CII条款 SUBS 是否达成有约束力的合同-The Aquafreedom

关于涉及到CII条款和欧盟碳税问题EU ETS，总算出了一个高等法院的判例。在The Aquafreedom案[1]中，只是不涉及到相关条款执行，仅仅是关于合同谈判，是否缔结有效合同的争议。

在这个案中，Southeaster Maritime Ltd船东与Trafigura Maritime Logistics Pte Ltd就The Aquafreedom轮在2023年1月30日或2月6日是否达成对双方有约束力的4年期租合同产生争议。船东认为合同是否成立取决于双方之间的书面通信的解释和法律效力。这些主要包括邮件和Whatsapp沟通。

其中最主要的争议是以下两个带“subs”的条款。

“Terms:

As per previously agreed terms sub review both sides。

Subs:

Owners BOD subs latest 1 working day after all terms agreed.

Charterers management approval latest 2 working day after all terms agreed.”

当事人双方就涉及到的CII条款进行了长时间沟通修改[2]，当双方没有达成一致意见。

高等法院的Jacobs法官认为就 CII 条款（以及整个拟议的租船合同）而言，这是一个还盘。承租人在其提交的材料中提到了许多权威机构，包括Stevenson, Jacques & Co. v McLean (1880) 5 QBD 345 案中的旧判决，其中 Lush 法官认为，在这种情况下，特定电报“仅仅是一项询问，应该得到答复，而不应被视为拒绝该要约”。正如Chitty on Contracts 第35版，该领域的基本原则是，法律区分拒绝与纯粹询问或索要信息，而无意拒绝要约条款。[3]

Jacobs法官认为，在Formation and Variation of Contracts一书中很好地解释了这一观点：[4]

如果没有明确接受要约，则并非所有对要约的回应都是拒绝。它可能只是询问，要求提供要约的更多细节，甚至询问要约是否是最终的，或者要约人是否愿意考虑对要约条款进行一些修改。毫无疑问，如果答复是后一种类型，特别是当答复列出了受要约人询问要约是否可以改变的一些细节时，将更难以证明这只是询价而不是还盘。 然而，它是还盘还是仅仅是询问取决于对答复的解释——这里一如既往，问题是通信的收件人应该如何合理地解释它。

Jacobs法官认为在本案中，在本案中，就 CII 条款（实际上还有提到的其他一些条款）而言，在租船合同谈判中存在通常的持续过程，其中每一方都在处理另一方提出的条款和措辞，以期缩小分歧。关于CII条款，承租人拒绝绝对义务，并试图纳入修改版本：尽力而为的义务，这当然比合理的努力更严格，但达不到绝对义务。 正如Cartwright所说，在这种情况下更难证明这只是询价而不是还盘。 Jacobs法官认为毫不怀疑，就本条款而言，通信的收件人会合理地将其解释为还价而不是询价。在Jacobs法官看来，这与目前这样的租船背景下经纪人之间通常的来回往来非常相似，人们通常期望双方提出反建议，而不是提出建议。因此，在考虑了船东所依据的各点后，Jacobs法官毫不怀疑，由于上述原因，Owners' Last 在发送时无法完全接受，并且承租人提出的还盘2023 年 2 月 1 日至 2 日的电子邮件也意味着此后将不再接受 Owners' Last（即使最初能够接受）。[5]

在法院处理简易判决申请的方法中，Jacobs法官参考了Lewison法官著名的判决。[6] 法院必须考虑当事人是否有现实的、而不是幻想的成功前景。现实的主张是具有一定程度说服力的主张。这意味着这一主张不仅仅是有争议的。在得出结论时，法院不仅必须考虑在简易判决申请中实际提交的证据，而且还必须考虑可以合理预期在审判中可获得的证据。法院不必在不分析当事人在法庭陈述中所说的一切的情况下只看表面价值。在某些情况下，所提出的事实断言可能显然没有真正的实质内容，特别是在与同时期文件相矛盾的情况下。[7]

