集微访谈 Christopher Timura：详解BIS出口新规及“美国人”规则

集微网消息，在往期的集微访谈栏目中，爱集微有幸采访了Gibson,Dunn&Crutcher LLP华盛顿办事处的高级法律顾问Christopher Timura。关于美国BIS新规，包括最新BIS出口管制的四个工具、“美国人”的规则、出口许可证政策等方面提出了一系列问题，并收到了十分有启发的答复。

问：首先，与BIS之前的管制范围相比，你能简要概括一下界限是怎样的吗？

答：这个领域很复杂，所以我会给你介绍一些不同类型工具的背景知识，然后我们可以谈谈它们剩下的部分。

但新规则使用了四种不同的监管工具，以扩大美国政府针对的行业出口管制范围。这些行业都是先进的集成电路制造业，尤其是用于支持人工智能和其他先进计算的集成电路。

下一个领域是半导体制造业。同样，他们专注于一般的半导体制造业，但也关注用于高级计算的半导体制造业。然后是超级计算机。政府正在通过一系列名为出口管制条例的条例来实施这些改革。这些工具分别制定了新型许可要求。这些许可要求的作用是允许国会部门实施不同的许可政策。因此，在某些情况下，人们试图出口、在中国境内转移或再出口到中国，然后美国政府将能够决定是否实施拒绝政策、推定拒绝或逐案审查。

制定管制措施实际上不是为了禁止出口，而是为了考察无许可证的出口。实际上，美国政府使用的是许可证制度，来决定某些出口是否可以继续进行。但有四种不同类型的工具。一个是基于物品的管制。这些在出口管制分类编号下有说明。这些都列在所谓的商业管制清单上。这也是出口管理条例的一部分。在这种情况下，美国政府创建了几个新的ECCN终端，重点关注先进的集成电路以及用于使其成为下一个工具的设备。这可以称为外国直接产品规则。这些都是非常不寻常的管制，过去很少用到。但在过去几年里，美国政府认定这可能是一种更有效的工具，可以用来阻止他们不想继续的活动。

例如，几年前，美国将华为列入实体名单后，当我继续获得某些可以支持5G的技术时，他们才意识到自己真心不希望有任何方法可以继续获得这些技术。

所以他们制定了一个新规则，基本上是指外国直接产品，即非美国公司在美国境外生产的产品。如果他们使用某些软件和技术，他们就不能将这些物品或产品运送给华为，对吗？因此，如果他们这样做，终于达到了美国政府想要效果，那就是限制这些先进技术的使用。所以这在当时是一个相对成功且有限制的规则。但最近他们扩大了外国直接产品规则的范围。这对俄罗斯来说是非常重要的方式。因此，在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后，美国基本上同意实施新的管制措施，以扩大任何使用美国政府软件技术和属于美国产品的外国直接产品范围。事实上，任何产品都不能提供给俄罗斯军队和用户。此外，还有一条规则不适用于俄罗斯军方和用户。这是非常成功的。部分原因是，美国提前与欧盟和其他盟友进行了谈判，在这些国家实施非常类似的管制。

他们看到针对华为制定的规则取得了成功，看到了针对俄罗斯和白俄罗斯制定的规则获得了成功。他们决定将同样的新规则应用于中国的这些行业。

因此，这些外国直接产品规则，我认为很有兴趣看到这个规则产生的效果，因为美国政府不一定要与美国以外的对手进行所有的高级谈判，这些对手将受到这些规则的影响。而且可能不会达成一致的共识。我认为国际社会对俄罗斯的态度就像对中国的态度一样。但这是一个非常强大的管制措施，因为它会触及和管控那些甚至不是我们本地生产的物品，而是用我们的软件、技术、主要组件以及整个计划生产的物品，而主要组件是一个有趣的术语。

