble / 路透社

《巴黎协定》标志着全球在气候变化问题上罕见地形成了一次共识。几乎所有国家，包括美国和中国，首次共同承诺加入一个旨在减少温室气体排放、限制全球变暖的框架之中。该协定确立了一个共同方向，即逐步向低碳经济转型，推进减排目标和净零目标，并维持持续性的多边合作。

The Paris Agreement marked a rare moment of global alignment on climate change. For the first time, nearly all states, including the United States and China committed to a common framework aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and limiting global warming. The agreement established a shared direction focus on the gradual transition toward low-carbon economies, emissions reductions, net-zero targets, and sustained multilateral cooperation.

在随后的几年里，这一承诺又得到一系列趋同趋势的强化。各国政府相继出台更加雄心勃勃的气候政策，金融市场开始将环境标准纳入投资决策，可再生能源在多个地区快速部署。围绕全球能源体系可以逐步转型、2020年至2030年将是加速这一转型的决定性十年，各方逐渐形成了广泛共识。

In the years that followed, this commitment was reinforced by a series of converging developments. Governments adopted increasingly ambitious climate policies, financial markets began integrating environmental criteria into investment decisions, and renewable energy expanded rapidly across multiple regions. A broad consensus emerged around the idea that the global energy system could be progressively transformed, and that the decade between 2020 and 2030 would be decisive in accelerating this transition.

然而，这一势头后来被证明比最初设想的更加脆弱。自2022年以来，一系列地缘政治冲击打断了《巴黎协定》后形成的转型轨迹。大规模冲突的回归，尤其是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后，使能源安全重新成为政策制定者关注的核心问题。霍尔木兹海峡等关键能源通道的不稳定局势进一步强化了这一转向；相关紧张形势凸显出全球石油供应的脆弱性。

Yet this momentum has proven more fragile than initially assumed. Since 2022, a series of geopolitical shocks has disrupted the trajectory set in motion after Paris. The return of large-scale conflict, most notably following theRussian invasion of Ukraine, reintroduced energy security as a central concern for policymakers. This shift was further reinforced by instability in key energy corridors, including the Strait of Hormuz, where tensions have underscored the vulnerability of global oil supply.

这些变化已经产生了切实后果。各国政府推迟或修订了脱碳时间表，扩大了对化石燃料基础设施的投资，并将供应安全置于长期气候目标之上。因此，尽管《巴黎协定》框架下的正式承诺依然存在，但其对政策和市场行为的实际影响力已经减弱。

These developments have had tangible consequences. Governments have delayed or revised decarbonization timelines, expanded investment in fossil fuel infrastructure, and prioritized supply security over long-term climate objectives.Thus, while the formal commitments of the Paris framework remain in place, their practical influence on policy and market behavior have weakened.

今天正在出现的，并不是“后巴黎时代”能源转型的简单延续，而是一幅更加复杂、更加碎片化的图景。气候目标仍然是一个重要参照，但它们越来越多地需要与地缘政治竞争、经济稳定和能源安全等考量相互竞争，并且往往被置于这些考量之下。全球能源转型曾被视为一项协调一致的共同努力，如今却正在战略竞争和系统性紧张的条件下展开。

Today, what is emerging is not a straightforward continuation of the post-Paris transition, but a more complex and fragmented landscape. Climate goals persist as a reference point, yet they increasingly compete with and are often subordinated to, considerations of geopolitical rivalry, economic stability, and energy security. The global energy transition, once framed as a coordinated effort, is now unfolding under conditions of strategic competition and systemic tension.

4月17日，俄罗斯克拉斯诺达尔边疆区图阿普谢发生乌克兰袭击事件，导致石油泄漏到黑海。图源：路透社

从气候行动势头到战略性逆转

From Climate Momentum to Strategic Reversal

然而，“后巴黎时代”转型轨迹的中断并不是在某一个瞬间突然发生的，而是在地缘政治冲击触发之下，各项优先事项迅速重新排序的结果。原本，人们期待2020年至2030年这十年将以加速脱碳为主要特征；但这种期待正越来越多地让位于一种更加复杂的现实：能源安全、经济稳定和战略竞争开始发挥决定性作用。

The disruption of the post-Paris trajectory did not,however, occur in a single moment, but through a rapid reordering of priorities triggered by geopolitical shocks. The expectation that the 2020–2030 decade would be defined by accelerated decarbonization has increasingly given way to a more complex reality in which energy security, economic stability, and strategic competition play a determining role.

俄乌冲突成为一个关键转折点。它暴露出能源供应体系的脆弱性，尤其是在欧洲，迫使各国政府重新评估能源转型的速度与结构。重新启用煤炭、扩建液化天然气基础设施、推动供应来源多元化等应急措施，都反映出政策重心正在紧急转向确保眼前的能源需求。

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a critical inflection point. By exposing the vulnerability of energy supply systems-particularly in Europe-it forced governments to reassess the pace and structure of the energy transition. Emergency measures, including the reactivation of coal, the expansion of liquefied natural gas infrastructure, and the diversification of supply sources, reflected an urgent shift toward securing immediate energy needs.

这种重新校准并不局限于欧洲。它标志着政策制定层面出现了更广泛的转变：长期气候目标开始被置于短期安全与韧性需求之下加以权衡。市场也同步作出反应，重新加大对化石燃料生产和基础设施的投资，从而进一步强化了这一趋势。

This recalibration was not limited to Europe. It signaled a broader transformation in policymaking, where long-term climate objectives began to be weighed against short-term imperatives of security and resilience. Markets responded in parallel, with renewed investment in fossil fuel production and infrastructure, further reinforcing this trend.

近来，霍尔木兹海峡等关键能源通道周边的不稳定局势进一步放大了这些压力。石油市场的波动，以及维持供应不中断所具有的战略重要性，使化石燃料在各国决策中的地位持续上升。

More recently, instability surrounding critical energy corridors such as theStrait of Hormuz has amplified these pressures. Volatility in oil markets and the strategic importance of maintaining uninterrupted supply have continued to elevate the role of fossil fuels in national decision-making.

然而必须强调的是，尽管气候承诺在形式上依然存在，其实际操作意义已经明显下降。正在出现的并不是既有进程的延续，而是一种优先事项的重新排序：能源安全正越来越多地压倒脱碳目标。

What must be emphasized, however, is that while climate commitments remain formally in place, their operational significance has been markedly reduced. What is emerging is not continuity, but a reordering of priorities in which energy security increasingly overrides decarbonization goals.

