万字长文精译！Stan Druckenmiller最新访谈：买入铜与金！成功关键不在智商，而在于扣动扳机的能力..

我认为“逆向投资”被过度神化了，不过我确实喜欢那种我拥有极强信心但无人相信的时刻，因为它会让我的信念更加坚定。”

本期我们跟进摩根士丹利与传奇投资大师斯坦·德鲁肯米勒的今日最新访谈，

节目上斯坦坦诚道曾因投资焦虑到每周呕吐一到两次，就在这无数次的呕吐中建立起来的出色业绩，让斯坦的成功不再是偶然...那些被焦虑淬炼过的洞见，在当下仍然句句见血。我们有必要再次屏住呼吸，去触摸斯坦娓娓道来的40年厚重智慧...

Narrator:From Morgan Stanley, this is Hard Lessons… where iconic investors reveal the critical moments that have shaped who they are today.

Narrator：欢迎收听摩根士丹利的「Hard Lessons」。在这里，具有代表性的投资家们将讲述那些塑造今日之他们的关键时刻。

Today on the show—the legendary macro investor Stan Druckenmiller in conversation with Iliana Bouzali, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Derivatives, Distribution and Structuring.

今天节目邀请到的嘉宾是传奇宏观投资人斯坦·德鲁肯米勒（Stan Druckenmiller），他将与摩根士丹利全球衍生品、分销与结构化主管Iliana Bouzali进行对话。

Druckenmiller ran Duquesne Capital Management with roughly 30% annualized returns and no losing years from 1981 to 2010.

德鲁肯米勒曾在1981年至2010年间执掌杜肯资本管理公司，实现了约30%的年化回报率且无一年亏损。

He now leads the Duquesne Family Office, managing his own capital, and is a philanthropist championing education, medical research, and the fight against poverty.

他现在领导杜肯家族办公室管理自有资金，同时也致力于教育、医学研究和脱贫事业的慈善事业。

Iliana Bouzali:Stan, thank you very much for doing this.

Iliana Bouzali：斯坦，非常感谢你能来参加这次节目。

Stan Druckenmiller:I'm thrilled to be here. I think the world of Morgan Stanley, so it's the least I can do.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：很高兴来到这里，我非常看好摩根士丹利，所以这是我力所能及的事情。

Bouzali:That is, it’s a privilege for us to have you here. I've been privy to some of your equity trades over the past year or so, where it did feel you were early, and I'm curious if you can, maybe, take us through one or two and how they came together.

布扎利：能邀请到您是我们的荣幸。在过去一年左右的时间里，我有幸观察到了您的一些股票交易，感觉有时你的入场时间点比较早。我很好奇，您是否能带我们回顾其中的一两个案例，谈谈这些交易是如何达成的。

Stan Druckenmiller:I'll pick one that might surprise you because it's not very sexy and it's not AI or anything, but I think it's a good example of our process at Duquesne.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：我选一个可能会让你感到惊讶的案例，因为它并不那么让人眼前一亮，也不是人工智能之类的，但我认为它是一个对杜肯投资过程的很好例证。

In the middle of last summer and toward the fall, the AI thing started to get, let me say, disturbingly heated and started at least to have some rhyme with what I went through in ‘99, 2000 and we were looking for other areas.

在去年盛夏到入秋期间，AI的热度开始变得——怎么说呢——令人不安地狂热，至少让我产生了一些1999年和2000年时的既视感，于是我们开始寻找其他领域。

The group brought in a company, Teva Pharmaceuticals. So Teva was this apparently, if you didn't know what was going on, a boring generic drug company out of Israel, selling at six times earnings.

团队推荐了一家公司，叫梯瓦制药（Teva Pharmaceuticals）。如果你不了解它的话，会觉得梯瓦看起来就是一家来自以色列、市盈率仅6倍的末流仿制药公司。

So, we met with the company—big transition going on. Richard Francis had come in who ran the same playbook at Sandoz. Very impressed with him—new how to take low-hanging fruit in terms of operating efficiency.

我们与公司管理层见了面，发现当时他们正处于巨大的转型期。理查德·弗朗西斯（Richard Francis）已经上任，他曾在山德士（Sandoz）执行过同样的策略。他的表现给我们留下了深刻的印象，他懂得如何通过提高运营效率来摘取“低垂的果实”。

But, much more importantly, he was taking them from a generic drug company to a growth company by embracing biosimilars, replacing the generic drugs, which that's why they were six times earnings with biosimilars and even some, some actual drugs.

但更重要的一点是，他正在试图通过拥抱“生物类似药”，甚至一些原研药，将公司从仿制药公司转型为成长型公司，而正是这些普通仿制药，让公司的市盈率仅有6倍。

The amazing thing is, the investor base were value investors, so they hated it. So, the stock sat there at six times earnings, while you could see this incredible management initiative going on. And, no one really believed him.