但你应该知道，主要组件甚至包括小型软件。有用于测试半导体的，测试设备的，或实验室测试的一种东西。所以它不一定是大型物品。实际上，它只是生产半导体所必需的任何物品。第三种类型的管制是最终用途和最终用户管制。这些是笼统的规则。它们也在那些试图效仿的监管机构中变得更受欢迎。但它基本上提出了更具针对性的出口管制类型。因此，欧盟有不同的最终用途和最终用户管制。美国拥有自己的最终用户管制。这是一种笼统的说法。基本上，美国禁止任何出口商出口受美国管辖的物品。如果他们知道这些物品将被用于超级计算机，或者先进制造业或集成电路制造业中的先进半导体设施，他们会禁止出口商出口这些物品给竞争对手中国。

第四个工具是最特别的。这是对美国人员的管制。我知道你对此有疑问。我们可以稍后谈论这一点，但美国所指出的人的概念很宽泛。这些是一种非同寻常的管制。直到现在，它们只适用于美国试图控制个人参与大规模毁灭性武器、化学和生物武器、弹道导弹技术生产的情况。基本上，针对这条规则，美国政府之所以给出这样的解释，因为他们现在看到了中国的军民融合政策。他们表示中国对先进集成电路制造商如此感兴趣，部分原因是中国将把这些用于同样的活动，用于生产大规模毁灭性武器和开发用于侵犯人权的工具。

因此，美国政府基本上说的是，我们不希望世界各地的人都参与这些活动。以上就是四种工具。它们是显著的扩展。我想我会用这个词来形容，但这真的是一个分水岭。我认为管制短期内不会改变。我认为这是保证我们国家安全的新方法。我认为，在不久的将来，美国不会改变这些管制方针。关于这个特定概念还有什么问题吗？

问：所以从实施额外出口管制的文本来看，美国人员是一个非常重要的概念。我从你那里解读到很多关于这个问题和这个术语的深刻启示。这是在讨论中国半导体行业吗?你能否详细说明美国人员禁令将如何影响中国的芯片和雄心壮志，以及这个圆桌会议上的美国人员是否会重塑全球半导体行业的人力资源格局？

答：简单的说，我认为它会被重塑，但他们只是让我们先谈谈美国人员的概念。所以美国人员的概念实际上有四个不同的元素。

首先，任何个人，任何美国公民或合法永久居民的自然人，你可能听说过绿卡，受保护的个人指在美国拥有难民或庇护身份的人。

这些都是美国人员，任何法人，包括大学、私营部门公司、研究机构、任何组织，任何在美国管辖范围内组织的实体都被视为美国人员。任何居住在美国的人。

所以如果你去美国旅行并进行同样的采访，你会被认为是美国人员，因为你当时在美国，对吗？这是领土限制。然后是位于美国的非美国公司的其他子公司或分支机构。如果他们在美国，也被视为美国人员。同样的原则也适用于那些居住在美国的人，他们也被视为美国人员。这是一个广泛的概念。正如我与其他新闻媒体交谈时所说。问题是现实中很多人都有双重国籍。有许多中国人来到美国，时间久了，他们获得了绿卡甚至公民身份。因此，这些双重国籍人士将面临一个非常困难的决定。还有一些人，他们的孩子可能是美国公民，但他们不是美国公民，这非常复杂。

所以我认为新规则的问题在于它没有必要就这种细微差别提供指导。但我认为美国政府心里很清楚。美国商务部昨天表示，他们对美国人员进行了严格的解释。他们基本上说的是，管制适用于这个人的某些行为。他们将推定拒绝任何为先进集成电路制造商做出贡献的美国人，这些人在那些从事传输、运输和转移活动的公司工作。这些人需要许可证。如果这些人工作的公司总部设在中国，他们将对那些获得许可的申请实行拒绝政策。他们将考虑逐案审查。

如果这些人为总部设在美国的公司工作，或者我们称为五大集团，第六个国家是韩国。这个领域有韩国、英国、日本、荷兰、德国，如果你在这些国家工作，并且你在中国有子公司、合资企业或其他实体，他们会根据具体情况评估这些问题和许可证申请。但就其实际应用而言，框架非常广泛。因此，服务意味着任何物品的维修，测试任何类似的东西都会被归入这个范畴。航运。你可以想象那些参与物流的高管，那些做出商业决策的人，把一个模具或一堆东西从一个地方转移到另一个地方。他们会卷入其中。这是有意为之的宽泛。不幸的是，我认为美国政府不会这样做。我们很清楚这一点。我认为他们在一段时间内会故意含糊其词，因为他们真的想切断与任何拥有美国人员身份的人之间的转移。