综合来看，这些发展指向的不是暂时偏离，而是一场结构性转变。在一个日益碎片化的国际体系中，能源转型正在被地缘政治现实重新塑造，并在某些情况下受到限制。

Taken together, these developments point to a structural shift rather than a temporary deviation. This energy transition is being reshaped and in some cases constrained, by the geopolitical realities of an increasingly fragmented international system.

在中东局势导致能源紧张的背景下，欧盟委员会22日公布名为 “加速欧盟” 的行动方案，旨在减轻能源价格飙升对欧洲家庭和企业造成的冲击，推动欧盟迈向 “能源独立”。图源：Getty Images

化石燃料“权力”的延续与扩张

The Persistence and Expansion of Fossil Fuel Power

与关于能源转型有序推进的主流叙事相反，化石燃料不仅仍然处于全球能源结构的中心位置，而且深深嵌入主要大国的战略计算之中。石油和天然气继续作为地缘政治影响力的工具发挥作用，既塑造着国际关系的运行方式，也影响着全球市场的结构。

Contrary to prevailing narratives of an orderly energy transition, fossil fuels remain not only central to the global energy mix but also deeply embedded in the strategic calculations of major powers. Oil and gas continue to function as instruments of geopolitical influence, shaping both the conduct of international relations and the structure of global markets.

近期发展表明，化石燃料权力的延续并不只是惯性或政策调整迟缓的结果。相反，它反映出一种更具“主动性”的模式：对能源资源和供应通道的控制，已经构成战略行为的核心要素。在这一背景下，化石燃料并不是即将被逐步淘汰的普通商品，而是需要被管理、被保障，并在可能情况下被加以利用的战略资产。

Recent developments suggest that this persistence is not merely the result of inertia or slow policy adaptation. Rather, it reflects a more deliberate pattern in which control over energy resources and supply routes constitutes a core element of strategic behavior. In this context, fossil fuels are not simply commodities to be phased out, but assets to be managed, secured, and, where possible, leveraged.

不同年份全球石油总需求月度走势，单位为百万桶/日。图源：IEA

委内瑞拉和波斯湾等地区的动态变化，正体现了这一模式。主要产油国的政治和经济变化，推动其能源部门重新组织，使外部力量得以在新的条件下重新接触相关储备，并促使这些资源重新融入全球市场。与此同时，霍尔木兹海峡等关键运输节点周边紧张局势加剧，也凸显出控制能源生产本身之外，控制能源流动同样重要。综合来看，这些发展指向一种双重战略：在政治上相互靠近的背景下扩大供应，在敌对关系中限制或扰乱供应。

The evolving dynamics in regions such as Venezuela and the Persian Gulf illustrate this pattern. Political and economic shifts in major oil-producing states have facilitated the reorganization of their energy sectors, enabling renewed access to reserves and their reintegration into global markets under altered conditions. At the same time, heightened tensions around critical transit points such as the Strait of Hormuz underscore the importance of controlling not only production, but also the flow of energy. Together, these developments point to a dual strategy: the expansion of supply in politically aligned contexts, and the restriction or disruption of supply in adversarial ones.

航运数据显示，委内瑞拉3月石油日出口量突破100万桶大关。图源：路透社

这种双重性表明，在更广泛的权力结构中，石油发挥着战略杠杆的作用。它不仅使国家能够保障自身能源需求，也使其能够影响全球定价、市场稳定，以及其他行为体开展活动时所处的经济条件。从这个意义上说，对化石燃料体系的管理，已经与地缘政治权力的行使密不可分。

This duality suggests that oil functions as a strategic lever within a broader architecture of power. It enables states not only to secure their own energy needs but also to influence global pricing, market stability, and the economic conditions under which other actors operate. In this sense, the management of fossil fuel systems becomes inseparable from the exercise of geopolitical power.

重要的是，这一动态必须放在大国竞争加剧的背景下理解，尤其是中美竞争不断加剧的背景下。获取能源资源、控制供应链，正日益同更广泛的战略关切交织在一起，其中包括技术领导权、工业能力和全球影响力。因此，影响主要产油地区的行动，其意义已经超出眼前的资源考量，并会塑造竞争对手追求其经济和政治目标时所处的战略环境。

Importantly, this dynamic must be understood within the coext of intensifying great-power competition, particularly between the United States and China. Access to energy resources and control over supply chains are increasingly intertwined with broader strategic concerns, including technological leadership, industrial capacity, and global influence. Actions affecting major oil-producing regions therefore have implications that extend beyond immediate resource considerations, shaping the strategic environment in which rivals pursue their economic and political objectives.

其结果是一种结构性悖论：尽管全球话语仍在强调脱碳，但能源安全与大国竞争的地缘政治逻辑，却进一步强化了化石燃料的中心地位，并使其被重新工具化——它们不再只是能源来源，也成为在日益激烈竞争的国际体系中进行战略布局的工具。

The result is a structural paradox. While global discourse continues to emphasize decarbonization, the geopolitical logic of energy security and competition reinforces the centrality of fossil fuels, re-instrumentalizing it, not only as sources of energy, but as tools of strategic positioning in an increasingly contested international system.

中东战事导致霍尔木兹海峡航运阻断，严重影响波斯湾的石油运输，亚洲与欧洲国家纷纷转向美国寻找替代货源。图源：Getty Images

能源转型，还是能源围困？

Energy Transition or Energy Siege?

如果说能源安全已经成为气候行动倒退的一个驱动因素，那么更深层的问题在于，为什么这种模式会如此持久，并且在政治上如此难以逆转。答案并不仅仅在于市场惯性或制度乏力，而在于一场日益塑造能源秩序本身的地缘政治斗争。乍看之下，这似乎是短期供应需求与长期气候目标之间的冲突；但实际上，它嵌入了一场更广泛的竞争之中，关乎权力、战略杠杆，以及对全球能源体系的控制。

If energy security has become a driver of climate backsliding, the deeper question is why this pattern has become so persistent and so politically difficult to reverse. The answer lies not only in market inertia or institutional weakness, but in the geopolitical struggle increasingly shaping the energy order itself. What appears at first glance to be a clash between short-term supply needs and long-term climate goals is, in reality, embedded in a broader contest over power, strategic leverage, and the control of global energy systems.

