鲍威尔讲话：缩表即将告终

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Thank you, Emily. And thank you to the National Association for Business Economics for the Adam Smith Award. It is an honor just to be mentioned alongside past recipients, including my predecessors Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke. Thank you for this recognition and for the opportunity to speak with you today.

谢谢你，艾米丽。也感谢全美商业经济协会（National Association for Business Economics）授予我亚当·斯密奖。能与包括我的前任珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）和本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在内的历届获奖者相提并论，我深感荣幸。感谢你们的认可，也感谢今天有机会与大家交谈。

Monetary policy is more effective when the public understands what the Federal Reserve does and why. With that in mind, I hope to enhance understanding of one of the more arcane and technical aspects of monetary policy: the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. A colleague recently compared this topic to a trip to the dentist, but that comparison may be unfair—to dentists.

当公众理解美联储的行动及其原因时，货币政策会更加有效。本着这一想法，我希望增进大家对货币政策中一个更为晦涩和技术性方面——美联储资产负债表——的理解。一位同事最近将这个话题比作去看牙医，但这种比较可能对牙医不公平。

Today, I will discuss the essential role our balance sheet played during the pandemic, along with some lessons learned. I will then review our ample reserves implementation framework and the progress we have made toward normalizing the size of our balance sheet. I will conclude with some brief remarks on the economic outlook.

今天，我将讨论我们的资产负债表在疫情期间所扮演的关键角色，以及我们学到的一些经验教训。然后，我将回顾我们的充足准备金实施框架以及我们在资产负债表规模正常化方面取得的进展。最后，我将对经济前景做简要评论。

Background on the Fed's Balance Sheet
One of the primary purposes of a central bank is to provide the monetary foundation for the financial system and the broader economy. This foundation is made of central bank liabilities. On the Fed's balance sheet, the liability side of the ledger totaled $6.5 trillion as of October 8, and three categories account for roughly 95 percent of that total.2 First, Federal Reserve notes—that is, physical currency—totaled $2.4 trillion. Second, reserves—funds held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Banks—totaled $3.0 trillion. These deposits allow commercial banks to make and receive payments and meet regulatory requirements. Reserves are the safest and most liquid asset in the financial system, and only the Fed can create them. The adequate provision of reserves is essential to the safety and soundness of our banking system, the resilience and efficiency of our payments system, and ultimately the stability of our economy.

美联储资产负债表背景

央行的主要目的之一是为金融体系和更广泛的经济体提供货币基础。这个基础由央行负债构成。在美联储的资产负债表上，截至10月8日，负债方总额为6.5万亿美元，其中三类负债约占总额的95%。² 首先，联邦储备券——即流通中的现钞——总额为2.4万亿美元。其次，准备金——存款机构存放在联邦储备银行的资金——总额为3.0万亿美元。这些存款使商业银行能够进行收付款并满足监管要求。准备金是金融体系中最安全、流动性最强的资产，并且只有美联储能够创造它们。充足的准备金供应对于我们银行体系的安全与稳健、支付体系的弹性和效率，以及最终我们经济的稳定至关重要。

Third is the Treasury General Account (TGA), currently at about $800 billion, which essentially is the checking account for the federal government. When the Treasury makes or receives payments, those flows affect dollar-for-dollar the supply of reserves or other liabilities in the system.3

第三是财政部一般存款账户（TGA），目前约有8000亿美元，这基本上是联邦政府的支票账户。当财政部进行支付或接收款项时，这些资金流动会等额影响系统中准备金或其他负债的供给。³

The asset side of our ledger consists almost entirely of securities, including $4.2 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities and $2.1 trillion of government-guaranteed agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS).4 When we add reserves to the system, we generally do so by purchasing Treasury securities in the open market and crediting the reserve accounts of the banks involved in the transaction with the seller. This process effectively transforms securities held by the public into reserves but does not change the total amount of government liabilities held by the public.5

我们资产负债表的资产方几乎完全由证券构成，包括4.2万亿美元的美国国债和2.1万亿美元的政府担保机构抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）。⁴ 当我们向系统增加准备金时，通常是通过在公开市场上购买国债，并将相应金额计入与卖方交易的银行的准备金账户。这个过程有效地将公众持有的证券转化为准备金，但不会改变公众持有的政府负债总额。⁵

The Balance Sheet Is an Important Tool
The Fed's balance sheet serves as a critical policy tool, especially when the policy rate is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB). When COVID-19 struck in March 2020, the economy came to a near standstill and financial markets seized up, threatening to transform a public health crisis into a severe, prolonged economic downturn.