问：对于许多美国大型半导体设备供应商来说，对中国的出口限制将是一个损失，例如KLA应用材料的研究。因此，从你的角度来看，他们找到了另一种或一些方法来弥补损失，因为我最近做了一些关于土地研究的新闻，因为新法律，实际上资金正在损失。

答：我认为公众对正在发生的事情有一个认知，也有一个公开的报道。因此，如果你是一家上市公司，很可能在第一周左右发生类似的事情。在这次公告之后，你会看到股价下跌，因为人们担心长期收入前景。但我认为重要的是要记住两件事。实际上，这些规则只针对某些先进半导体、某些制造设备和超级计算机。所以这不全是制造设备，也不全是集成电路，对吧？因此，这些公司甚至可以继续在中国销售产品，用于制造非先进集成电路。但另一件需要记住的事是，美国已经对半导体制造实施了管制。这些只是针对特定先进集成电路的新管制措施。

在某种程度上，他们在中国销售制造设备的能力受到了限制，这可能已经成为他们商业计划的一部分。我只是怀疑，因为我没有亲自为这些特定公司提供过建议，但我怀疑他们在试图向中国运送一些此类设备时，已经遭到了商务部的许可拒绝。

从某种意义上说，这条业务线可能还没有发展得那么好。但我认为退一步讲，个别美国公司会因此受到伤害，但这是美国政府做出的战略选择。

我认为他们想要明确的是，这里有一套规则，这是这一趋势的新方向，你可能应该尝试重新调整你的模式收入，以预测在不久的将来可能无法向中国出售这种设备。

这是其中的一部分。但我认为更重要的不是损失，我认为更重要的是成本。而这正是美国政府可能没有完全意识到的一点，它实际上是导致供应链中断的原因。在某种程度上，中国正在进行先进制造，或者正在进行测试或加工的某些方面。这真的会让你冷静下来。至少在短期内，公司要弄清楚如何应用这些规则，以及是否能获得授权。这个行业的供应链通常需要12到24个月才能开发出来，对吗？这是一个非常复杂的制造过程。你无法转移它。你不能在6个月内转移它。美国政府已经颁发了为期6个月的临时通用许可证，但对于那些在中国拥有供应链的公司来说，这远远不够把供应链转移到其他地方。

问：所以正如你刚才提到的台积电和英特尔，或其他类似大型互联网公司都获得了临时美国许可证。你认为BIS会以特定的心态来决定接受哪家公司吗?

答：我要说的是一种官方和非官方心态。

所以官方的想法是有一个实际的许可证政策，美国政府已经表示，它将继续审查许可证申请，并将这些新管制措施与具体情况联系起来。如果所涉及的公司是美国公司的子公司，或者是一家总部位于A5国和A6国的公司的附属公司。其中包括台湾、韩国、日本和荷兰。他们已经表示将逐案审查这些问题。

相比之下，下一个港口是一家总部设在中国的公司。他们说有推定拒绝，所以已经有书面政策。至于他们将如何应用这一点，但美国也说过这只是一方面，监管也将考虑运往这些公司的技术水平。还有他们是否有成熟的贸易合规体系。所以这种技术水平非常重要，因为即使在今天，美国政府也在发放许可证。

例如，向华为运送特定种类的产品，即使它一直在实体清单中，即使它受外国直接产品规则的约束。即使在今天，也有公司获得了向华为运送产品的大量许可证。但那是因为美国政府认为，美国送去的产品不会在技术上取得重大飞跃。它只是为了支持手机之类的东西。就某些技术、路由器或交换机而言，这是一种更基本的技术。