正因如此，我们不能简单地将当下理解为一个不同国家各自追求不同发展路径的时期。问题不仅仅在于，中国和美国正在沿着不同的能源模式前进，而这些模式原则上可以并行共存。更深层的现实是，这些模式正在发生碰撞。

This is why the present moment cannot be understood simply as a period in which different states are pursuing different developmental pathways. The issue is not merely that China and the United States are advancing through distinct energy models that might, in principle, coexist side by side. The deeper reality is that these models are colliding.

中国在可再生能源、电池、电动汽车和清洁能源制造领域的崛起，并不只是一个产业故事，更是一个地缘政治故事。它预示着一种未来的出现：战略影响力可能不再主要取决于对传统化石资源的控制，而越来越取决于在电气化技术、供应链和基础设施中的主导地位。这一转变将对全球权力格局产生深远影响。

China’s rise in renewables, batteries, electric vehicles, and clean-energy manufacturing is not only an industrial story; it is a geopolitical one. It suggests the emergence of a future in which strategic influence may depend less on traditional control of fossil resources and more on dominance in the technologies, supply chains, and infrastructures of electrification. That shift has profound implications for global power.

新疆吐鲁番市鄯善县1GW“光热+光伏”一体化项目。图源：新华社

正是这一转变，进一步凸显了当今能源安全问题核心处的矛盾。对美国而言，能源长期以来不仅关乎繁荣，也与战略准则、全球投射能力和体系性影响力紧密相连。自21世纪初以来，美国安全思维反复将对主要能源生产地区、运输通道和海上咽喉要道的进入与影响，视为其全球主导地位的重要组成部分。在这一框架下，化石能源并不只是商品，而是一种杠杆：它可以被保护、被制裁、被改道、被扣留，也可以被用来强化联盟和依赖关系。随着“转型”话语兴起，这一逻辑并未消失。恰恰相反，它仍在塑造美国权力更深层的战略反射。

It is precisely this shift that sharpens the contradiction at the heart of energy security today. For the United States, energy has long been tied not only to prosperity, but to strategic doctrine, global reach, and systemic influence. Since the early 2000s, American security thinking has repeatedly treated access to and influence over major energy-producing regions, transport corridors, and maritime chokepoints as integral to its global primacy. In that framework, fossil energy is not merely a commodity, it is a source of leverage: something that can be protected, sanctioned, rerouted, withheld, or used to reinforce alliances and dependencies. This logic has not disappeared with the language of transition. On the contrary, it continues to shape the deeper strategic reflexes of U.S. power.

也正因如此，这场冲突远比单纯围绕能源选择的分歧更加严重。一个坚定走向可再生能源、电气化和更加分布式生产体系的世界，不仅会改变排放轨迹，也可能削弱美国长期依赖的化石燃料架构在地缘政治中的中心地位。它将把竞争场域转向中国已经取得显著优势的领域。从这一角度看，问题便不再只是环境问题。能源转型本身成为一个战略问题。气候科学并不一定会被直接、统一地否认；相反，每当其政策含义可能加速一种不利于华盛顿的权力再分配时，它就会被搁置到一旁。

That is why the conflict is more serious than a simple disagreement over energy choices. A world moving decisively toward renewable energy, electrification, and more distributed systems of production would not only alter emissions trajectories; it could also reduce the geopolitical centrality of the fossil-fuel architecture on which American power has long relied. It would shift the terrain of competition toward sectors in which China has already gained significant advantage. Seen from that perspective, the issue is no longer merely environmental. The transition itself becomes a strategic problem. Climate science is not necessarily denied in a direct or uniform way; rather, it is displaced whenever its implications threaten to accelerate a redistribution of power unfavorable to Washington.

这有助于解释，为什么即便面对气候危险的压倒性证据，对能源安全的追求仍常常会强化对化石燃料的依赖。问题并不只是各国政府行动迟缓、前后不一或言行不符，而是化石能源仍然提供着可再生能源体系尚未完全复制的战略效用。石油和天然气依然同航运通道、军事保护、地区影响、制裁机制、定价权和胁迫外交紧密相连。它们深深嵌入旧有的地缘政治语法之中。可再生能源或许承诺了更高的可持续性，但它并不会自动提供同样一套由咽喉要道和控制权构成的权力架构。对于习惯于以控制、稀缺和杠杆来思考问题的国家而言，这一点极其重要。

This helps explain why the pursuit of energy security so often reinforces fossil dependence even in the face of overwhelming evidence about climate danger. It is not simply that governments are slow, inconsistent, or hypocritical. It is that fossil energy still offers forms of strategic utility that renewable systems do not yet fully replicate. Oil and gas remain tied to shipping lanes, military protection, territorial influence, sanctions regimes, pricing power, and coercive diplomacy. They are deeply embedded in the older grammar of geopolitics. Renewables may promise greater sustainability, but they do not automatically provide the same architecture of chokepoints and command. For states accustomed to thinking in terms of control, scarcity, and leverage, this matters enormously.

乌克兰战争将这一矛盾充分暴露出来。一场最初表现为军事和领土层面的冲突，很快揭示出能源在地缘政治秩序中的持久中心地位。欧洲与俄罗斯天然气脱钩，确实加快了寻找替代方案的步伐，也强化了扩大可再生能源的政治理由。但与此同时，它也加深了欧洲在短期内对替代性化石能源供应的依赖，尤其是对液化天然气、应急合同以及安全获取能源资源的激烈竞争的依赖。从这个意义上说，乌克兰战争并不只是扰乱了旧有能源秩序；它重新激活了这一秩序最深层的逻辑。供应安全再次压倒了气候政策的一致性，能源转型的政治议程也在战略紧迫性的压力下被迫后退。

The war in Ukraine brought this contradiction into full view. What began as a military and territorial conflict quickly exposed the enduring centrality of energy to geopolitical order. Europe’s rupture with Russian gas did accelerate the search for alternatives and strengthen the political case for renewable expansion. But it also deepened the short-term reliance on alternative fossil supplies, especially liquefied natural gas, emergency contracts, and intensified competition for secure access. In this sense, the Ukraine war did not simply disrupt the old energy order; it reactivated its deepest logic. Supply security once again overrode climate coherence, and the politics of transition were pushed back under the pressure of strategic urgency.