资产负债表是一个重要工具
美联储的资产负债表是一个关键的政策工具，尤其是在政策利率受到有效利率下限（ELB）约束时。当2020年3月新冠疫情来袭时，经济几乎陷入停滞，金融市场失灵，有可能将一场公共卫生危机转变为一场严重而持久的经济衰退。

In response, we established a number of emergency liquidity facilities. Those programs, supported by Congress and the Administration, provided critical support to markets and were remarkably effective in restoring confidence and stability. At their peak in July 2020, loans from these facilities totaled just over $200 billion. Most of these loans were quickly unwound as conditions stabilized.6

作为回应，我们设立了多项紧急流动性工具。这些在国会和政府支持下的计划，为市场提供了关键支持，并在恢复信心和稳定方面取得了显著成效。在2020年7月的高峰期，这些工具提供的贷款总额略超2000亿美元。随着市场状况稳定，大部分贷款很快被解除。⁶

At the same time, the market for U.S. Treasury securities—normally the deepest, most liquid market in the world and the bedrock of the global financial system—was under extraordinary pressure and on the verge of collapse. We used large-scale purchases of securities to restore functionality to the Treasury market. Faced with unprecedented market dysfunction, the Fed purchased Treasury and agency securities at an extraordinary pace in March and April of 2020. These purchases supported the flow of credit to households and businesses and fostered more accommodative financial conditions to support the recovery of the economy when it ultimately came.7 This source of policy accommodation was important as we had lowered the federal funds rate close to zero and expected it to remain there for some time.

与此同时，通常是世界上最深、流动性最强的市场，也是全球金融体系基石的美国国债市场，正承受着巨大的压力，濒临崩溃。我们通过大规模购买证券来恢复国债市场的功能。面对前所未有的市场失灵，美联储在2020年3月和4月以前所未有的速度购买了国债和机构证券。这些购买支持了对家庭和企业的信贷流动，并营造了更为宽松的金融环境，以支持经济最终到来的复苏。⁷ 这种政策宽松的来源非常重要，因为我们已将联邦基金利率降至接近零的水平，并预计将在一段时间内保持在该水平。

By June 2020, we slowed our purchase pace to a still substantial $120 billion per month. In December 2020, as the economic outlook remained highly uncertain, the FOMC said that we expected to maintain that pace of purchases "until substantial further progress has been made toward the Committee's maximum employment and price stability goals."8 That guidance provided assurance that the Fed would not prematurely withdraw support while the economic recovery remained fragile amid unprecedented conditions.

到2020年6月，我们将购买速度放缓至每月1200亿美元，这仍然是一个相当大的数额。2020年12月，由于经济前景仍然高度不确定，联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）表示，我们预计将维持这一购买速度，“直到在实现委员会的最大就业和价格稳定目标方面取得实质性进一步进展”。⁸ 这一指引提供了保证，即在经济复苏于前所未有的条件下仍然脆弱时，美联储不会过早撤回支持。

We maintained that pace of asset purchases through October 2021. By then, it had become apparent that elevated inflation was not likely to go away without a strong monetary response. At our meeting in November 2021, we announced a phaseout of asset purchases. At our next meeting in December, we doubled the pace of the taper and said that asset purchases would conclude by mid-March of 2022. Over the entire period of purchases, our securities holdings increased by $4.6 trillion.