令人惊讶的是，当时的投资者群体全是价值投资者，而这些投资者讨厌弗朗西斯提出的这一倡议。因此，在这种出色的管理层倡议正在推进时，股价却因为没人相信这一倡议而停滞在6倍市盈率。

And again, growth investors didn't want it because they hadn’t made the transition yet. Value investors didn't want it and were actually selling it because he was doing a growth strategy.

而且，成长型投资者不想要它，因为转型尚未完成；价值投资者也不想要它，甚至因为弗朗西斯执行这一成长战略而抛售它。

So that was about six or seven months ago and the stock was $16. And today it's $32 and not much has happened. Other than he's proved biosimilars, they've come up with a drug that's not a generic.

那是大约六七个月前的事，当时股价是16美元，今天它是32美元，其实期间并没发生什么大事，除了他证明了生物类似药的潜力，而且他们还研发出了一种非仿制药。

So it's re-rated from six times earnings to, I guess, 11.5 or 12 times earnings. So, it was a whole different set of circumstances but it encapsulates what we look at. If you look at today, you're not going to make any money.

所以它的估值从6倍市盈率上涨到了大概11.5或12倍。虽然这一情况完全不同，但它概括了我们的关注点：如果你只看当下，是赚不到钱的。

If you try and look ahead and what might change and how investors might perceive something ahead. This one happened a little more quicker than I thought, but that would be a recent name.

你必须向前看，思考什么可能会发生变化，以及投资者未来会如何认知这些变化。这个案例的兑现比我想象得快一点，但这是最近的一个典型。

Bouzali:Fascinating. And very intriguing. I say it's intriguing because I think many people, maybe people not in the market, but certainly many people, when they think of Stan Druckenmiller, they think of a huge macro investor.

布扎利：这个案例非常引人入胜，非常有意思。我之所以说它有意思，是因为我觉得很多人——也许是非市场专业人士，但肯定包括很多人——在想到斯坦·德鲁肯米勒时，会认为您是一个宏观巨头。

And I have seen you dabble—more than dabble—really go into areas of the market, especially in equities, that are much more niche, such as healthcare or biotech.

但我看到您涉足——甚至不止是涉足——深度进入了市场中那些非常细分的领域，尤其在股票上，比如医疗保健或生物技术。

And my question is, do you have to be an expert, an analyst, someone that understands the whole pipeline of drugs to get that right?

我的问题是：您是否必须成为专家，或者成为那种理解整个药物研发管线的专家才能做对这些交易？

Stan Druckenmiller:Thank God the answer is an emphatic no. But I've got to have an expert at Duquesne who is, and trust his judgment, and then I've got to have a feel for how the market will embrace the change he's describing.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：谢天谢地，答案一定是否定的，但杜肯必须拥有一位这样的专家，并且我们要信任他的判断，然后我必须去试图分析市场将如何接纳他所描述的这种变化。

But we did make a big move into biotech. I could sense that there was a potential leadership change just because of the phobia around AI.

我们确实在生物技术领域有大动作，我当时能感觉到那种由于对AI的恐惧，市场领导位置发生的更替。

And, I knew because I've been on the board of Memorial Sloan-Kettering for 30 years, that probably the best use case out there of AI is biotech through drug discovery, diagnostics, monitoring everything. So, biotech had been on its butt for like four years.

而且我在纪念斯隆-凯特琳癌症中心董事会待了30年，我深知AI在生物领域落地最好的用例可能就是生物技术，比如测试药物发现、诊断、监测等所有环节，此前生物技术已经低迷了大约四年。

I also grew up with technical analysis and you could see the momentum changing. So, that was the theory behind biotech. But honestly, when the analysts start talking about genetic sequencing and gene editing and proteins, it's going right over Stan's head.

我也是在技术分析的背景下成长起来的，当时我们能看到动能正在发生变化，这就是投资生物技术的理论基础。但坦率地说，分析师谈论的基因测序、基因编辑和蛋白质这些，已经完全超出了我的理解范畴。

But I get their level of enthusiasm. We have a very good biotech team. That's really important because I trust them, and when they're really enthusiastic, that's as important to me as the actual facts, because I'm not smart enough to understand a lot of the actual facts.

但我能感受到他们的热情程度，我们有一支非常优秀的生物技术团队，这非常重要，因为我信任他们，他们对此表现得热忱，对我来说和实际事实一样重要，因为我还没有聪明到能理解很多实际的事实细节。

Bouzali:So you filter not just the data, but the people that work for you.

布扎利：所以您过滤的不只是数据，还有为您工作的人。

Stan Druckenmiller:Yeah.My advantage is not IQ, it's trigger pulling.I admit it’s some kind of intelligence. But my mother-in-law says I'm an idiot savant.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：是的。我的优势不在于智商，而在于扣动扳机的能力（即执行力）。我承认这也是一种智慧，但我岳母说我是个“白痴天才”。

I wasn't in the top 10% of my class. A lot of people think I'm smarter than I am because I'm good at our business. But I have a very narrow form of intelligence that allows me to love and play this game.