它已经允许某些种类的出口。另一部分是合规计划的成熟度。美国政府要确信，如果你把一种产品或技术以及制造方法送到中国的子公司，它不会被转移。所以你有没有管制措施来确保它不会被偷，对吧？否则这家公司的员工就不会接受它。这样我就可以把它给别人。有一种非官方的说法是，像台积电和英特尔这样非常成熟的公司，他们已经有非常成熟的合规计划，因为这些问题他们已经考虑很长时间了。他们非常担心失去自己的知识产权。因此，因此，他们可能比不太熟悉技术管制和相关风险的小型公司更有可能获得许可证。

因此，我认为这里既有正式政策，也有非正式政策。但这两者的另一部分存在一种悟性，对吧？那些成功获得向中国出口许可证的公司都有能力证明收入的重要性。例如，他们能否在美国继续进行研发取决于在其他国家（包括中国）销售某些产品获得的收入，如果他们能将两者建立一种联系，那么美国政府就可以看到这仍然符合美国政府的战略利益，对吗？因为美国不想扼杀其和盟国公司继续研究、开发和创新的能力。

所以坦白地说，你需要雇一些人（比如我和其他在这个领域提供建议的人）编写申请，确保你符合所有不同的政策论点，假设这些论点准确无误，适用于特定的出口。

问：非常感谢。我们继续讨论下一个问题好吗？BIS估计，新管制条例下施加的新规则导致每年提交的许可证申请量增加。那么他们使用什么样的计算方法或分析方法来做出这样的估计呢？

答：是的，所以我没有在该机构工作过，所以我没有太多这方面的第一手资料，但我能想到他们是如何做出这种估计的。

正如我前面提到的，美国政府已经管制了某些半导体制造设备的出口。从它去年获得的许可证数量来看，也是如此。例如，以此为基础，实际上可以知道今年预计会有多少许可证。所以我可以依照一个特定的数字，然后说我们去年收到了500个许可证。但这些正在制定的新管制措施将包含一套新技术。因此，我们可能会期待更多的许可证申请。美国一直在关注这些市场，并知道谁在做什么。但归根结底，这一估计是有根据的。这并不是说美国没有完全了解所有出口先进产品的人。我认为中国除了通过提交许可证，他们也有可能使用其他机构收集的出口数据。

在美国，我们有一种叫做自动化商业环境的概念，出口商在离开美国时必须记录其出口的性质。中国可能也在使用这些类型的信息。但我认为，你只能对你完全了解的事物进行评估，尤其是对于像超级计算机这样的新领域，我想他们说过他们只期望五个申请。我想中国只有少数几个工厂符合当今超级计算机的定义。但有个很有趣的问题，中国的数据中心是否可能考虑使用超级计算机。美国政府还没有澄清这一点。如果是这样的话，你所说的是数百个与之相关的申请，我认为这是最好的。我想我们应该用大致估计这个词。你同时在猜测和估计。坦白地说，我大致估计其中一些数字。

问：历史上，许多游说团体和法律机构在美国贸易纠纷中扮演着重要的角色。所以在你看来，他们是否还在关注像美国对中国的限制?

答：可以说是也可以说不是。我不认为这些游说组织能够改变目前事情的总体发展轨迹。美国情报部门和国防部门对中国先进设备制造能力大大增强感到非常担忧。他们认为这是一种战略威胁。此外，两党还广泛支持对中国实施新的管制。因此，即使共和党和民主党在中期选举后或下次选举中有变化，他们也会服从共和党的领导。我认为他们不会对此做出任何改变。因此，就总体政策而言，他们不会对此产生太大影响。但一些游说组织和行业协会所起的作用是进一步教育机构了解某些规则的影响。

因此，我认为他们今天可能发挥的最大作用是教育许可决策者。因此，有许可授权官员，还有政治人士，他们要对敏感的申请进行权衡。他们会教育许可决策者供应链意味着什么，对吗？他们会说，实际上我们不能把我们的制造业转移到中国以外的地方。现在已经走投无路了。要想进入你们感兴趣的代工厂要等两年的时间。所以他们将有可能介入，并教育许可决策者这些规则的实际影响。

到那时，商务部可能会决定重新调整其决策。但我认为在许可方面会有更多的调整。会发放临时通用许可证，这将是管制方面的实际变化。

以下是采访原文（英文）：

Q：First, it is widely believed like 1/4 scope of export controls, like which is published on october the 7th compared to previous fires from bis, could you briefly summarize how border it is? And regarding the new clarification of EAR.