悬挂俄罗斯国旗的油轮“阿纳托利·科洛德金”号停靠在古巴马坦萨斯的一处石油码头。图源：美联社。

同样的逻辑并不止于欧洲。委内瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗以及霍尔木兹海峡，并不是混乱全球图景中彼此割裂的事件。它们都是一张更大棋盘上的组成部分。在这张棋盘上，对化石资源及其运输通道的控制仍然至关重要，因为关键竞争对手，尤其是中国，依然依赖这些资源和通道。

The same logic extends beyond Europe. Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz are not disconnected episodes in a chaotic global landscape. They are parts of a wider chessboard in which control over fossil resources and routes continues to matter because key rivals, especially China, still depend on them.

中国或许正在可再生能源领域快速推进，但它并未摆脱化石能源层面的脆弱性。中国经济仍然需要大量进口石油和天然气，其中相当一部分要经过存在争议的空间，或来自政治风险较高的产油国。这就为一种战略打开了空间：对不可再生能源来源和运输通道的主导，不仅服务于传统能源安全目标，也服务于更广泛的目标，即限制中国的战略回旋余地。

China may be advancing rapidly in renewables, but it has not escaped fossil vulnerability. Its economy still requires substantial imported oil and gas, much of it moving through contested spaces or politically exposed producers. This creates an opening for a strategy in which dominance over non-renewable energy sources and transport corridors serves not only traditional energy security goals, but the broader objective of constraining China’s room for maneuver.

正因如此，当前能源秩序不能被描述为旧模式与新模式之间的中性共存。它正越来越成为一个对抗场域。一边是转型逻辑，中国试图在下一轮能源时代的基础设施中获取优势；另一边则是一种仍然从化石能源控制、海上监督、地区压力点以及既有国际体系维护中汲取力量的战略反射。在这一国际体系中，能源依赖仍然可以被转化为地缘政治杠杆。二者并不是在和平地并行展开，而是在围绕未来的规则和条件展开竞争。

This is why the current energy order cannot be described as a neutral coexistence between an old model and a new one. It is increasingly a field of confrontation. On one side stands the logic of transition, with China seeking advantage in the infrastructure of the next energy era. On the other stands a strategic reflex that continues to draw power from fossil control, maritime oversight, regional pressure points, and the preservation of an international system in which energy dependence can still be converted into geopolitical leverage. The two are not peacefully unfolding in parallel. They are competing over the terms of the future.

在这场对抗中，欧洲处于一种不安的位置。它既是能源不安全的受害者，有时又在无意中参与了化石燃料—安全秩序的再生产。失去俄罗斯能源供应，戏剧性地暴露出欧洲对可靠能源的强烈需求。这使欧洲在努力把自身塑造为全球气候领导者的同时，更容易受到外部冲击影响，也更依赖替代性的化石燃料安排。欧洲或许使用的是绿色转型的话语，但其在能源短缺和价格波动面前的结构性脆弱，仍不断将其拉回眼前供应安全的紧迫要求之中。这样一来，它反而强化了这样一种地缘政治环境：可再生能源雄心被置于化石燃料必要性之下。

Europe occupies an uneasy place within this confrontation. It is at once a victim of energy insecurity and, at times, an inadvertent participant in the reproduction of the fossil-security order. Its thirst for reliable energy, exposed dramatically by the loss of Russian supply. This has made it more vulnerable to external shocks and more dependent on alternative fossil arrangements precisely at the moment when it seeks to present itself as a global climate leader. Europe may speak the language of green transformation, but its structural exposure to energy scarcity and price volatility continues to pull it back toward the imperatives of immediate supply. In doing so, it reinforces the very geopolitical environment in which renewable ambition is subordinated to fossil necessity.

其结果，是一种高度不稳定的全球状态。气候变化要求加速脱碳，但围绕能源展开的竞争，却正在推动主要大国和脆弱地区采取维持化石燃料重要性的策略。这是一场地缘政治竞争，在其中，对能源的控制仍然与争夺战略主导权密不可分。

The result is a deeply unstable global condition. Climate change demands accelerated decarbonization, yet the rivalry surrounding energy is pushing major powers and vulnerable regions toward strategies that preserve fossil relevance: a geopolitical contest in which control over energy remains inseparable from the struggle for strategic dominance.

那么，真正的危险并不只是气候行动停滞不前，而是气候行动已经进入一个权力剧场：能源转型正越来越多地被地缘政治竞争所塑造、延宕和扭曲。

The real danger, then, is not just climate inaction. It is that climate action has entered a theater of power in which energy transition is increasingly shaped, delayed, and distorted by geopolitical competition.

波斯湾战事已经引发欧洲地图的能源危机。图源：AI生成图片

欧洲、乌克兰、霍尔木兹与化石燃料—安全棋盘

Europe, Ukraine, Hormuz, and the Fossil-Security Chessboard

如果说上一部分揭示了能源转型与地缘政治竞争之间的战略碰撞，那么下一步就需要观察这种碰撞如何在具体危机场域中展开。这一矛盾已经不再抽象。它体现在乌克兰战争之中，体现在委内瑞拉和伊拉克战略重要性的重新上升之中，体现在围绕伊朗的持续动荡之中，尤其体现在霍尔木兹海峡等咽喉要道的持续中心地位之中。这些案例共同表明，尽管“转型”话语日益高涨，全球能源体系仍然深深受制于化石燃料控制的政治逻辑。

If the preceding section identified the strategic collision between energy transition and geopolitical rivalry, the next step is to observe how that collision is being played out across concrete theaters of crisis. The contradiction is no longer abstract. It is visible in the war in Ukraine, in the renewed strategic relevance of Venezuela and Iraq, in the persistent volatility surrounding Iran, and above all in the continued centrality of chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. Together, these cases reveal that the global energy system remains deeply structured by the politics of fossil control, even as the language of transition grows louder.

欧洲寻找能源供应的过程，成为更广泛地强化化石燃料—安全秩序的一部分。液化天然气被赋予更高的战略重要性，外部供应方获得了新的杠杆，原本以临时必要性为理由建设的基础设施，也开始产生更长期的影响。表面上看，这些措施是应急反应；但在气候危机要求更坚决摆脱化石燃料之际，它们也产生了维持化石能源依赖的效果。欧洲并没有放弃转型，但转型被迫与一种安全恐慌共存，而这种恐慌强化的，恰恰是欧洲原本应当逃离的旧体系。

Europe’s search for supply became part of a wider reinforcement of the fossil-security order. Liquefied natural gas assumed greater strategic importance. External suppliers acquired new leverage. Infrastructure once justified as temporary necessity began to generate longer-term implications. What was presented as an emergency response also had the effect of preserving fossil dependence at the very moment when the climate crisis required sharper departure from it. Europe did not abandon the transition, but the transition was forced to coexist with a security panic that strengthened the old system from which it was supposed to be escaping.