我在学校时甚至不是排名前10%的学生，但很多人认为我比实际更聪明，这只是因为我很擅长我们的业务。我拥有一种非常狭隘的智慧，让我能够热爱并玩转这个游戏。

Bouzali:I know many people who would love to get inside your head and understand your mental models. You spoke to us about your way of thinking, and I have a really honest, basic question: How much of it can be taught and how much of it is innate?

布扎利：我知道很多人都想走进您的内心，理解您的思维模型。您谈到了您的思考方式，我有一个非常坦诚且基本的问题：这其中有多少是可以后天教授的，又有多少是天生的？

Stan Druckenmiller:Look, I, I was given a gift. I don't know why I was given the gift, but I have this gift and it's for compounding money. Certainly part of is innate. You either have the skill set for this business or you don't.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：听着，我被赋予了一种天赋，那就是让资金复利的能力，我不知道为什么会被赋予这种天赋，但我确实有。当然，其中一部分是天生的。你在这个行业要么有这种技能组合，要么没有。

Having said that, I had a great mentor in Pittsburgh when I started out and I find it very common that great investors have incredible mentors. So to me, it's a necessary condition that you have sort of this innate skill set or gift, but it's almost a necessary condition on top of it that you have a mentor. I'm sure there's some people out there that that's not true of, but for me, it was a combination.

话虽如此，我刚出道时在匹兹堡遇到了一位伟大的导师，我发现伟大的投资人通常都有出色的导师，这很常见。对我而言，拥有这种先天的技能或天赋是必要条件，但在其之上，拥有一位出色的导师也几乎是一个必要条件。我相信肯定也有人不需要导师也能成功，但对我来说，成功是天赋和导师相结合的产物。

I was very lucky to have two mentors. One, I basically learned all the kind of stuff we're talking about. And then Soros. It's funny, when I went there, I thought I would learn what makes the yen and the market go up and move.

我很幸运有两位导师。第一位导师让我学到了我们现在正在讨论的所有这些东西；然后第二位就是索罗斯。有趣的是，我去他那里时，我以为我会学到是什么因素驱动了日元和市场走势。

Immodestly, I learned I knew much more about that than he did. What I learned from him wassizing. It's not whether you're right or wrong, it's how much you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong.

毫不谦虚地说，我后来发现，在这方面我懂的比他多得多。但我从他那里学到了是“仓位规模”，重点不在于你是对是错，而在于当你对的时候你赚了多少，当你错的时候你赔了多少。

And that was a, that was an invaluable lesson. So, you can have something innate, but if you don't have mentors and people to teach you, you're not going to maximize it as much as you do when you do have them.

那是一个无价的教训。所以，你可以有某种天赋，但如果你没有导师和教导你的人，那你就无法将你的天赋发挥到极致。

Bouzali:Should we turn to markets?

布扎利：我们可以聊聊市场吗？

Stan Druckenmiller:Do we have to?

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：必须聊吗？

Bouzali:Oh, it seems to be almost obligatory with you.

布扎利：跟您谈话的话，这似乎是一个必谈话题。

Stan Druckenmiller:Okay.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：好吧。

Bouzali:So, when it comes to markets, it seems to me you treat them less like forecasts and more like systems that kind of reveal themselves.

布扎利：关于市场，在我看来，您对待它们的方式不太像是在做预测，更像是在观察系统的某种自我揭示。

So, let's pretend you don't have a hedge fund, and you come down from Mars and you have to start a portfolio from scratch. How do you anchor it at this moment in time? What do you buy first?

那么，让我们假设您没有管理对冲基金，您从火星降临，必须从零开始构建一个投资组合。在当前这个时间点，您会如何锚定它？您首选会买什么？

Stan Druckenmiller:That's a hard question. Just a couple principles before I would start. It appears to me the U.S. economy is already strong, and it's going to get much stronger because we're looking at the Big Beautiful Bill, looking at a lot of stimulus.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：这是一个难题，在开始之前，我想先说明几个原则。在我看来，美国经济已经很强劲了，而且由于我们正在关注的大法案（Big Beautiful Bill）以及大量的刺激措施，它还会变得更强。

My guess is the Fed is certainly not going to hike and probably going to cut. So that's a backdrop. But against that backdrop, that would be wonderful if we were undervalued. We're not undervalued. We're toward the top of the valuation range, historically.

我的猜测是美联储肯定不会加息，而且很可能会降息，这就是背景。但在这个背景下，如果估值比较低那就太好了，可惜情况并非如此。从历史来看，我们正处于估值区间的顶部。

What would be exciting about developing a hedge fund portfolio right now is the one thing I'm sure of—is there's massive disruption and massive change ahead.So actually, for the opportunity to set for the next 3 or 4 years, I'm really excited.Macro has been dead for 10 or 15 years. I don't think that's the case anymore.

目前构建对冲基金组合令人兴奋的一点是——我唯一确定的是——未来会有大规模的颠覆和变革。所以实际上，对于未来3到4年的机会窗口，我非常兴奋。宏观已经沉寂了10到15年，我认为这种情况已经不复存在了。

But if you know anything about me, I tend to change my mind every three weeks. But given the backdrop, we would probably be long, more an eclectic basket of equities.