A：This is a complex area, so I'll give you some background on the different types of tools, and then we can talk about their rest.

But the new rules use four different regulatory tools to expand export controls on the sectors that the US government is targeting here. And those sectors are advanced, integrated circuit manufacturing, particularly the kinds of any ii cs that are used to support artificial intelligence and other advanced computing.

The next sector, a semiconductor manufacturing itself. And again, they're focused on general some semiconductor manufacturing, but also the ones that are used in advanced computing. And then super computers. And the government is implementing these changes through a set of regulations that are called the export administration regulations. These tools, each create new types of licensing requirements. What these licensing requirements do is they allow the department of congress to then apply different licensing policies. So in some cases, people try to export or transfer within China or re export to China, the US government will then be able to decide whether to apply a denial policy, the presumption of denial, or a case by case review.

The creation of the controls is meant really to, it's not a prohibition, it's a probation without licensing. It's really the licensing regime that the US government then uses to toggle one way or the other, whether certain exports could continue. But there's four different types of tool. One is the item based controls. These are described under export control classification numbers. ECC ends. These are listed on what's called the commerce control list. That's part of the same export administration regulations. In that instance, the US government has created several new ECC ends that are focused on both the advanced ICs themselves, as well as the equipment used to make them the next tool. It's called a foreign direct product rule. And these are really unusual controls. They were very rarely used in the past. But over the last several years, the US government has determined that this is probably a more effective tool at trying to stop an activity that they're not interested in continuing.

For example, after the US put HUAWEI on the entity list several years ago, they realized that while I was continuing to get access to certain kinds of of technologies that could support, for example, five g they really didn't want one way to continue to have access to that.

And so they created a new rule, basically said foreign direct products. So products that are produced outside the united states by non US companies. If they use certain software and technology, they can't send those items, those products to HUAWEI either, right? And so when they did that, finally had the effect that the US government was trying to do, which was took to curtail will always access to these advanced technologies. So that was a relatively successful and limited rule at the time. But they more recently expanded the foreign direct product rules. It's very significant ways with respect to Russia. So after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the US agreed to basically put in new controls to expand foreign direct products of virtually any item that the US government software technology and from the united states. Really, any product cannot go to military and users in Russia today. And then also, there's another rule that doesn't apply to military and users in Russia. And that's been very successful. In part, because the US negotiated ahead of time to work with the European union and other allies to implement very similar controls in those countries.

They're seeing the success that they had with the HUAWEI rule, and they seeing the success that they're having with the Russia rule, Russia and Belarus rules. And they decided to apply the same new rules to this place to these sectors in China.

So these foreign direct product rules, I think it's gonna be an interesting thing to see how it plays out, because the US government has not necessarily done all of the advanced negotiations with counter-parties outside the united states, who will be affected by these rules. And there may not be the same kind of consensus. I think that the global community has with respect to Russia, as it would have with respect to China. But that's a very powerful control, because it reaches out and grabs items that are not even US origin, but are produced with US software, technology, major components, as well as whole plans, and major components is kind of an interesting term.

But you should know that major components includes even tiny things. Pieces of software. There are used to test semiconductors, or test equipment, test bed labs, a kind of a thing. So it's not necessarily a big item. Actually, it's just any item that's necessary for the production, a of a semiconductor. The third type of control is an end use and end user control. These are kinds of catchall rules. They become more popular as well within regulators who are trying to. But it basically come up with more targeted types of export controls. So the European union has different end use and end user controls. The united states has end use Indian user controls. And what these are is there's a kind of catchalls. Basically, they prohibit any exporter that exporting items that are subject to US jurisdiction. They prohibit them from being able to export those items, two counter parties in China. If they know that they'll be used, for example, in supercomputers, or in advanced semiconductor facilities that are involved in advanced manufacturing, IC manufacturing.