我们一直将这一资产购买速度维持到2021年10月。到那时，情况已经很明显，若无强有力的货币政策回应，高企的通胀不太可能自行消退。在我们2021年11月的会议上，我们宣布逐步退出资产购买。在接下来的12月会议上，我们将缩减购债的步伐加倍，并表示资产购买将在2022年3月中旬结束。在整个购买期间，我们持有的证券增加了4.6万亿美元。

A number of observers have raised questions, fairly enough, about the size and composition of asset purchases during the pandemic recovery.9 Throughout 2020 and 2021, the economy continued to face significant challenges as successive waves of COVID caused widespread disruption and loss. During that tumultuous period, we continued purchases in order to avoid a sharp, unwelcome tightening of financial conditions at a time when the economy still appeared to be highly vulnerable. Our thinking was informed by recent episodes in which signals about reducing the balance sheet had triggered significant tightening in financial conditions. We were thinking of events of December 2018, as well as the 2013 "taper tantrum."10

一些观察人士对疫情恢复期间资产购买的规模和构成提出了相当合理的疑问。⁹ 在整个2020年和2021年，随着一波又一波的新冠疫情造成广泛的破坏和损失，经济持续面临重大挑战。在那个动荡时期，我们继续进行购买，以避免在经济似乎仍然非常脆弱的时候出现急剧且不受欢迎的金融条件收紧。我们的想法受到了近期一些事件的启发，在这些事件中，有关缩减资产负债表的信号曾引发了金融条件的显著收紧。我们想到的是2018年12月的事件，以及2013年的“缩减恐慌”。¹⁰

Regarding the composition of our purchases, some have questioned the inclusion of agency MBS purchases given the strong housing market during the pandemic recovery.11 Outside of purchases aimed specifically at market functioning, MBS purchases are primarily intended, like our purchases of Treasury securities, to ease broader financial conditions when the policy rate is constrained at the ELB.12 The extent to which these MBS purchases disproportionately affected housing market conditions during this period is challenging to determine. Many factors affect the mortgage market, and many factors beyond the mortgage market affect supply and demand in the broader housing market.13

关于我们购买的构成，一些人质疑在疫情恢复期间房地产市场强劲的情况下，为何要购买机构MBS。¹¹ 除了专门针对市场功能的购买外，MBS购买的主要目的，与我们购买国债一样，是在政策利率受有效利率下限（ELB）约束时，放宽更广泛的金融条件。¹² 在此期间，这些MBS购买在多大程度上对房地产市场状况产生了不成比例的影响，是难以确定的。许多因素影响抵押贷款市场，而抵押贷款市场之外的许多因素也影响着更广泛的房地产市场的供需。¹³

With the clarity of hindsight, we could have—and perhaps should have—stopped asset purchases sooner. Our real-time decisions were intended to serve as insurance against downside risks. We knew that we could unwind purchases relatively quickly once we ended them, which is exactly what we did. Research and experience tell us that asset purchases affect the economy through expectations regarding the future size and duration of our balance sheet.14 When we announced our taper, market participants began pricing in its effects, pulling forward the tightening in financial conditions.15 Stopping sooner could have made some difference, but not likely enough to fundamentally alter the trajectory of the economy. Nonetheless, our experience since 2020 does suggest that we can be more nimble in our use of the balance sheet, and more confident that our communications will foster appropriate expectations among market participants given their growing experience with these tools.

事后看来，我们本可以——或许也应该——更早停止资产购买。我们当时的实时决策旨在作为防范下行风险的保险。我们知道，一旦停止购买，我们可以相对迅速地解除它们，而这也正是我们所做的。研究和经验告诉我们，资产购买通过对我们资产负债表未来规模和持续时间的预期来影响经济。¹⁴ 当我们宣布缩减购债时，市场参与者开始计入其影响，从而提前了金融条件的收紧。¹⁵ 更早停止购买可能会产生一些影响，但可能不足以从根本上改变经济的轨迹。尽管如此，我们自2020年以来的经验确实表明，我们可以更灵活地使用资产负债表，并且更有信心，鉴于市场参与者对这些工具的经验日益丰富，我们的沟通将能培养他们形成适当的预期。

Some have also argued that we could have better explained the purpose of asset purchases in real time.16 There is always room for improved communication. But I believe our statements were reasonably clear about our objectives, which were to support and then sustain smooth market functioning and to help foster accommodative financial conditions. Over time, the relative importance of those objectives evolved with economic conditions. But the objectives were never in conflict, so at the time this issue appeared to be a distinction without much of a difference. That is not always the case, of course. For example, the March 2023 banking stress led to a sizable increase in our balance sheet through lending operations. We clearly differentiated these financial stability operations from our monetary policy stance. Indeed, we continued to raise the policy rate through that time.

