期刊The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2026年第1期目录及摘要

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

期刊介绍：

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review（《日内瓦风险与保险评论》，简称GRIR）是由日内瓦协会（The Geneva Association）出版的学术期刊，同时也是欧洲风险与保险经济学家协会（European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists）的官方期刊。GRIR的研究范围广泛，包括保险产品和市场的经济学、不确定性下的决策理论、个人、公司和社会的风险分担或风险缓解机制。特别关注与风险分担和缓解机制相关的市场失灵问题，例如由信息摩擦和激励问题引起的市场失灵，以及政府在通过监管或社会保险提供风险管理方面的作用。期刊的出版周期为每年两期，分别在3月和9月发布。

本期看点：

●随着工人赔偿保险成本的上升，企业有动机将员工错误地归类到表面上更安全的职业类别中，以降低保费。当法定福利提高工人赔偿保险成本时，无论是在非常规任务中发生的致命事故所占比例，还是为非常规任务风险所支付的工资差异，都会随之增加。

●研究发现，保险公司资产的管理成本会扭曲均衡价格，导致偿付能力II框架下保险公司会计估值会出现相当于其投资总额1.8%或自有资金14%的偏差，抑制了保险公司对高管理成本资产的持有。

●由于高再保险覆盖要求导致保险附加费用过高，偿付能力监管也可能抑制对巨灾风险的保险购买。适度允许巨灾状态下的保险公司违约，可在防范投保人利益受损的同时避免抑制巨灾保险购买，从而提升整体福利。

●风险往往被理解为灾难性事件发生的可能性。在平均-灾难框架下提出了一种灾难厌恶的度量方法，研究了风险决策中三个常见的问题：自我保护、投资组合选择以及保险需求。

※ 本期目录

●The wages of irregular tasks: workers’ compensation benefits and occupational misclassification

●Market equilibrium with management costs and implications for insurance accounting

●Catastrophe insurance and solvency regulation

●Disaster aversion in the mean-disaster framework and its applications

The wages of irregular tasks: workers’ compensation benefits and occupational misclassification

非常规任务的报酬：工人赔偿福利与职业误分类

作者

Michael D. Makowsky（克莱姆森大学），Kelsey Roberts Bacon（克莱姆森大学）

摘要：As workers’ compensation insurance costs increase, firms have incentive to misclassify employees under ostensibly safer job classifications to lower premiums. Using Occupational Safety and Health Agency accident investigation records, we measure employee risk of fatality while performing tasks reported to investigators as outside of employee duties (“irregular tasks”). We observe standard compensating wage differentials paid for fatal accident risk during regular tasks uncorrelated with insurance costs. Both the share of fatal accidents occurring during irregular tasks and the wage differentials paid for irregular task risk, however, increase when mandated benefits increase workers’ compensation insurance costs.

随着工人赔偿保险成本的上升，企业有动机将员工错误地归类到表面上更安全的职业类别中，以降低保费。本研究利用职业安全与健康管理局的事故调查记录，测算了员工在执行被调查人员报告为职责范围之外的任务（即“非常规任务”）时的死亡风险。我们观察到，在常规任务中，用于补偿致命事故风险的标准工资差异与保险成本并无关联。然而，当法定福利提高工人赔偿保险成本时，无论是在非常规任务中发生的致命事故所占比例，还是为非常规任务风险所支付的工资差异，都会随之增加。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-023-00093-2

Market equilibrium with management costs and implications for insurance accounting

考虑管理成本的市场均衡及其对保险会计的启示

作者

Michael Florig（巴黎综合理工学院）& Olivier Gossner（巴黎综合理工学院、伦敦政治经济学院）

摘要：We examine a general equilibrium investment model in which agents incur management costs for holding assets. We characterize the influence of these costs on equilibrium prices as a weighted average of these costs for market participants. We then propose a correction method for this influence in valuation procedures used under regulatory frameworks, such as Solvency II. For insurers subject to Solvency II, the accounting correction amounts to approximately €130 billion, the equivalent of 1.8% of investments or 14% of own funds. These results not only contribute to the understanding of management costs in market equilibrium, but also highlight a distortion in current practices which discourages the holding of assets that are expensive to manage and typically inaccessible directly by policyholders.

我们研究了一个一般均衡投资模型，其中代理人持有资产会产生管理成本。我们将这些成本对均衡价格的影响刻画为市场参与者这些成本的加权平均值。随后，我们针对诸如偿付能力II等监管框架下的估值程序，提出了一种对这种影响的修正方法。对于受偿付能力II约束的保险公司而言，这一会计修正的金额约为1300亿欧元，相当于其投资总额的1.8%或自有资金的14%。这些结果不仅有助于理解管理成本在市场均衡中的作用，也揭示了当前实践中存在的一种扭曲——这种扭曲抑制了保险公司持有那些管理成本高昂且通常保单持有人无法直接获得的资产。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-024-00107-7

Catastrophe insurance and solvency regulation

巨灾保险与偿付能力监管

作者

Arnaud Goussebaïle（苏黎世联邦理工学院），Alexis Louaas（法国Square研究中心）

摘要：Solvency regulation can prevent insurers from making decisions that are detrimental to policyholders. However, it can also discourage the purchase of insurance for catastrophic risks by causing prohibitive insurance loading due to high reinsurance coverage constraints. This paper examines this delicate trade-off. We show that a solvency regulation allowing some level of insurer default in catastrophic states can be a first-best policy. The default rate of this first-best policy varies depending on the risk line and market conditions. Our numerical simulations indicate that it is possible to closely approximate the first-best policy by implementing a straightforward solvency regulation, considering insurers’ Expected Shortfall and Value at Risk, the reinsurance loading, and policyholders’ risk aversion. Therefore, reforming current solvency regulations in this direction could improve policyholders’ welfare.

偿付能力监管可以防止保险公司做出对保单持有人不利的决策。然而，由于高再保险覆盖限制导致保险附加费用过高，偿付能力监管也可能抑制对巨灾风险的保险购买。本文探讨了这种微妙的权衡关系。我们表明，允许保险公司在巨灾状态下出现一定程度的违约的偿付能力监管可能是一种最优政策。这种最优政策的违约率因风险类型和市场条件而异。我们的数值模拟表明，通过实施一种简单的偿付能力监管，并考虑保险公司的预期亏损（Expected Shortfall）和风险价值（Value at Risk）、再保险附加费用以及保单持有人的风险厌恶程度，可以非常接近这一最优政策。因此，沿着这一方向改革当前的偿付能力监管，有望提高保单持有人的福利。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-024-00106-8

Disaster aversion in the mean-disaster framework and its applications

平均-灾难框架中的灾难厌恶及其应用

作者

Dennis W. Jansen（得克萨斯农工大学），Liqun Liu（得克萨斯农工大学）

摘要：Risk is often understood as the likelihood of a disastrous event despite the predominant notion of risk measured by the dispersion in the distribution of an outcome variable. In a mean-disaster framework, this paper proposes a measure of disaster aversion and studies the three often-encountered problems of decision making under risk: self-protection, portfolio choice, and insurance demand. Clear-cut intuitive comparative statics results are obtained for each of these decisions with respect to the effect of the strength of disaster aversion.

尽管当前主流的风险概念通常以结果变量分布的离散程度来衡量，但风险往往被理解为灾难性事件发生的可能性。在平均-灾难框架下，本文提出了一种灾难厌恶的度量方法，并研究了风险决策中三个常见的问题：自我保护、投资组合选择以及保险需求。针对每一个决策问题，本文都得到了关于灾难厌恶强度影响的清晰且直观的比较静态分析结果。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-025-00111-5