但如果你了解我，就知道我倾向于每三周就改变一次主意。但基于目前的背景，我们可能会做多一个更具兼容性的股票池。

For until the fall of the last three years, our portfolio is very much AI driven. We still have drips and drabs of AI around, but it's not driving the engine anymore to some extent.We still have big positions in Japan and Korea. Some of them are AI. Some of them are not.

直到去年秋天的三年里，我们的组合很大程度上是由AI驱动的。我们现在仍零星持有AI相关仓位，但在某种程度上它已不再是驱动引擎了。我们在日本和韩国仍有重仓，其中有些与AI相关，有些不相关。

We're bearish on the US dollar,mainly because sort of the top of the historic range in terms of purchasing power and foreigners are way, way overloaded in dollars. And I don't know whether it's like a sell America trade because it's more like if they don't buy American assets on a net basis because of the trade balance and because of the position, the dollar will go down on its own. And we think that is the most likely course here.

我们看空美元，主要是因为，从购买力来看，美元正处于历史区间的顶部，而且外国人持有的美元头寸已经极度超载了。我不确定这是否属于“抛售美国”的交易，但我们认为最可能的路径是，如果由于贸易余额和头寸分布，他们不在净基础上购买美国资产的话，美元自身就会走低。

And we own copper.It's not a genius trade. It's a big consensus trade. There's no supply coming on, meaningful supply very tight for the next eight years. And obviously you have a big add on from AI and data centers. We're not long on copper equities as much as we are, we just keep rolling the front end.

此外我们持有铜，这算不上什么天才交易，而是非常共识的交易。未来八年没有显著的新增供应，供应非常紧张；而且显然，AI和数据中心带来了巨大的增量需求。我们持有的不是铜矿股，更多是通过前端合约不断展期。

We have some gold.That's mainly a geopolitical trade. It's not so much a monetary trade.

我们还持有黄金，这主要是一项地缘政治交易，而非货币政策的交易。

And then because we're long all these risk assets I just mentioned, we're short bonds.I don't necessarily expect to make money short bonds. But I think we might make a lot if I'm right on the economy and it's a disinflationary growth, I'd probably break even, and I don't lose anything, but it allows me to hold the other assets I mentioned.

最后，由于我们在做多我刚才提到的所有风险资产，所以我们做空债券。我不一定指望靠做空债券赚钱，但我觉得，如果我对经济的判断正确——即一种反通胀式的增长，我可能会盈亏平衡，也不亏钱，但做空债券能支撑我持有上述的其他资产。

If I'm wrong and the strong growth creates inflation—it wouldn't be that unusual if the Fed were to cut into a booming economy for inflation to take off, particularly with what's going on with commodities.

如果我错了，强劲增长引发了通胀——如果美联储在经济繁荣时降息导致通胀飙升，那也并不奇怪，特别是考虑到大宗商品的情况。

So I'm open minded to that.But we create a matrix and the bonds are helpful in both ways.

所以我对此持开放态度，我们构建了一个矩阵，而债券在双向情形下都有对冲帮助。

Bouzali:The equity market has changed a lot over the past decade. And you have all these new types of capital, whether it's multi-strategy hedge funds, retail investors, systematic players, ETFs.

布扎利：过去十年股票市场发生了巨大变化，出现了各种新型资本，无论是多策略对冲基金、散户投资者、系统化参与者还是ETF。

How has that changed the time horizon that you feel you have edge versus, let's say, ten years ago? Are you more comfortable with the one-week, the one-month, the one-year trade? Or maybe it's not prescriptive. How do you think about that?

与十年前相比，这如何改变了您认为自己拥有优势的“时间跨度”？您是更倾向于一周、一个月还是一年的交易？或者这并非定式，您是如何思考这个问题的？

Stan Druckenmiller:Most trades I put on, I think in terms of 18 months to three years, that's how long I think they're probably going to evolve. Not every trade. You know, some are a year, some are five years. But I will admit that I've put on a three-year trade that five days later I'm out of and I've reversed.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：我建立的大多数头寸，考虑的都是18个月到3年的时间跨度，因为这是我认为它们可能演化的周期。但并非每笔交易都如此，有些是一年，有些是五年。但我必须承认，我曾建立过一个三年的头寸，但五天后我就清仓并反手做空了。

But, if you're talking about how I conceptualize it, all this noise about how much the system in the market has changed, that has not changed what I just said at all.And, the violence that creates is more useful for entry points if it goes against what my belief over the given time frame is.

但是，如果你问我如何进行思考的，关于市场系统发生巨大变化的那些噪音，完全没有改变我刚才说的那套逻辑。而这种系统变化产生的波动性，如果它偏离了我在特定时间框架内的信念，反而更有利于入场。

So, I think it's a lot of noise that makes my life annoying, because I'd rather just have nice, calm markets that move in a direction.But also, it creates opportunities and you have to use the volatility as opposed to being abused by the volatility other than mentally, which I'm going to be.