这一发展本身的意义并不局限于欧洲。欧洲对能源的迫切需求并不是孤立存在的；它会传导至全球市场，并加剧围绕稀缺供应的竞争。它还帮助正当化了一种更广泛的政治叙事，即把化石燃料扩张辩护为应对不稳定局势的理性选择。

That development matters beyond Europe itself. Europe’s energy thirst does not operate in isolation; it reverberates through global markets and deepens competition for scarce supply. It also helps legitimize a wider political narrative in which fossil expansion is defended as a rational answer to instability.

从这个意义上说，欧洲既是地缘政治能源扰动的受害者，也是化石燃料—安全逻辑再生产的参与者。欧洲越是不安全，就越会强化碳氢能源、航运路线和外部供应方在全球层面的重要性。而这种逻辑越是得到强化，就越难以把气候转型作为国际能源政策中压倒一切的组织原则。

In this sense, Europe becomes both a casualty of geopolitical energy disruption and a participant in the reproduction of the fossil-security logic. The more insecure Europe becomes, the more it reinforces the global importance of hydrocarbons, shipping routes, and external suppliers. And the more that logic is reinforced, the harder it becomes to treat climate transition as the overriding organizing principle of international energy policy.

乌克兰战争还在第二层意义上改变了战略地图。它再次证明，能源始终与胁迫、联盟管理和全球权力站队密不可分。能源并不仅仅是冲突的后果；它本身就是冲突运行的场域之一。对供应的控制、制裁、价格冲击以及替代供应格局，都成为这场战争向战场之外辐射影响的工具。也正因如此，能源转型不能被视为一个纯粹技术性或环境性的问题。只要能源体系仍然容易受到地缘政治断裂的冲击，各国政府就会继续优先选择那些它们认为可以被保障、被控制，或受到军事保护的供应形式。

The war in Ukraine also altered the strategic map in a second sense. It reaffirmed that energy remains inseparable from coercion, alliance management, and global power alignment. Energy is not merely a consequence of conflict; it is one of its operating terrains. Control over supply, sanctions, price shocks, and substitution patterns all became tools through which the war radiated beyond the battlefield. This is precisely why the transition cannot be treated as a purely technical or environmental matter. As long as energy systems remain vulnerable to geopolitical rupture, governments will continue to privilege forms of supply they believe can be secured, controlled, or militarily protected.

同样的逻辑也可以在西半球看到。委内瑞拉长期以来在华盛顿被视为政治上高度敏感的对象，但每当供应形势趋紧，或地缘政治灵活性变得有用时，它又会周期性地重新进入战略计算之中。这并不是一个偶然的矛盾。它揭示出，当化石能源重新获得紧迫性时，规范性话语可以多么迅速地被重新校准。

That same logic is visible in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela, long treated as politically radioactive in Washington, periodically re-enters strategic calculation whenever supply conditions tighten or geopolitical flexibility becomes useful. This is not an incidental contradiction. It reveals how quickly normative language can be recalibrated when fossil energy regains urgency.

一个受到制裁的产油国，可能突然再次变得重要，并不是因为其治理状况发生了根本变化，而是因为其资源仍然嵌入全球安全方程之中。同样，更广泛的模式也适用于伊拉克。伊拉克的重要性之所以延续，并不仅仅因为它拥有能源储备，也因为它身处一个能源、安全架构和大国竞争高度交织的地区。

A sanctioned producer can suddenly become relevant again, not because its governance has fundamentally changed, but because its resources remain embedded in a global security equation. The same broader pattern applies to Iraq, whose importance persists not only because of its reserves, but because it sits within a region where energy, security architecture, and great-power competition remain closely interlinked.

因霍尔木兹海峡封闭，伊拉克石油出口受阻，经叙利亚转运出海成为替代方案之一。图源：路透社

伊朗则进一步凸显了这一图景。很少有案例能像伊朗这样清楚地说明，化石能源、战略地理与地缘政治对抗依然紧密交织在一起。伊朗之所以重要，不仅因为其拥有碳氢资源，也因为它所处的位置，以及它能够威胁的对象。霍尔木兹海峡并不只是一个狭窄的海上通道，它是全球化石能源经济的动脉之一。那里任何不稳定，都将远远超出海湾地区本身，影响亚洲、欧洲和美国的能源价格、市场心理、保险成本、航运安排和战略规划。霍尔木兹正是地理本身转化为杠杆的地方。

Iran sharpens the picture further. Few cases better illustrate how fossil energy, strategic geography, and geopolitical confrontation remain fused. Iran matters not only because of its hydrocarbons, but because of where it sits and what it can threaten. The Strait of Hormuz is not simply a narrow maritime corridor. It is one of the arteries of the global fossil economy. Any instability there reverberates far beyond the Gulf, affecting prices, market psychology, insurance costs, shipping calculations, and strategic planning across Asia, Europe, and the United States. Hormuz is where geography itself becomes leverage.

这一点对于中国而言尤其重要。中国在可再生能源和电气化领域的推进，并没有消除其对进口化石燃料的持续需求。中国经济的规模仍然需要大量石油和天然气投入，其中相当一部分暴露在海上运输路线和政治不稳定地区之中。这意味着，全球向可再生能源转型，并未消解化石能源咽喉要道的战略价值。相反，这些咽喉要道仍然是竞争对手计算压力、暴露程度和约束能力的工具。在这样一个世界里，正因为新能源秩序尚未完全形成，对旧能源秩序的控制才依然具有巨大意义。

This is especially significant in relation to China. China’s advance in renewable energy and electrification does not eliminate its continued need for imported fossil fuel. Its economic scale still requires substantial oil and gas inputs, much of them exposed to maritime routes and politically unstable regions. That means the global shift toward renewables has not yet dissolved the strategic value of fossil chokepoints. On the contrary, these chokepoints remain instruments through which rivals can calculate pressure, exposure, and constraint. In such a world, control over the old energy order retains immense relevance precisely because the new one is not yet complete.