关于法律或解释问题，Lewison 法官认为根据第24部分提出的申请引起法律或解释上的缺陷的情况并不少见，并且如果法院确信它已掌握了正确确定问题所需的所有证据，并且既然双方已经有充分的机会在争论中解决这个问题，那么就应该迎难而上并作出裁决。 原因很简单：如果被申请人的案件在法律上不利，那么他实际上就没有真正的希望能够成功地完成其索赔或成功地对他的索赔进行辩护（视情况而定）。同样，如果申请人的案件不符合法律规定，则越早确定越好。如果有可能通过证据表明，虽然目前法庭上没有以文件或口头证据形式提供的材料，但此类材料很可能存在并且预计在审判时可以获得，做出简易判断是错误的，因为成功的前景是真实的，而不是幻想的。然而，仅仅认为应该允许案件进入审判阶段是不够的，因为可能会出现一些对解释问题产生影响的事情。[8]

Moore-Bick勋爵在所提到的案中认为，如果据说某份文件的撰写环境与其解释有关，特别是如果据称这些情况指向的解释并非该文件自然具有的解释，则被诉人必须提供充分的证据 这些情况使法院能够看到，如果相关事实在审判中得到证实，它们可能会对结果产生影响。[9]

关于合约解释，Jacobs法官认为，当事人的争议实质上与要求法院解释公认签订的合同条款时出现的问题没有什么不同；法官不认为任何一方认为解释原则与通常适用于合同解释问题的原则有任何不同。Jacobs法官认为关于合同解释的基本法律原则没有争议，Popplewell法官在The Ocean Neptune案[10]的判决中方便地总结了这些内容，该判决被Chitty on Contracts引用。[11]

法院的任务是确定当事人选择用来表达协议的语言的客观含义。法院必须考虑所使用的语言并确定什么是合理的人，即具有所有背景知识的人当事人在签订合同时所处的情况下可以合理地获得该信息，并且能够理解当事人的意思。法院必须将合同视为一个整体，并根据合同的性质、形式和质量在起草合同时，或多或少地考虑更广泛背景的要素，以达成其对所用语言的客观含义的看法。如果有两种可能的解释，法院有权优先选择符合商业常识的解释并拒绝另一种解释。解释是一项统一的工作；在语言给出的指示与竞争解释的含义之间取得平衡时，法院必须考虑条款起草的质量，并且还必须意识到这样一种可能性，即一方可能同意了事后看来不符合其利益的某件事；同样，法院绝不能忽视一项条款可能是经过谈判达成的妥协方案或谈判者无法商定更准确条款的可能性。这种统一的做法涉及一个迭代过程，根据合同条款检查每项建议的解释，并调查其商业后果。更详细的分析是从事实背景和竞争性解释的含义开始，还是从仔细审查合同中的相关语言开始，并不重要，只要法院平衡每个人给出的含义即可。

Jacobs法官认为该摘要综合了过去10年英国最高法院3个权威判决中所阐述合约解释的原则。[12]

Jacobs法官认为现在已经非常明确地确定，在租船合同中，带有subs或者subjects的协议表明合同存在一些尚未履行的先决条件。具有约束力的合同的签订取决于相关一方或多方同意摘除这些限定条件。提及近几年来涉及subs/subject to的案例[13]，Jacobs法官认为带有subject的合同很明显是否定合同意图，与subject to contract格式有相同的法律效力。这意味着这些subject在解除之前，双方之间不存在合同合同。套用Lewison勋爵的话，须经承租人管理层批准的协议根本就不是协议。这意味着在本案中，合同中相关subs的明确含义是在解除这些subs之前不存在具有约束力的合同。因此，出于这个原因，在2023年1月30日不存在具有约束力的合同；在同意所有条款之前不存在具有约束力的合同，承租人的主张不成立。