一些人还认为，我们本可以在当时更好地解释资产购买的目的。¹⁶ 沟通总有改进的空间。但我相信，我们的声明对于我们的目标是相当清晰的，即支持并维持市场的平稳运行，以及帮助营造宽松的金融环境。随着时间的推移，这些目标的相对重要性随着经济状况而演变。但这些目标从未冲突，所以在当时，这个问题似乎只是一个没有太大区别的细微差别。当然，情况并非总是如此。例如，2023年3月的银行业压力导致我们的资产负债表通过贷款操作大幅增加。我们明确区分了这些旨在维护金融稳定的操作与我们的货币政策立场。事实上，在那段时间里，我们继续提高了政策利率。

Our Ample Reserves Framework Works Well
Turning to my second topic, our ample reserves regime has proven highly effective, delivering good control of our policy rate across a wide range of challenging economic conditions, while promoting financial stability and supporting a resilient payments system.17

我们的充足准备金框架运作良好
转向我的第二个话题，我们的充足准备金制度已被证明非常有效，在各种充满挑战的经济条件下，都实现了对我们政策利率的良好控制，同时促进了金融稳定并支持了一个有弹性的支付体系。¹⁷

In this framework, an ample supply of reserves ensures adequate liquidity in the banking system, and control of our policy rate is achieved through the setting of our administered rates—interest on reserve balances and the overnight reverse repo rate. This approach allows us to maintain rate control independently of the size of our balance sheet. That is important given large, unpredictable swings in liquidity demand from the private sector and significant fluctuations in autonomous factors affecting reserve supply, such as the Treasury General Account.

在这个框架下，充足的准备金供应确保了银行体系内有足够的流动性，而对我们政策利率的控制是通过设定我们的管理利率——准备金余额利息和隔夜逆回购利率——来实现的。这种方法使我们能够在控制利率的同时，不受资产负债表规模的影响。考虑到私营部门流动性需求的巨大且不可预测的波动，以及影响准备金供应的自主性因素（如财政部一般账户）的显著波动，这一点非常重要。

This framework has proven resilient whether the balance sheet is shrinking or growing. Since June 2022, we have reduced the size of our balance sheet by $2.2 trillion—from 35 percent to just under 22 percent of GDP—while maintaining effective interest rate control.18

无论资产负债表是收缩还是扩张，这个框架都显示出了韧性。自2022年6月以来，我们已将资产负债表规模缩减了2.2万亿美元——从占GDP的35%降至不足22%——同时保持了有效的利率控制。¹⁸

Our long-stated plan is to stop balance sheet runoff when reserves are somewhat above the level we judge consistent with ample reserve conditions.19 We may approach that point in coming months, and we are closely monitoring a wide range of indicators to inform this decision.20 Some signs have begun to emerge that liquidity conditions are gradually tightening, including a general firming of repo rates along with more noticeable but temporary pressures on selected dates. The Committee's plans lay out a deliberately cautious approach to avoid the kind of money market strains experienced in September 2019. Moreover, the tools of our implementation framework, including the standing repo facility and the discount window, will help contain funding pressures and keep the federal funds rate within our target range through this transition to lower reserve levels.

我们长期以来的计划是，当准备金水平略高于我们判断与充足准备金条件相符的水平时，停止缩减资产负债表。¹⁹ 我们可能在未来几个月接近这一点，并且我们正在密切监测一系列广泛的指标来为这一决策提供信息。²⁰ 一些迹象已经开始出现，表明流动性状况正在逐步收紧，包括回购利率的普遍走强，以及在特定日期出现的更明显但暂时的压力。委员会的计划制定了一个审慎的方法，以避免出现2019年9月那样的货币市场紧张状况。此外，我们实施框架的工具，包括常备回购便利和贴现窗口，将有助于遏制融资压力，并在此向较低准备金水平过渡的过程中，将联邦基金利率保持在我们的目标区间内。

Normalizing the size of our balance sheet does not mean going back to the balance sheet we had before the pandemic. In the longer run, the size of our balance sheet is determined by the public's demand for our liabilities rather than our pandemic-related asset purchases. Non-reserve liabilities currently stand about $1.1 trillion higher than just prior to the pandemic, thus requiring that our securities holdings be equally higher. Demand for reserves has risen as well, in part reflecting the growth of the banking system and the overall economy.