由此浮现出来的，已经不只是一组地区危机，而是一张棋盘。在这张棋盘上，不同危机场域服务于一种共同的战略功能。乌克兰暴露了能源依赖型欧洲的脆弱性，并重新激活了应急化石能源供应的政治逻辑；委内瑞拉提醒人们，资源获取可以迅速压倒政治一致性；伊拉克则表明，那些不稳定但不可或缺的产油国仍然具有持续重要性；伊朗和霍尔木兹则揭示，海上咽喉要道仍然是管理全球能源不安全的核心环节。在这些案例中，同一种模式反复出现：每当能源安全变得紧迫，化石能源体系便重新获得战略优先地位，而气候逻辑则被推到一旁。

What emerges, then, is something more than a set of regional crises. It is a chessboard on which different theaters serve a common strategic function. Ukraine exposes the vulnerability of energy-dependent Europe and revives the politics of emergency fossil supply. Venezuela reminds us that resource access can quickly override political consistency. Iraq demonstrates the continued relevance of unstable but indispensable producers. Iran and Hormuz reveal that maritime chokepoints remain central to the management of global energy insecurity. Across these cases, the same pattern recurs: whenever energy security becomes urgent, fossil systems regain strategic primacy, and climate logic is pushed to the side.

其后果令人警醒。每一次新的地缘政治冲击，都会强化这样一种主张：必须保护供应、实现进口多元化、扩大能源战略储备、保障运输通道，并巩固旧有能源伙伴关系。然而，这些措施虽然在眼前安全逻辑下具有合理性，却也延长了气候行动被置于次要位置的条件。世界由此陷入一种反复循环：地缘政治危机重新唤起化石燃料的紧迫性；化石燃料的紧迫性延缓或稀释能源转型；被延缓的转型加深气候不稳定；而气候不稳定又反过来加剧对能源安全的争夺。

The consequence is sobering. Every new geopolitical shock strengthens the argument for protecting supply, diversifying imports, expanding strategic reserves, securing routes, and reinforcing old energy partnerships. But these measures, while rational within the logic of immediate security, also prolong the conditions under which climate action becomes secondary. The world becomes trapped in a repeating cycle: geopolitical crisis revives fossil urgency; fossil urgency delays or dilutes transition; delayed transition deepens climate instability; and climate instability, in turn, intensifies the scramble for secure energy.

从这个意义上说，欧洲、乌克兰、委内瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗和霍尔木兹，并不是世界政治中彼此分离的章节。它们是同一个未解现实相互关联的表现：国际体系仍在通过那些正在制造全球性不安全的结构来寻求安全。只要这一矛盾没有被直接面对，能源安全就会继续在地缘政治竞争中被重新定义，而能源转型也将始终处于脆弱状态。这种脆弱并不只是因为能力不足或政治意愿不够，而是因为延缓本身可能具有战略价值。

In this sense, Europe, Ukraine, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and Hormuz are not separate chapters of world politics. They are interconnected expressions of the same unresolved reality: the international system still seeks security through structures that are helping to produce planetary insecurity. Until that contradiction is addressed directly, energy security will continue to be redefined through geopolitical rivalry, and the transition will remain vulnerable, not simply because of insufficient capacity or inadequate political will, but because delay itself may carry strategic value.

能源转型的延迟，并不只是推迟气候目标的实现；它也会延后中国在未来能源产业中崛起所带来的地缘政治收益。从这一角度看，转型过程中的延宕或扰乱，可能具有战略价值；而以化石燃料为基础的旧秩序延续，对美国而言也不只是发挥防御性作用。通过延长石油、天然气和关键咽喉要道的中心地位，它不仅可能维持美国的战略杠杆，也可能减缓中国将其在可再生能源领域的领先地位转化为更广泛结构性权力的能力。

A delayed energy transition does not simply defer climate goals; it also postpones the geopolitical benefits of China’s rise in future energy industries. From this perspective, delay or disruption within the transition may carry strategic value, while the persistence of the fossil-based order can serve more than a defensive role for the United States. By prolonging the centrality of oil, gas, and key chokepoints, it may not only sustain U.S. strategic leverage but also slow China’s ability to convert its leadership in renewables into broader structural power.

从这个意义上说，能源转型的延迟不仅是气候行动上的挫折，也可能成为一种战略性推迟机制，用以延缓中国在新兴能源秩序中的上升。

In this sense, a delayed transition is not only a climate setback; it may also function as a strategic deferral of China’s ascent in the emerging energy order.

气候变化与权力重组

Climate Change and the Reordering of Power

在这场不断展开的能源危机中，最终攸关的并不只是脱碳的速度，甚至也不只是单独意义上的全球气候稳定。更根本的是，世界正在进入这样一个时期：气候变化、能源转型与地缘政治竞争，正汇聚为一场围绕未来权力分配的斗争。这正是当前时刻具有历史分量的原因所在。问题不再只是世界能否足够迅速地从化石燃料转向可再生能源，而是这种转型能否在不动摇现有国际秩序长期依赖的战略等级结构的情况下发生。

What is ultimately at stake in this unfolding energy crisis is not only the pace of decarbonization, nor even the stability of the global climate taken in isolation. More fundamentally, the world is entering a period in which climate change, energy transition, and geopolitical rivalry are converging into a single struggle over the future distribution of power. This is what gives the current moment its historic weight. The question is no longer simply whether the world can move from fossil fuels to renewable energy quickly enough. It is whether such a transition can occur without destabilizing the strategic hierarchies on which the existing international order has long depended.

正因如此，这一问题不能被简单归结为通常意义上的政治意愿不足。障碍要深得多。气候行动正在同根深蒂固的优势体系发生碰撞。旧能源秩序并不只是为工业经济提供动力；它还支撑着联盟体系、军事投射、贸易路线、金融影响力和地缘政治依附关系。它塑造了一个可以通过控制开采、定价、供应、保护和准入来行使权力的世界。因此，摆脱这一秩序并不只是采用更清洁的技术，而是动摇现代战略权力的一项物质基础。

This is why the problem cannot be reduced to a failure of political will in the ordinary sense. The obstacles are deeper. Climate action is colliding with entrenched systems of advantage. The old energy order did not merely power industrial economies; it underpinned alliances, military reach, trade routes, financial influence, and geopolitical dependency. It created a world in which power could be exercised through control over extraction, pricing, supply, protection, and access. To move away from that order is therefore not simply to adopt cleaner technologies. It is to unsettle one of the material foundations of modern strategic power.