And the 4th tool is the most extraordinary one. It's the control on US persons. I know you have a question about that. Later. We can talk about that then, but the US person concept is a broad one. And these are really kind of extraordinary controls. Up until this point. They've only been applied in the situations where the US was trying to control US person involvement in the production of weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missile technology. And what they basically, the reason why this rule has been the US the explanation the US government is given is that they're now seeing with the military civil fusion policy in China. They're saying that the China is so interested in the manufacturer of advanced ICs, in part, because it's gonna be using those for those same kinds of activities, for the production of weapons, of mass destruction, for the development of tools that would be used in human rights violations.

And so the US government is basically saying we do not want US persons located anywhere in the world involved in those activities. So those are four tools. They are significant expansion. I think ii use the word. This is used a lot, but this really is a watershed moment. I think. I don't think go, I don't think these are changing anytime soon. I think this is a new vector of US just national security. I don't see the united states changing its course on these controls in anytime in the near future. Any more questions about that particular concept?

Q：So according to the text of implementation of additional export controls, us person is a very important conception. I have read many insightful illumination from you in on this issue and this term sparks. Is it debating the chinese semiconductor community? Could you elaborate how the us person ban will affect chin, chinese high and chips, ambition, and whether the landscape of human resources for global semiconductor industry usually reshaped by this roundtable us person. Yeah.

A：I think the short answer is I think it will be reshaped, but they are just let's talk about the us person concept first. So the US person concept, there's actually four different elements.

First of all, any individual, any natural person that's a citizen in the united states or legal, permanent resident, you may have heard the term green card, protected individuals, people who have a refugee or asylum status in the united states.

Those are all US persons, any juridical person that includes like legal persons, like universities, private sector companies, research institutes, any organization, any entity that's organized under a jurisdiction in the united states is considered to be a US person as well. Any person located in the united states.

So if you were to travel to the united states and conduct the same interview, you would be considered a US person, because you're in the united states at the time, right? That's a territorial limitation. And then the other ideas, subsidiaries, or branches of non US companies that have a location in the united states. The same principle applies there if they're located in the united states, considered US persons, too. It's a broad concept. As I have talked with some other news outlets. The problem with this is that the reality is a lot of people have dual nationals, dual nationality. There are many people who are China origin who have come to the united states and have gotten green cards or or maybe even citizenship over time. And so those dual nationals will be stuck in a very difficult decision. Clearly. And there's also individuals whose whose children might be us citizens, but they're not I the reality of this is very can be very complex.

And so I think the problem with the new rule is that it doesn't necessarily give guidance yet on the kind of nuance. But I think the us government is pretty clear. The department of commerce said yesterday that they are applying a strict construct of US person. What they've said is essentially, the control applies to this person, certain kinds of conduct. They will have a presumption of denial for any US person that's contributing to the advanced manufacturer of I cs, who work in those companies who are involved with servicing with transmitting, shipping, transferring any of these activities. They're gonna require license for that. And if the company they work for is China headquartered, they're gonna apply a policy of deniable to those licensed applications. And they will consider, on a case by cases, case basis.

If those individuals are working for companies that are headquartered in the united states, or whether we're called a group, a five great group, a six country, south korea, In this space, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, if you're located in those countries and you happen to have a subsidiary or some sort of a joint venture or other entity in China that you're working in, they'll evaluate those questions, those license applications on a case by case basis. But in terms of the actual practical application of this, the framing is very, very broad. So servicing means any repair of an item, testing anything like that would call it would fall into that. Shipping. You can imagine executives that are involved in logistics, people who make business decisions to transfer aa die or mass from one place to another. They would be involved in this. It is an intentionally broad. And I unfortunately, I don't think the US government is going to. We have a lot of clarity on this. I I think they're gonna be deliberately vague for a period of time on this, because they truly want to cut off the transfer, of know how at this point from anybody who has US person status

Q：The explore restriction to China will resource like a happy loss for many big US semiconductor equipment suppliers, such as in kla applied materials for them research. So from your perspective, where they find like, like another way or some ways to hedging against their losses, because I recently do some news like the land research is actually, now it's actually like the money is vanishing because of like the new law.