所以，我认为这些噪音让我的生活变得很烦人，因为我更希望市场能平稳地朝着某个方向移动。但同时，它也创造了机会，你必须利用波动，而不是被波动性所伤害——除了精神上的伤害，这是难免的。

But I mean, you can't let yourself be a victim of volatility and you can take advantage of it. It's just hard mentally.

我的意思是，你不能让自己成为波动的受害者，你可以利用它，只是这在心理上很难。

Bouzali:But you said, I'd rather have trending markets. Fair. Am I wrong in sometimes thinking you're more comfortable being contrarian? Or do you embrace the consensus more? How do you think about that?

布扎利：但您说过您更喜欢趋势明确的市场。我觉得您在做逆向投资时更舒服，是我错了吗？还是您其实也拥抱共识？您是怎么想的？

Stan Druckenmiller:Ithink contrarianism is overrated.Soros used to say the crowd's right 80% of the time. You just can't be caught in the other 20% because you can get your head handed to you.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：我认为逆向投资被过度神化了。索罗斯曾说，大众在80%的时间里是对的。你只是不能被困在剩下的那20%里，因为那会让你身首异处。

I get some intellectual satisfaction out of playing in the 20%, but as a concept, I think contrarianism is overrated.I do like it when I have extreme conviction and no one else believes it. It gives me even more conviction.

我在参与那20%的交易时确实能获得某种理智上的满足感，但逆向投资作为一个概念，我认为它被高估了。我确实喜欢那种我拥有极强信心但其他人都没有的时刻，因为这会进一步坚定我的信念。

I don't care if a trade is crowded, if I think the thesis is right and the trend is with me. I mean, for entry points I care, but I don't really care in terms of the investment. It doesn't bother me.

但我并不在乎一笔交易是否拥挤，只要我认为逻辑正确且趋势在我这一边。我的意思是，我会在意入场点是否拥挤，但就投资本身而言，我并不在乎，这不会困扰我。

Bouzali:We had an investor zoom call in December 2022, and we were discussing macro, rates, dollar, US versus the rest of the world.

布扎利：2022年12月我们曾有过一次投资者视频会议，当时我们在讨论宏观、利率、美元以及美国与世界其他地区的对比。

And after we spoke a little bit, I asked you what you think on rates. And I will quote essentially verbatim what you said. You said I couldn't care less about rates—the only thing that matters is AI and Nvidia.

在我们聊了一会后，我问您对利率的看法，我现在几乎可以逐字引用您的原话。您当时说：“我一点也不关心利率——唯一重要的事情是AI和英伟达。”

Stan Druckenmiller:I don't remember that, but that's nice.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：我不记得了，但这话说得真漂亮。

Bouzali:What was going on? How did you see it?

布扎利：当时是什么情况？您是怎么预见的？

Stan Druckenmiller:So, the Nvidia story is quite interesting and it's a perfect example of the process we spoke about earlier, where I rely on other people. So, I have some young superstars in my firm. And they had a network and they started really talking about AI.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：英伟达的故事非常有趣，它完美体现了我们之前提到的投资流程，即我依赖于他人。我的公司里有一些年轻的超级明星，他们有自己的网络，大约在22年初，他们开始真正深入谈论AI。

This was in early- to mid-‘22, and then I started noticing that the kids at Stanford were shifting from crypto, 50/50 crypto and 50/50 AI to more going to AI.And that's something we've always looked at in venture is where the kids are going.

然后我开始注意到，斯坦福大学的孩子们正在发生从50%关注加密货币、50%关注AI，转向更多地投身AI。天才年轻人的流向是我们在风投领域一直关注的指标。

When we bought Palantir in ‘08, ‘09, it was because that was a cool company back then that all the kids wanted to go to. So, my partner had in people from his AI network in there in Palo Alto. They came in and explained AI. Most of it went over my head, but I knew that this was really big.

我们在2008、2009年买入Palantir，就是因为那是当时所有的孩子都想去的酷公司。我的一位合伙人在帕罗奥图（Palo Alto）有他的AI网络，并邀请他们过来让他们解释AI，大部分内容我都听不懂，但我知道这会是一场巨变。

Bouzali:Why did you feel it was really big? It could have been a fad. You didn't feel this way for other fads.

布扎利：为什么您觉得这是一场巨变？它本可能只是昙花一现。您对其他热潮可没这种感觉。

Stan Druckenmiller:Because I had total trust in my partner, and I thought I was grasping the enormity. It turns out I wasn't grasping the enormity because I didn't know about large language models, but I knew about all the other conventional stuff that was going on in AI.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：因为我完全信任我的合伙人，而且我觉得自己抓住了它的影响力。事实证明，其实我当时并没有真正理解其深远意义，因为那时我还不知道大语言模型，但我了解AI领域正在发生的所有其他常规进展。

So, I said to my partner, what should I buy? He said Nvidia—that's the way to play AI. So just on this, about as much as you just heard, I bought a not-big position in Nvidia, but enough to get hurt on or to make some money on.