中国在这场转型中的作用至关重要。中国在可再生能源、电池、电动汽车、电网技术以及产业规模方面的快速推进，使其所处位置已经超出了单纯经济层面的意义。中国已经接近那些可能定义下一轮能源发展时代的关键产业制高点。

China’s role in this transformation is central. Its rapid advance in renewable energy, batteries, electric vehicles, grid technology, and industrial scale has given it a position that extends beyond economics. Ithas placed China near the commanding heights of sectors likely to define the next era of energy development.

中国中南部的一座电力传输枢纽，它是全球最长、最强的特高压输电线路的终点。图源：纽约时报

这并不意味着中国已经摆脱矛盾，也不意味着中国的能源体系已经进入“后化石燃料”阶段。但它确实意味着，如果全球能源转型加速推进，结构性优势就可能逐步转向那些在电气化产业中占据更有利位置的行为体，而不再主要掌握在旧有碳氢能源主导架构中的优势方手中。

This does not mean that China has escaped contradiction, nor that its energy system is already post-fossil. But it does mean that the transition, if accelerated globally, could gradually shift structural advantage toward actors that are better positioned in the industries of electrification than in the older architecture of hydrocarbon dominance.

对美国而言，在一定程度上，对其他那些形成于化石能源时代地缘政治逻辑之中的大国而言，这就造成了一种深刻的战略困境。原则上支持快速脱碳是一回事；接受一场可能重新分配产业、技术和地缘政治优势的转型，则是另一回事。

For the United States, and to some extent for other powers formed within the geopolitical logic of the fossil age, this creates a profound strategic dilemma. To support rapid decarbonization in principle is one thing. To accept a transition that may redistribute industrial, technological, and geopolitical advantage is another.

这正是气候政策常常在话语上得到拥抱、却在战略上受到约束的更深层原因。阻力并不总是公开的，也并不总是意识形态化的。它往往表现为拖延、观望、泛安全化、附条件承诺，或重新强调化石能源体系的韧性。但其累积效果是相同的：能源转型被放缓，并不只是因为它本身困难重重，也因为它一旦成功，可能以某些行为体并不愿完全接受的方式改变权力平衡。

This is the deeper reason why climate policy so often appears rhetorically embraced yet strategically constrained. Resistance is not always open, nor always ideological. Often it appears in the form of delay, hedging, securitization, conditional commitment, or renewed emphasis on fossil resilience. But the cumulative effect is the same: the transition is slowed not only because it is difficult, but because its success may alter the balance of power in ways that some actors are unwilling fully to accept.

正是在这里，气候问题与全球秩序问题变得不可分割。如果世界主要由科学必要性来支配，那么脱碳的逻辑早已势不可挡。物理证据清晰明确，技术路径也越来越可行，不作为的代价还在持续上升。然而，当前的国际体系并不只按照科学逻辑运行。它还在竞争、不对称、不安全感以及维护相对优势的逻辑中运行。气候科学可以界定问题的紧迫性，却无法决定政治选择的优先次序。这些选择仍然要经过国家持久战略计算的过滤；各国追问的不只是“什么是必要的”，还有“谁会获益、谁会受损、谁来主导”。

This is where the climate question becomes inseparable from the question of global order. If the world were governed primarily by scientific necessity, the logic of decarbonization would already be overwhelming. The physical evidence is clear, the technological pathways are increasingly available, and the costs of inaction continue to mount. Yet the international system at this point, does not operate on scientific logic alone. It operates through competition, asymmetry, insecurity, and the preservation of relative advantage. Climate science may define the urgency of the problem, but it does not determine the hierarchy of political choices. Those choices are filtered through the enduring calculations of states that still ask not only what is necessary, but who gains, who loses, and who leads.

从这一角度看，最大的危险或许并不是传统意义上对气候变化的否认，而是这样一个世界的出现：气候扰动被充分承认，却仍然从属于战略竞争。在这样的世界里，各国政府可能会投资于气候适应、绿色技术、韧性建设和选择性脱碳，同时在化石燃料杠杆仍具有地缘政治效用的地方继续加以保留。其结果是在一个竞争性体系中采取碎片化行动；在这个体系中，国家优势受到的保护，比地球稳定本身更为坚决。这是一种更隐蔽、也可能更持久的失败形式。

Seen in this light, the greatest danger may not be denial of climate change in the traditional sense. It may be the emergence of a world in which climate disruption is fully acknowledged, yet still subordinated to strategic rivalry. In such a world, governments may invest in adaptation, green technology, resilience, and selective decarbonization, while continuing to preserve fossil leverage wherever it remains geopolitically useful. The result would not be total inaction. It would be fragmented action within a competitive system that protects national advantage more fiercely than planetary stability.That is a far more subtle and perhaps more durable form of failure.

欧洲的位置再次说明了这种紧张关系。欧洲试图在气候规范和监管雄心方面发挥引领作用，但其能源不安全又反复将其拉回供应依赖和地缘政治脆弱性的严峻现实之中。中国试图在未来产业中取得领导地位，却仍然暴露在化石燃料瓶颈和海上风险之下。美国推动清洁创新，却仍然从一个碳氢能源、制裁、海上通道和产油国影响力依旧居于中心的世界中获得战略收益。

Europe’s position once again illustrates this tension. It seeks to lead on climate norms and regulatory ambition, yet its energy insecurity repeatedly pulls it back into the hard realities of supply dependence and geopolitical vulnerability. China seeks leadership in the industries of the future, yet remains exposed to fossil bottlenecks and maritime risk. The United States promotes clean innovation, yet continues to derive strategic benefit from a world in which hydrocarbons, sanctions, sea lanes, and producer influence remain central.

因此，每一个主要行为体都被困在一种矛盾之中：一边是它所宣示的能源未来，另一边是它仍然身处其中的战略现实。相应地，气候危机已经不再只是排放问题，也关乎新能源秩序将在何种政治条件下被建立起来。Each major actor is therefore caught in a contradiction between the energy future it proclaims and the strategic present it still inhabits. Accordingly, the climate crisis is no longer only about emissions, it is also about the political terms under which a new energy order will be built.