A：I think that there is a public perception of what's happening, and there's a public reporting. And so if you're a publicly traded company, it's possible that in the like what has happened in the first week or so. After this announcement, you'll see share price dropping, because people are worried about the long term revenue prospects. But I think that it's important to kind of remember two things. This is really only these rules are focused on certain advanced semiconductors and certain manufacturing equipment and supercomputers. So it's not all manufacturing equipment, and it's not all ICs, right? So these companies can continue to sell products, even in China that could be used in manufacturing non advanced ICs. But the other thing to remember is that this is the US has already had controls in place on semiconductor manufacturing. These are just new controls that target very specific kinds of advanced ICs.

It's probably the case that in some ways, their limitation on their ability to sell manufacturing equipment in China was in a way already factored into their business planning. Ii suspect I don't know, because I don't personally advise any of these particular companies, but I suspect that they've already experienced licensing denials from the department of commerce when they've tried to send some of this equipment over to China.

In some sense, as this business line may not have been all that well developed yet. But I think the taking a step back, US individual US certain US companies will be hurt by this, but this is a strategic choice that the US government has taken.

They wanted to be clear, I think, here with a set of rules that this is the new vector of where this is heading and that you should probably be trying to re calibrate your revenue of models to anticipate that you're not gonna be able to sell that kind of equipment to China anytime in the near future.

So that's kind of one part of this. But I think the more significant losses is not really, ii I think the more significant cost. And this is the one the US government may not be fully aware of, is really the disruption to supply chains as a result of this. To the extent there was advanced manufacturing going on or some aspect of the testing or processing that was going on in China. That's really gonna call this is that's really gonna chill that. At least in the near term, while companies figure out how to apply these rules and whether or not they can get authorizations for them. This I supply chains in this sector typically take 12 to 24 months to develop, right? This is very complex manufacturing process. You just can't shift it. You can't shift it in 6 months. And the US government has issued a temporary general license for 6 months, but that's nowhere near enough time for companies that have supply chains into China to relocate to other places.

Q：So TSMC Intel, like you just mentioned, or some other like big internet, a big intent, begin to show you aspire. Still got temporary US license for China chief expense that the expansion like TSMC got expansion for 1 year like in Nanjing. Do you believe bis like holds particular mindset to decide which company can?

A：There's kind of an official mindset and unofficial that I'll talk about.

So the official mindset that there's an actual licensing policy, the US government has said that it will continue to review applications for licenses, associate with these new controls on a case by case basis. If the company involved is a subsidiary of the US company, or a subsidiary of a company based in group A5 and group A6 countries. And that includes Taiwan, that includes South Korea, includes Japan, which includes the Netherlands. So they've already said that they will review those on a case by case basis.

And contrast, the next port is for a company that's headquartered in China. They say there's the presumption of denial, so there's already a written policy. And in terms of how they're going to apply this, but the US has also said and that this is just one line and the regulations that it's also going to take into consideration the level of technology that will be sent to these companies. And then also whether they have mature trade compliance systems. So that level of technology is really important, because even today, the united states government is issuing licenses.

For example, to send certain kinds of products to HUAWEI, even though always on entity list, even though it's subject to this entity list, foreign direct product rule. There are companies that are getting large licenses to ship items to HUAWEI even today. But that's because the US government satisfied that the products the US is sending is not going to enable while way to make a major leap forward in its technology. It's just gonna support maybe things like it's by its handsets or something. That's kind of more basic in terms of some of the technology or routers or switches, whatever.

It's allowing certain kinds of exports already. The other part of the two is just the level of the maturity of the compliance program. The US government has to be convinced that if you send a product or technology technology and how to manufacture something to a subsidiary in China that it won't be diverted. Right? So do you have the controls in place to make sure that it won't be stolen, right? Or there won't be employees at that company that will take it. And so I can give it to somebody else. There's sort of the unofficial part of this is that these very sophisticated companies like TSMC Intel, they already have very mature compliance programs, because they've been thinking about these issues for a long time. And they're very concerned about losing their own intellectual property. So they may be more likely to get licenses than maybe a smaller company that might be less familiar with technology controls and the risk associated with it.