所以，我问我的合伙人：“我该买什么？”他说：“英伟达——那是布局AI的不二法门。”所以就凭这些，大概就像你刚才听到的这么多信息，我买入了英伟达，仓位不算大，但足以产生盈亏影响。

And then about two weeks later, ChatGPT happened, which had not mentioned in our conversation.Well, even I understood, okay, the enormity of what that meant when I saw even the rudimentary things it was doing back then. So, then I doubled the position.

大约两周后，ChatGPT问世了，而我们在之前的对话中根本没提过。好吧，即便是我，当时在看到它能做的那些基础功能时后，也理解了这意味着什么。于是，我将仓位翻倍了。

And then one of the great services you and Morgan Stanley provide are these macro calls and, um, all the macro guys, including myself, luckily I hadn't talked yet, were espousing their views on the world—which are probably worth a nickel and a cup of coffee.

后来，你们摩根士丹利提供了一项非常棒的服务，就是这些宏观研讨会。当时所有的宏观分析师，包括我在内（幸运的是当时还没轮到我发言），都在阐述各自对世界的看法——这些看法可能也就值五分钱加一杯咖啡。

And an analyst there who was from the tech world said, ‘You guys are in the trees and you're missing the forest. There's something much bigger than anything you're talking about, even for macro.’ And, he went on to amplify everything I had heard three weeks ago or four weeks ago about AI.

而现场有一位来自科技界的分析师说：“你们都是只见树木不见森林，现在正发生着比你们谈论的任何事情都要重大的变革，即便对宏观领域也是如此。”接着，他开始详尽阐发我三四周前听到的关于AI的一切。

But this time I had ChatGPT between that conversation and him. So, then I doubled my position again.

但那一次，在那次对话和他发言之间，我已经体验过ChatGPT了。于是，我又一次加倍了仓位。

And literally, I don't think I knew how to spell Nvidia three months before and when the stock took off, I knew through years of experience, when you have massive, massive change, investors just can't make themselves keep up with it. And it was funny because the person who knew ten times more than anybody at the table and probably 50 times more than me about AI, he sold his Nvidia shortly thereafter.

真的，我想三个月前我甚至都不知道英伟达怎么拼，但当股价起飞时，我凭借多年的经验知道，当这种极其重大的变革发生时，投资者往往跟不上节奏。有趣的是，那个对AI的了解比当时席间任何人多十倍、可能比我多五十倍的人，此后不久就卖掉了他的英伟达。

But I knew that this stock would go up for at least 2 or 3 years and go up a lot. And I said publicly in an interview about five months later, as, I cannot possibly see myself selling Nvidia over the next 2 or 3 years because it had already gone from like 150 to 390. And this person couldn't believe I still owned it. And I basically said, not only do I own it, the way these things evolve, this stock can't not go up for at least three years.

但我知道这只股票至少会涨两三年，而且涨幅会非常巨大。大约五个月后，我在一次采访中公开表示，我无法想象自己在未来两三年内卖掉英伟达，因为当时它已经从150美元涨到了390美元。那个人简直不敢相信我还持有它。我回应道，我不仅持有它，而且根据这类事物的演化规律，这只股票在未来三年内不可能不涨。

So then the stock goes to 800 and I violated everything I said in the interview. I couldn't stand success. I'd gone from 150 to 800. I was long term in it. I couldn't deal with it, and I sold it. And then it was 1,400 like five weeks later and I was sick. But, um, it's amazing how little I knew about Nvidia. I couldn't even tell you what the earnings were.

随后股价涨到了800美元，我违背了自己在采访中所说的一切。我无法直视这种成功（赚钱效应）。股价从150涨到了800，我本该长期持有的，但我受不了了，把它卖了。结果五周后它就涨到了1400美元，我简直都要吐血了。但是，令人惊讶的是，我对英伟达其实知之甚少，我甚至都说不出它的收益具体是多少。

Bouzali:It's a sign of confidence. And it's because you're Stan Druckenmiller that you can be so blatantly honest about the way you think about these things.

布扎利：这是一种自信的表现，正因为你是斯坦·德鲁肯米勒，你才能对这些想法如此坦诚。

And I think it's very encouraging to portfolio managers that are coming up in the business, and they often feel like they need to be intellectually, very much on their game constantly. What I'm getting from this, the ability to filter, to manage, instead of being wedded to a spreadsheet is really unique and quite helpful.

我认为这对那些正在成长的投资组合经理们非常有启发，他们往往认为自己在智力上必须时刻保持巅峰状态。我从中学到的是，这种筛选信息和管理团队的能力，而不是死守着一张Excel表格，这个经验非常独特且极有帮助。

You said something, that you violated what you had said and sold at 800. Would you have done that 20 years ago? Is this a sign of a more mature way of trading now versus before?