此外，在2月6日Whatsapp的信息，Jacobs法官拒绝接受这样的建议，即该消息应该以某种方式被忽视，或者在某种程度上不那么重要，因为它是通过 WhatsApp 而不是电子邮件发送的，因为这种建议是异想天开，没有任何真正的成功前景。之前的信件中没有任何内容表明传达所有者立场的消息无法通过 Whatsapp发送，或者这是非官方渠道的性质，并且已经给出了一些重要消息的示例是通过 Whatsapp 传达的。法官认为如果批评信息中的言论是口头发出的，而不是通过 Whatsapp 发出的没有理由忽视它们。如果是口头表达的话，很可能会对到底说了什么产生争议。因此，重要的问题是信息传达的内容，而不是形式，邮件还是Whatsapp所发送。法官认为，Whatsapp所发的内容与“我们不同意这些条款”的说法并没有显著不同。在声明他们不在那里做生意的情况下，这些早期的话意味着船东不愿意按照正在讨论的条款签订合同。

出于这些理由，Jacobs法官认为在本案中，没有达成有约束力的合同，船东申请简易判决成功。

在航运实务谈判中，当事人双方，很多时候中间有经纪人，为了方便，经常电话、电邮、微信、QQ、whatsapp及skype等都可能用上。这些不同形式的沟通交流都可能达成有约束力的合同，最主要是看所表达的真正含义。

早先的案例，Ackner勋爵认为当还在谈判的时候，任何一方在任何时候以任何理由都有权退出谈判。Ackner勋爵的这一观点也被其他法官及贵族院所接受。这是个对原则极不妥协的陈述，使得谈判的协议在实际中变得毫无用处；如果损害赔偿是根据另一方的期望或履行利益而进行的，作为任何违反合同签订前协议的损害赔偿将变得名存实亡。[14]

Lloyd勋爵在Pagnan S.p.A. v. Feed Products Ltd 案[15]中也归纳了一些基本原则：

(1) 为了确定在通信交往过程中合同是否已经缔结，首先要看整个通信往来。

(2) 即使各方已经就拟议合同的所有条款达成一致，但他们可能打算在达成一些进一步的条件之前，合同不具有约束力。这是普通的“Sub to Contract”案件。

(3) 另外，他们可能打算在达成一些进一步的条款之前，合同不具有约束力。

(4) 相反地，即使有进一步的条件尚待商定或进一步的手续需完成，双方可能打算立即受到约束。

(5) 如果双方未能就这样的进一步条款达成一致，那么现有的合同不会失效，除非未能就这些进一步的条款达成一致，会导致合同整体不可履行或者不确定。

判断一合约是否已经成立，不可以在某个特定的时间上划一界限，然后来判断成立与否；而应该看谈判过程中，前前后后所发生的一切整体来判断。上诉法院的Lewison勋爵在Clydesdale Bank Plc v Duffy案[16]中说，这只是对既定原则的反映，为了决定在一系列来文中是否达成了具有约束力的协议，法院必须审视整个系列，而不是停留在所谓的协议之日。要约函是“Subject to contract”，以合同为准，公认的是这样的方式来处理是在否定合同意图。[17] 因此，在日常实务中正确的做法是询问一个理性的，精通业务的人如何理解双方之间的交流。没有任何法律上的理由认为，双方当时不打算签订合同，而是简化他们的书面合同；并期望书面文件应该包含比之前已达成一致的双方承若更详细的定义。[18]

[1] The Aquafreedom [2024] EWHC 255 (Comm).

[2] Charterers agree to make BEST endeavours to return the vessel to Owners with no less than C rating.

[3] Chitty on Contracts, 35th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, at para.4-124:

“Whether the communication is a counter-offer or a request for information depends on the intention, objectively ascertained, with which it is made.”

