奥巴马政府还在很多问题上表现出了一定程度的灵活性和适应性——亦工作亦学习，可以这么说。比如，在对伊拉克政策上，奥巴马极大地放慢了美军的撤退计划，撤退速度比他之前在竞选总统时所承诺的放缓了许多。他成功兑现了先前的大部分承诺。按照布什和伊拉克总理努里 马利基早在2008年商定的日程计划，他最终在2011年底下令让美军撤退回国。这时，奥巴马再次变得务实起来，尽管撤军行为引发了美国右派的强烈抗议。很难想象，一位美国总统如何能够——或应该能够——让他的军队在别国驻留，而且是在一个不欢迎美军、正常法律体系内也不乐意采取行动改变态度的国家里。奥巴马的批评者有时候拒绝承认，在美国帮助下建立的伊拉克民主是有权自行作出决定的，而且，华盛顿的影响力有限，即便是对于巴格达而言——可能奥巴马会是第一个认识到这一点的人。
有时，奥巴马的言论会被误解。当他宣布所有美军从伊拉克撤退是其执政的标志性成果时，即便是奥巴马政府内的一些人仍在极力尝试与伊拉克人达成协议，试图使美军可以在伊拉克驻扎更长时间。但是，总的来说，我们相信，与其坚持在不受欢迎的地方驻留，不如在被要求离开的时候撤退，这样会更有利于美国海外军事干预的未来，美国也可以借此举重建其国际声誉。美国花费了大量钱财，牺牲了很多美国士兵的生命，为的是给伊拉克人民一个机会，让他们凭借自己的力量站起来。现在，奥巴马必须要弄清楚如何对付日益专制的马利基；至少，一些商业往来应该暂停，比如美国正在向伊拉克出售F-16战斗机这类事务，应该暂停直到马利基履行其政治承诺和宪法义务为止。
在中国问题上，奥巴马一开始努力鼓励中国在全球问题上承担更多责任，结果却令他失望，而中国在整个亚洲的地位全方位凸显，为了应对这样的局面，奥巴马团队在全亚洲地区都有效掌握了主动权。在近代的几任美国总统中，奥巴马与中国的紧张关系并不罕见。但是，由于美国在经济和策略上都在走下坡路，使得中国领导人的自信心与日俱增，奥巴马面对的任务就变得复杂起来。他作出了很大努力来加强美国对亚洲地区的领导，尽管他重新调整后的美国与亚洲国家间关系还不能完全满足中美关系的需求。中美关系必须是前瞻性的，一部分是竞争的关系，另外也要有合作与协作的关系。在2010和2011年，奥巴马很好地处理了眼前面临的挑战，但在2012年及以后，如何处理美国与崛起中的大国之间的关系，对此奥巴马采用的外交政策令他自己陷入了进退两难又亟待解决的糟糕境地之中。（高菲 译）
The Obama administration also has displayed a degree of flexibility and adaptiveness—on-the-job learning, so to speak—on numerous matters. On Iraq policy, for example, the president slowed down the U.S. troop withdrawal substantially—in contrast with his campaign promises—honoring most of the spirit of his earlier pledge without being bound by every letter. And when he finally brought the troops home in late 2011, according to a schedule first designed and agreed upon by President Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki back in 2008, he again was being pragmatic, even though the move elicited howls of protest from the right of the U.S. political spectrum. It is hard to see how an American president could have—or should have—retained U.S. forces abroad in a country that was not willing to take proper steps to invite them to remain under a normal legal framework. As Obama s critics sometimes fail to acknowledge, the Iraqi democracy that we helped create has a right to make its own decisions, and—as Obama would be the first to recognize—Washington has limits on its influence, even with Baghdad.
Obama s rhetoric has sometimes been misplaced, as when he declared the return of all U.S. troops from Iraq a signature accomplishment of his administration, even though his administration was on record as trying to reach an accord with Iraqis to keep them deployed there longer. But, on balance, we believe it is better for the future of U.S. military intervention abroad that the United States reestablishes its reputation for leaving when asked than for remaining where it is not wanted. The United States has spent a fortune in treasure and the blood of American soldiers to give Iraqis a chance to stand on their own feet. Now Obama must figure out how to deal with an increasingly autocratic Maliki; at a minimum, business as usual on matters like the pending U.S. sale of F-16s to Iraq should be suspended until Maliki honors his previous political pledges and constitutional obligations.
In the case of China, when initial efforts to encourage Beijing to assume greater responsibility on global issues proved disappointing, and when Beijing became more muscular in a variety of ways in Asia, the Obama team responded with effective initiatives throughout the region. Obama s experience of tensions with China was hardly unique among modern American presidents, but his task was complicated by an increasingly confident Chinese leadership that perceived an America moving toward economic and strategic decline. He did much to strengthen America s commitment to a leadership role in Asia—though his rebalancing toward Asia is not a complete answer to the need for a forward-looking relationship with China that must be partly competitive yet also cooperative and collaborative. Obama handled the immediate challenges well in 2010 and 2011, but the natural trajectory of his recent policies leaves him with serious unresolved dilemmas as to how to handle relations with the world s predominant rising power in 2012 and beyond.
本文来源：新华网
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王晓易_NE0011