你提到你违背了之前的承诺，在800美元卖掉了。如果在20年前，你会这么做吗？这是否意味着现在的交易方式比以前更成熟了？

Stan Druckenmiller:Probably not. I'm not used to making six times for my money in an equity in two years, and I'm not Warren Buffett. I think I would have screwed it up 20 years ago when I was good to

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：可能不会。我不习惯在两年内在一只股票身上赚到六倍的收益，我毕竟不是沃伦·巴夫特。我觉得即便是在20年前巅峰状态的时候，我也一样会把这笔交易搞砸。

Bouzali:What are some things—if there are some things that you have unlearned over the past 20, 30 years or you had to unlearn?

布扎利：在过去二三十年里，有哪些东西是你已经抛弃的，或者不得不强迫自己忘记的？

Stan Druckenmiller:I don't unlearn anything because scars are something I always keep in mind because they can help you out.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：我不会“忘记”任何东西，因为那些“伤疤”是我需要始终铭记的，它们能帮我避坑。但我得说，由于一系列我不想赘述的情况，我被提拔得太早了。我23岁就成了分析师，26岁就成了首席投资经理，而且我没读过商学院，所以在分析方面，我从未系统学习过所有必备的基本面知识。

So, I relied heavily—and my mentor was really into it, and back then nobody was doing it—on technical analysis and I learned all the intricate details of it. Okay. I can unequivocally tell you that technical analysis is about 20% as effective today as it was then, because no one was using it.But when everybody is using it, it doesn't work anymore because you don't have a unique thing to act against.

因此，我当时严重依赖技术分析（我的导师非常推崇这个，而当时没人做这个），并且掌握了其中的所有复杂细节。现在，我可以明确地告诉你，技术分析在今天的有效性只有当年的20%，因为现在每个人都在用。当所有人都在用的时候，它就不再灵验了，因为你不再拥有可以作为对手盘的独特优势。

So, it's kind of sad because it's easy and you can be lazy. You don't have to work that hard. You just look at a chart instead of going into a 10Q and all this other stuff. But technical analysis is a problem.

这挺令人难过的，因为技术分析很省事，你可以变懒，不需要那么辛苦地去钻研10Q报告之类的东西，看张图表就行。但技术分析确实是个问题。

In the same vein, price versus heat news was huge for me for 20 or 30 years, and if you had great news and a stock wasn't responding to the news, 90% of the time the news was coming, that was bad.

同样，在过去二三十年里，“价格与热点新闻的背离”对我来说曾是一个巨大的信号：如果出了重大利好而股价没有反应，那么接下来有90%的可能性会有重大利空。

Unfortunately, around 2000, a lot of smart people started coming into our business. I was the only one in my class, I think, from Bowdoin, that went into the financial industry, because we'd been in a bear market for ten years. Well, then again, every wise guy learned what I'm just talking about, so it doesn't work anymore.

不幸的是，大约从2000年开始，大量聪明人涌入了我们这个行业。我记得当年在鲍登学院，我是班里唯一一个进入金融行业的人，因为那时市场已经低迷了十年。但后来，每一个聪明家伙都学会了我刚才说的这套逻辑，所以它也不再灵验了。

So back then, the company reported horrible earnings, opened down in the aftermarket and then was up 10% the next day, almost guaranteed to be higher six months later. That's not true anymore because everybody else has learned that. So those would be the two big things. I haven't unlearned them, but I don't rely on them to the extent that I used to.

在过去，如果一家公司公布了糟糕的财报，盘后跳空低开，但第二天却上涨了10%，这几乎可以保证六个月后股价会更高。现在这种规律不再成立，因为大家都知道了。所以这就是两大改变，我没有忘记它们，只是不再像以前那样依赖它们了。

Bouzali:They've been loved to death, basically. Are there any other signals that have been elevated in importance then, conversely to signals that have been diminished?

布扎利：大概是它们被滥用了这种意思。那么，相比于这些重要性下降的信号，有没有什么信号的重要性提升了？

Stan Druckenmiller:Not really. There's no silver bullet. And I'm the great beneficiary of 40 years of scars and successes that I can go back on, and a lot of pattern recognition, because there's not much I haven't seen in this business.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：并没有，没有什么灵丹妙药。我是这40年伤疤与成功的受益者，我可以回看过去，利用大量的模式识别，因为在这个行业里我没见过的事已经不多了。

I'd say the biggest disappointment in my career has been, I think I have more wisdom, and I have more tools of the trade than I had in my 30s and 40s, and I was a much better portfolio manager then because back then I had courage. I would take bigger convicted positions. I'm trying to regain some of my nerve just because it's more fun.

我职业生涯中最大的遗憾是，虽然我觉得现在的我比三四十岁时更有智慧、掌握的工具更多，但那时的我是一名更优秀的投资组合经理，因为那时候我有勇气，我敢建立更大、更有信心的头寸。我现在正试图找回那种胆识，因为那很有趣。

Bouzali:So you're chickening out?