[4] Cartwright: Formation and Variation of Contracts, 3rd ed:

“Not every response to an offer is a rejection if it does not unequivocally accept the offer. It may be merely an inquiry, asking for further details of the offer, or even asking for guidance about whether the offer is final or whether the offeror might be willing to consider some variation to the terms of the offer. No doubt if the response is of this latter kind, particularly where the response sets out some particulars on which the offeree is asking whether the offer might be varied, it will be more difficult to show that it was only an inquiry and not a counter offer. However, whether it is a counter-offer or merely an inquiry depends upon the interpretation of the response—and here, as always, the question is how the addressee of the communication ought reasonably to have interpreted it.”

[5] The Aquafreedom, per Jacobs J. at [55]-[56].

[6] Easyair Ltd (t/a Openair) v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), per Lewison J. at [15].

“The correct approach on applications by defendants is, in my judgment, as follows:

i)The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91;

ii) A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8];

iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”: Swain v Hillman;

iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10];

v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550;

vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63; ”

[7] The Aquafreedom, per Jacobs J. at [95]:

“The court must consider whether the party has a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. A realistic claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable. In reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial. The court does not have to take at face value and without analysis everything that parties say in their statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents.”

[8] Easyair Ltd (t/a Openair) v Opal Telecom Ltd, ibid, per Lewison J. at [15]:

“On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction.”

[9] ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725, per Moore-Bick LJ at [13].

[10] The Ocean Neptune [2018] EWHC 163 (Comm), per Popplewell J. at [8].

[11] Chitty on Contracts, 35th ed, at para.16-053:

“The court’s task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen in which to express their agreement. The court must consider the language used and ascertain what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract, would have understood the parties to have meant. The court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to the objective meaning of the language used. If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other. Interpretation is a unitary exercise; in striking a balance between the indications given by the language and the implications of the competing constructions, the court must consider the quality of drafting of the clause and it must also be alive to the possibility that one side may have agreed to something which with hindsight did not serve his interest; similarly, the court must not lose sight of the possibility that a provision may be a negotiated compromise or that the negotiators were not able to agree more precise terms. This unitary exercise involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are investigated. It does not matter whether the more detailed analysis commences with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as the court balances the indications given by each.”

[12] Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24.

[13] Goodwood Investments v Thyssenkrupp Industrial Solutions [2018] EWHC 1056 (Comm); The Leonidas [2020] EWHC 1986 (Comm); The Newcastle Express [2022] EWCA Civ 1555.

[14] Walford v Miles [1992] 2 A.C. 128:

“In my judgment, while negotiations are in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from those negotiations, at any time and for any reason. There can be thus no obligation to continue to negotiate until there is a ‘proper reason’ to withdraw. Accordingly a bare agreement to negotiate has no legal content.”

[15] Pagnan S.p.A. v. Feed Products Ltd [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.601(C.A.):

(1)In order to determine whether a contract has been concluded in the course of correspondence, one must first look to the correspondence as a whole. See Hussey v. Horne-Payne (1879) 4 App. Cas. 311.

(2)Even if the parties have reached agreement on all the terms of the proposed contract, nevertheless they may intend that the contract shall not become binding until some further condition has been fulfilled. That is the ordinary "subject to contract" case.

(3)Alternatively, they may intend that the contract shall not become binding until some further term or terms have been agreed; see Love and Stewart v. Instone, where the parties failed to agree the intended strike clause, and Hussey v. Horne-Payne, where Lord Selborne said at p. 323.

(4)Conversely, the parties may intend to be bound forthwith even though there are further terms still to be agreed or some further formality to be fulfilled (see Love and Stewart v. Instone per Lord Loreburn at p. 476).

(5)If the parties fail to reach agreement on such further terms, the existing contract is not invalidated unless the failure to reach agreement on such further terms renders the contract as a whole unworkable or void for uncertainty.

[16] Clydesdale Bank Plc v Duffy [2014] EWCA Civ 1260, at [12].

[17] Global Asset Capital, Inc & Anor v Aabar Block S.A.R.L. & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ 37, at [40].

[18] Bear Stearns Bank Plc v Forum Global Equity Ltd [2007] EWHC 1576, at [171].

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