资产负债表规模正常化并不意味着回到疫情前的资产负债表。从长远来看，我们资产负债表的规模是由公众对我们负债的需求决定的，而不是由我们与疫情相关的资产购买决定的。目前，非准备金负债比疫情前高出约1.1万亿美元，因此要求我们持有的证券也要相应增加。对准备金的需求也有所上升，部分反映了银行体系和整体经济的增长。

Regarding the composition of our securities portfolio, relative to the outstanding universe of Treasury securities, our portfolio is currently overweight longer-term securities and underweight shorter-term securities. The longer-run composition will be a topic of Committee discussion. Transition to our desired composition will occur gradually and predictably, giving market participants time to adjust and minimizing the risk of market disruption. Consistent with our longstanding guidance, we aim for a portfolio consisting primarily of Treasury securities over the longer run.21

关于我们证券投资组合的构成，相对于已发行的国债总量，我们的投资组合目前超配长期证券，低配短期证券。长期的构成将是委员会讨论的一个议题。向我们期望的构成过渡将是渐进和可预测的，给予市场参与者调整的时间，并最大限度地降低市场扰动的风险。根据我们长期的指引，我们的目标是在长期内持有一个主要由国债构成的投资组合。²¹

Some have questioned whether the interest we pay on reserves is costly to taxpayers. In fact, that is not the case. The Fed earns interest income from the Treasury securities that back reserves. Most of the time, our interest earnings from Treasury holdings more than cover the interest paid on reserves, generating significant remittances to the Treasury. By law, we remit all profits to the Treasury after covering expenses. Since 2008, even after accounting for the recent period of negative net income, our total remittances to Treasury have totaled more than $900 billion. While our net interest income has temporarily been negative due to the rapid rise in policy rates to control inflation, this is highly unusual. Our net income will soon turn positive again, as it typically has been throughout our history. Of course, having negative net income has no bearing on our ability to conduct monetary policy or meet our financial obligations.22

一些人质疑我们支付给准备金的利息是否会给纳税人带来成本。事实上，情况并非如此。美联储从支持准备金的国债中获得利息收入。在大多数时候，我们从国债持有中获得的利息收入足以覆盖支付给准备金的利息，从而为财政部带来可观的上缴利润。根据法律，我们在扣除开支后将所有利润上缴给财政部。自2008年以来，即使考虑到近期净收入为负的时期，我们向财政部上缴的总额也超过了9000亿美元。虽然由于为控制通胀而迅速提高政策利率，我们的净利息收入暂时为负，但这是非常不寻常的。我们的净收入很快将再次转正，正如我们历史上通常的情况一样。当然，净收入为负对我们执行货币政策或履行财务义务的能力没有影响。²²

If our ability to pay interest on reserves and other liabilities were eliminated, the Fed would lose control over rates. The stance of monetary policy would no longer be appropriately calibrated to economic conditions and would push the economy away from our employment and price stability goals. To restore rate control, large sales of securities over a short period of time would be needed to shrink our balance sheet and the quantity of reserves in the system. The volume and speed of these sales could strain Treasury market functioning and compromise financial stability. Market participants would need to absorb the sales of Treasury securities and agency MBS, which would put upward pressure on the entire yield curve, raising borrowing costs for the Treasury and the private sector. Even after that volatile and disruptive process, the banking system would be less resilient and more vulnerable to liquidity shocks.

如果我们支付准备金和其他负债利息的能力被取消，美联储将失去对利率的控制。货币政策的立场将不再能根据经济状况进行适当校准，并将使经济偏离我们的就业和价格稳定目标。为了恢复利率控制，将需要在短时间内大规模出售证券，以缩减我们的资产负债表和系统中的准备金数量。这些出售的数量和速度可能会给国债市场运作带来压力，并损害金融稳定。市场参与者将需要吸收出售的国债和机构MBS，这将对整个收益率曲线施加上行压力，提高财政部和私营部门的借贷成本。即使在那个动荡和破坏性的过程之后，银行体系的韧性也会减弱，更容易受到流动性冲击的影响。

The bottom line is that our ample reserves regime has proven remarkably effective for implementing monetary policy and supporting economic and financial stability.