挑战并不只是加快能源转型，而是防止转型被大国竞争所驱动。如果可再生能源沦为又一个竞争场域，脱碳进程就可能以不均衡且过于缓慢的方式推进，难以遏制不断升级的全球性动荡。相反，如果能源转型不被理解为一场零和式的权力转移，而是被视为构建更稳定国际秩序的基础，它就可能为摆脱“化石燃料—安全陷阱”提供一条出路。然而，要实现这一结果，需要一种当前仍然匮乏的政治想象力。

The challenge is not just to accelerate the transition, but to prevent it from being driven by rivalry. If renewable energy becomes another arena of competition, decarbonization may proceed unevenly and too slowly to limit escalating global disruption. If, instead, the transition is framed not as a zero-sum shift in power but as the foundation of a more stable international order, it could offer a way out of the fossil-security trap. That outcome, however, demands a level of political imagination that is currently lacking.

因此，气候变化危机与秩序危机已经不可分割。旧有化石燃料体系在环境上不可持续，而新的能源体系尚未完全形成，就已经在地缘政治上陷入争夺。二者之间，正是我们这个时代的核心斗争：人类究竟能否建设一个由地球整体必要性所指引的能源未来，还是说，这一未来将被一个碎片化世界中的种种竞争所扭曲、延宕，并被武器化。

The crisis of climate change is therefore inseparable from a crisis of order. The old fossil system is environmentally unsustainable, yet the new energy system is geopolitically contested before it is fully formed. Between the two lies the central struggle of our time: whether humanity can build an energy future guided by planetary necessity, or whether that future will be distorted, delayed, and weaponized by the rivalries of a fractured world.

图源：路透社

结论

Conclusion

气候危机常常被表述为一个科学、技术和政治意愿问题。但这种框架已经不再充分。本文所要论证的是，气候变化如今已经置身于一场更大范围的地缘政治斗争之中，这场斗争围绕能源、权力和战略优势展开。向可再生能源的转型，并不是在一个中性的政策空间中展开的。它发生在一个碎片化的国际体系之中，在这个体系中，各国继续计算的不仅是环境必要性，还有相对收益、依赖关系、杠杆和控制权。

The climate crisis is often presented as a problem of science, technology, and political will. But that framing is no longer sufficient. What this article has argued is that climate change now sits inside a much larger geopolitical struggle over energy, power, and strategic advantage. The transition to renewable energy is not unfolding in a neutral policy space. It is taking place in a fractured international system in which states continue to calculate not only environmental necessity, but also relative gain, dependency, leverage, and control.

这正是能源安全与气候行动之间的矛盾变得如此尖锐的原因。问题并不只是各国政府未能按照气候科学的要求一以贯之地行动，而是现有能源秩序仍然提供着主要大国不愿放弃的战略收益。化石燃料依然同军事投射、制裁、咽喉要道、联盟体系和影响力网络相联系。相比之下，可再生能源则指向产业和地缘政治优势的重新分配；在新兴能源经济的关键领域中，中国已经取得了显著领先。

That is why the contradiction between energy security and climate action has become so acute. The issue is not merely that governments fail to act consistently on what climate science requires. It is that the existing energy order still provides strategic benefits that major powers are reluctant to surrender. Fossil fuels remain tied to military reach, sanctions, chokepoints, alliances, and systems of influence. Renewable energy, by contrast, points toward a redistribution of industrial and geopolitical advantage, one in which China has already secured a significant lead in key sectors of the emerging energy economy.

从这一角度看，气候行动的延宕并不总是无知、否认或制度乏力的产物。它也可能反映出一种更深层的战略逻辑：维护一种仍在服务地缘政治目的的能源架构，哪怕这种架构正在加剧生态不稳定。本文所考察的战争、危机和压力点——无论是乌克兰、委内瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗、霍尔木兹，还是欧洲的能源脆弱性——都不是气候叙事边缘的孤立扰动。它们本身就是气候叙事的一部分。它们揭示出这样一个世界：国际体系仍在通过那些正在加剧地球不安全的结构来寻求安全。

From this perspective, climate delay is not always the product of ignorance, denial, or institutional weakness alone. It can also reflect a deeper strategic logic: the preservation of an energy architecture that continues to serve geopolitical purposes even as it drives ecological instability. The wars, crises, and pressure points examined in this article be it Ukraine, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Hormuz, and Europe’s energy vulnerability, are not separate disturbances on the margins of the climate story. They are part of the climate story. They reveal a world still seeking security through the very structures that are worsening planetary insecurity.

这才是真正的危险。能源转型或许会继续推进，但可能以一种被扭曲的形式推进：被竞争拖慢，被不安全感碎片化，并从属于大国博弈的棋局。在这样的世界里，脱碳并不会停止，但它不再主要由科学紧迫性所支配。相反，它会被卷入一场关于谁将塑造下一轮能源秩序、谁将主导其战略后果的斗争之中。

This is the real danger. The transition may continue, but in a distorted form: slowed by rivalry, fragmented by insecurity, and subordinated to the chess game of great-power competition. In such a world, decarbonization does not stop, but it ceases to be governed primarily by scientific urgency. Instead, it becomes entangled in the struggle over who will shape the next energy order and who will dominate its strategic consequences.

因此，我们这个时代的核心问题，已经不再只是世界是否会摆脱化石燃料，而是世界能否在转型本身被地缘政治冲突俘获之前做到这一点。一旦发生这种情况，气候变化就不再只是环境紧急状态。它将成为新一轮权力等级结构被争夺和塑造的场域。

The central question of our time, then, is no longer simply whether the world will move beyond fossil fuels. It is whether it can do so before the transition itself is captured by geopolitical conflict. If that happens, climate change will no longer be only an environmental emergency. It will become the terrain on which a new hierarchy of power is fought out.

而这或许正是最残酷的悖论：人类已经知道，为避免更深重的气候灾难必须做什么，却仍然被困在一个把生存之路转化为竞争工具的国际体系之中。

And that may be the cruelest paradox of all: that humanity already knows what it must do to avoid deeper climate catastrophe, yet remains trapped in an international system that turns the path to survival into an instrument of rivalry.

梅赫里·马达尔沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）荣誉教授、联合国教科文组织下属国际创意和可持续发展中心（ICCSD）顾问委员会成员

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of the Advisory Committee of the International Center for Creativity and Sustainable Development under the auspicious of UNESO (ICCSD).

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