So I think there's both formal and informal policies that are in play here. But the other part of the two is that there's a kind of savvy, right? That the companies that have been successful in getting licenses to export to China have been able to make an argument about the importance of that revenue. If they can make a linkage, for example, between their ability to continue doing research and development in the united states is dependent upon revenue that from sales of certain items in other countries, including China, then the US government can see that still in the US government strategic interest, right? Because it doesn't want to shut down the ability of US and allied country companies to continue to research and develop and innovate.

So there's a certain savvy where you hire people, frankly, like me and other people who advise in this space, to write the applications to make sure that you're hitting all the different policy arguments that are assuming that they're accurate that will apply to a particular export.

Q：Thank you. I believe. Yes. So shall we move on to next question? Sure. Bis estimate estimates that the new controls under the ear imposed by the rule where resulting increased license application, which are submitted annually. So what kind of calculation methods or sticky and analysis they use or do such estimation?

A：Yeah, so I've not worked in the agency, so I don't have a lot of first hand knowledge about how they would do this, but I can think of how they might be able to develop certain kinds of estimates.

So as I mentioned before, the us government already controls the export of certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment. And so could take the number of licenses it received last year. For example, a as a baseline actually inform how many licenses it might expect this year. And so I could have taken a certain number and said, okay, we received 500 last year. But these new controls that were developing will encompass a new set of technologies. And therefore, we might expect more license applications. The us has been watching these markets and has a sense of who's doing what. But at the end of the day, it's an educated estimate. It's not a a there's the us doesn't have complete visibility into all of the people who are making exports of advanced. I sees into china except through past licenses that are submitted. It's also possible that they're using data on exports that are collected in other agencies.

We have something called the automated commercial environment in the united states where exporters have to record the nature of their exports as they're leaving the, united states. It's possible that they're using those types of information as well. But I think you can only develop estimates about things that you have complete visibility into a knowledge, and for particularly for a new area like supercomputers, I think they said that they would only expect five applications. And I thought that's if you there only may be a handful of facilities in china that are would meet the definition of super computers today. But a there's an interesting question as to whether data centers in china would be potentially consider supercomputers. Us government hasn't clarified that yet. If that's the case, you're talking about hundreds or hundreds and hundreds of applications potentially associated with that, I think that it's at best. I think we use the word, a guesstimate. You're guessing and estimating at the same time. I I think some of these numbers, frankly, I guesstimate.

Q：Historically, like many lobby groups and legal series agencies, play an important role in the medication for us signal trade dispute. So in your opinion, do they like still have some cow regard the nearest like the usk for restrictions with china?

A：Yes and no. I don't think that these lobbying organizations will be able to change the overall trajectory of what's happening right now. There's very significant concern within the intelligence and uh defense agencies of the united states about china's rapid rise with respect to its ability to manufacture of these. And they see it not, they see it as a strategic threat. There's also just widespread bipartisan political support for new controls on china. So republicans and democrats, even if there is a change after the midterms coming up or even in the next election, they were to switch to republican leadership. I don't think they're gonna make any changes with respect to this. So in terms of the overall policy thrust, I would say, no, they're not gonna have much effect on that. But the role that some lobby organizations and trade associations play is further educating the agency about the implications of certain roles.

So I think one the biggest role that they may play today is in educating the pilot that the licensing decision makers. So there's licensing officers, and then there's political people who are asked to kind of weigh in on sensitive applications. They're gonna be educating them on what this really means with respect, for example, a supply chain, right? They're gonna be able to come in and say, actually, we can't relocate our manufacturing of this outside of China There's nowhere else to go right now. And there's a 2 year waiting list to get into that foundry that you guys are interested in us using. So so they will be able to potentially to come in and educate them on the actual practical implications of the rules.

And then at that point, the department commerce might decide to re calibrate its decision making. But I think it's gonna be more re calibration in terms of licensing. And the issuance is of temporary general licenses that it will be an actual change in the controls themselves.