总而言之，我们的充足准备金制度在实施货币政策以及支持经济和金融稳定方面，已被证明非常有效。

Current Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy Outlook
I will close with a brief discussion of the economy and the outlook for monetary policy. Although some important government data have been delayed due to the shutdown, we routinely review a wide variety of public- and private-sector data that have remained available. We also maintain a nationwide network of contacts through the Reserve Banks who provide valuable insights, which will be summarized in tomorrow's Beige Book.

当前经济状况与货币政策展望
最后，我将简要讨论经济和货币政策的前景。尽管由于政府停摆，一些重要的政府数据被延迟发布，但我们例行审查了各种仍然可用的公共和私营部门数据。我们还通过各储备银行维持着一个全国性的联系网络，他们提供了宝贵的见解，这些见解将在明天的褐皮书（Beige Book）中进行总结。

Based on the data that we do have, it is fair to say that the outlook for employment and inflation does not appear to have changed much since our September meeting four weeks ago. Data available prior to the shutdown, however, show that growth in economic activity may be on a somewhat firmer trajectory than expected.

根据我们确实拥有的数据，可以公平地说，自四周前我们九月份的会议以来，就业和通胀的前景似乎没有太大变化。然而，在政府停摆前可获得的数据显示，经济活动的增长轨迹可能比预期的要稍微强劲一些。

While the unemployment rate remained low through August, payroll gains have slowed sharply, likely in part due to a decline in labor force growth due to lower immigration and labor force participation. In this less dynamic and somewhat softer labor market, the downside risks to employment appear to have risen. While official employment data for September are delayed, available evidence suggests that both layoffs and hiring remain low, and that both households' perceptions of job availability and firms' perceptions of hiring difficulty continue their downward trajectories.23

尽管截至八月份失业率保持在低位，但新增就业人数已急剧放缓，部分原因可能是由于移民减少和劳动力参与率下降导致劳动力增长放缓。在这个活力减弱、略显疲软的劳动力市场中，就业的下行风险似乎有所增加。虽然九月份的官方就业数据被延迟发布，但现有证据表明，裁员和招聘活动都保持在低水平，并且家庭对工作机会的看法和企业对招聘难度的看法都继续呈下降趋势。²³

Meanwhile, 12-month core PCE inflation was 2.9 percent in August, up slightly from earlier this year, as rising core goods inflation has outpaced continued disinflation in housing services. Available data and surveys continue to show that goods price increases primarily reflect tariffs rather than broader inflationary pressures. Consistent with these effects, near-term inflation expectations have generally increased this year, while most longer-term expectation measures remain aligned with our 2 percent goal.

与此同时，八月份的12个月核心个人消费支出（PCE）通胀率为2.9%，比今年早些时候略有上升，因为核心商品通胀的上涨超过了住房服务业的持续通缩。现有数据和调查继续显示，商品价格上涨主要反映了关税的影响，而非更广泛的通胀压力。与这些影响相一致，近期的通胀预期今年普遍上升，而大多数长期预期指标仍与我们2%的目标保持一致。

Rising downside risks to employment have shifted our assessment of the balance of risks. As a result, we judged it appropriate to take another step toward a more neutral policy stance at our September meeting. There is no risk-free path for policy as we navigate the tension between our employment and inflation goals. This challenge was evident in the dispersion of Committee participants' projections at the September meeting. I will stress again that these projections should be understood as representing a range of potential outcomes whose probabilities evolve as new information informs our meeting-by-meeting approach to policymaking. We will set policy based on the evolution of the economic outlook and the balance of risks, rather than following a predetermined path.

就业下行风险的上升改变了我们对风险平衡的评估。因此，在我们九月份的会议上，我们认为采取进一步措施，向更中性的政策立场迈进是适当的。在我们努力平衡就业和通胀目标之间的紧张关系时，不存在无风险的政策路径。这一挑战在九月份会议上委员会参与者预测的分散性中显而易见。我将再次强调，这些预测应被理解为代表了一系列可能的结果，其概率会随着新信息为我们逐次会议的决策方法提供依据而演变。我们将根据经济前景的演变和风险的平衡来制定政策，而不是遵循预设的路径。

Thank you again for this award and for inviting me to join you today. I look forward to our conversation.

再次感谢你们授予我这个奖项，并邀请我今天参加活动。我期待着我们的对话。