The Obama administration also has displayed a degree of flexibility and adaptiveness—on-the-job learning, so to speak—on numerous matters. On Iraq policy, for example, the president slowed down the U.S. troop withdrawal substantially—in contrast with his campaign promises—honoring most of the spirit of his earlier pledge without being bound by every letter. And when he finally brought the troops home in late 2011, according to a schedule first designed and agreed upon by President Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki back in 2008, he again was being pragmatic, even though the move elicited howls of protest from the right of the U.S. political spectrum. It is hard to see how an American president could have—or should have—retained U.S. forces abroad in a country that was not willing to take proper steps to invite them to remain under a normal legal framework. As Obama s critics sometimes fail to acknowledge, the Iraqi democracy that we helped create has a right to make its own decisions, and—as Obama would be the first to recognize—Washington has limits on its influence, even with Baghdad.
Obama s rhetoric has sometimes been misplaced, as when he declared the return of all U.S. troops from Iraq a signature accomplishment of his administration, even though his administration was on record as trying to reach an accord with Iraqis to keep them deployed there longer. But, on balance, we believe it is better for the future of U.S. military intervention abroad that the United States reestablishes its reputation for leaving when asked than for remaining where it is not wanted. The United States has spent a fortune in treasure and the blood of American soldiers to give Iraqis a chance to stand on their own feet. Now Obama must figure out how to deal with an increasingly autocratic Maliki; at a minimum, business as usual on matters like the pending U.S. sale of F-16s to Iraq should be suspended until Maliki honors his previous political pledges and constitutional obligations.
In the case of China, when initial efforts to encourage Beijing to assume greater responsibility on global issues proved disappointing, and when Beijing became more muscular in a variety of ways in Asia, the Obama team responded with effective initiatives throughout the region. Obama s experience of tensions with China was hardly unique among modern American presidents, but his task was complicated by an increasingly confident Chinese leadership that perceived an America moving toward economic and strategic decline. He did much to strengthen America s commitment to a leadership role in Asia—though his rebalancing toward Asia is not a complete answer to the need for a forward-looking relationship with China that must be partly competitive yet also cooperative and collaborative. Obama handled the immediate challenges well in 2010 and 2011, but the natural trajectory of his recent policies leaves him with serious unresolved dilemmas as to how to handle relations with the world s predominant rising power in 2012 and beyond.