布扎利：所以你现在变胆小了？

Stan Druckenmiller:Oh for sure. I've been chickening out for a long time. I'm Mr. TACO, except it's not T, it's DACO. Druck Always Chickens Out.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：噢是的，我已经变胆小很久了。我是TACO先生，只不过这个T要换成D，也就是DACO（Druck Always Chickens Out，德鲁肯总是临阵退缩。

Bouzali:In terms of other maybe experiences that you've had, or a chip on your shoulder? Do you have a chip on your shoulder that makes you better at this?

布扎利：谈谈你的其他的经历吧，或者是你身上那种“不服输的劲头”？你是否有某种执念让你在这一行做得更好？

Stan Druckenmiller:No, no, I just, um, grew up—my dad and my sisters played games with me all the time. I was just a really sore loser. I love games, but I really hate to lose, so I'm just very driven.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：不，没有，我只是……在成长过程中，我父亲和姐妹们总是和我一起玩游戏。我是一个输不起的人，我热爱游戏，但我真的讨厌输，所以我非常有动力。

It's a sickness. I don't know where it comes from, but I might as well channel it and make it productive instead of just a disease because it is a little bit unseemly. But it's who I am.

这是一种病，我不知道它从何而来，但我最好还是引导它，让它产生生产力，而不是任由它发展成一种病态，因为这确实有失风度，但这就是真实的我。

Bouzali:Embrace it. Finally, this show is called Hard Lessons. Can you look back in your life or career and maybe take us through something that you had to learn the hard way?

布扎利：拥抱它吧。最后，由于我们这个节目叫「hard lessons」，所以你能回顾一下你的生活或职业生涯，让我们了解一下你通过艰苦方式学到的教训吗？

Stan Druckenmiller:Let me just say, I have so many scars. You can't believe it. Everyone knows how I played the Nasdaq melt up in ‘99. Sold it perfectly in January and then bought the exact top. And someone says, what did you learn from that? I said nothing, I learned not to do that 20 years before, but I got emotional, which I fight every day. I would literally like throw up like once or twice a week, just from anxiety when I'd have a drawdown and so forth.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：这么说吧，我身上的伤疤多得你无法想象。所有人都知道我在1999年是如何操作纳斯达克暴涨的。我在1月份卖得非常完美，然后却买在了最高点。有人问：“你从中学到了什么？”我说：“什么都没学到。”早在20年前我就学过不要那样做，但我还是变得情绪化了，这是我每天都要与之抗争的东西。当出现净值回撤等情况时，我真的会因为焦虑而每周呕吐一两次。

And at some point in my career, I learned that you're going to continue to make mistakes, you're going to continue to get emotional, you're going to continue to have that happen from now and then. But you've got a gift. And just stop torturing yourself for like 48 hours or maybe longer over this because you've been doing this long enough and the record is there long enough that it's no longer like random accident, which I did not believe for like 15 years.

后来在职业生涯的某个阶段，我明白了一点：你会继续犯错，你会继续变得情绪化，这些事情以后还是会时常发生；但你拥有一种天赋。别再为了这些事折磨自己48小时甚至更久了，因为你入行已经足够久了，你的业绩记录也足够长，这说明成功已不再是随机的偶然——而这一点在之前的15年里我是不相信的。

So, the hard lessons have been like hundreds of mistakes, but that they're just a moment in time. And when you have these drawdowns and if there's money managers listening to this and you're good, it's easier said than done. Just get over it and move on.

所以，所谓的“hard lessons”就是经历了成百上千次的错误，但它们只是时间长河中的一瞬间。如果有正在听节目的基金经理，而且你确实很优秀的话，虽然说起来容易做起来难，但请挺过去，继续前行。

Bouzali:So Stan Druckenmiller had imposter syndrome for 15 years?

布扎利：这么说，斯坦·德鲁肯米勒也经历过15年的“冒充者综合征”？

Stan Druckenmiller:Yes. Maybe longer.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：是的，可能更久。

Bouzali:Wow.

布扎利：哇。

Stan Druckenmiller:Maybe longer.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：可能更久。

Bouzali:Incredible. As we're finishing. I want to say thank you for being here. I got to know you later in your career, and it's just been fascinating to see you think and trade—to see you in action. You've been very generous with your time, and on behalf of Morgan Stanley, thank you very much.

布扎利：太不可思议了。在结束之际，我想说声谢谢。我在您职业生涯的后期才结识您，观察您的思考和交易、看您实操，真的是一件非常令人着迷的事。您非常慷慨地跟我们分享了许多，我代表摩根士丹利非常感谢您。

Stan Druckenmiller:As I said in the beginning, I wouldn't do this for many. And I think the world of Morgan Stanley, so it was delightful to be here.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：正如我开头所说，我不会为很多人做这种访谈。我对摩根士丹利的评价极高，所以在这里聊得很愉快。

Bouzali:Thank you. Stan.

布扎利：谢谢，斯坦。

Stan Druckenmiller:Thanks, Iliana.

斯坦·德鲁肯米勒：谢谢，Iliana。

Sean‘s take：https://t.zsxq.com/LvoAV

跨资产笔记：https://t.zsxq.com/i90xY

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