《西方国企的兴衰》016：国企的效率真的不如私企吗？

作者：吴刚梁

导语：在人们的印象中，国企的效率肯定不如民企。事实上是这样吗? 如果是，背后的原因又是什么呢，仅仅是因为所有制不同吗？有人说，国企一定搞不好，有人说，如果管理得当，国企同样也能成功，不一定非得进行产权改革不可。您同意哪种观点？老吴今天带您读原著。记得在最后一部分还有老吴的“精彩”点评哦。

实证研究：国企的效率并一定比私企低

It is extremely difficult to compare efficiency in private enterprises and SOEs because it is not easy to find two exactly comparable firms operating in the same country.

要拿国企与私企的效率作比较是非常困难的，因为很难在同一国家找到两家具有可比性的企业。

Electricity utilities in the United States provide one exception. They have been described as being "as close to perfection in public-private comparability as any other imaginable real world case" (Yunker 1975, 66).

不过，美国的供电企业却是个例外。有人说它们“在公私企业的可比性方面，堪称完美。” (Yunker 1975, 66)。

Private electricity utilities in California have conceded that their costs are higher than those of state-owned electricity firms but have argued that their territories are more difficult to serve (Neuberg 1977, 310n.).

加州的私营电力公司承认它们的成本比国有电力公司更高，但他们认为，这是因为在它们的服务区域，展业难度更大(Neuberg 1977, 310n.)。

Different electricity firms also have different input costs because one uses hydroelectric power and another coal, or because the cost of capital is lower for the SOE: municipal firms in the United States can raise funds by issuing tax-exempt bonds.

此外，各家电力公司投入的成本也不一样：一家是水力发电，另一家是煤炭发电。还有，国有电力公司的资金成本更低。作为美国的市政公司，它可以通过发行免税的债券来募资。

At the same time, it may be argued that differences in input costs are a result of the lack of pressure on management to bargain.

也有人认为，私营电力投入成本高，是因为其管理层没有认真讨价还价的压力。

Despite these difficulties, a number of studies have contrasted similarly situated private enterprises and SOEs, that is, cases in which both operate in the same country and in the same environment, such as electric power and refuse collection in the United States. These studies are summarized in Aharoni (1986, 196-201).

尽管搞比较研究相当困难，但还是有很多人将各方面类似的私企和国企进行比较，例如美国的电力公司和垃圾处理公司。Aharoni (1986, 196-201)对这些研究进行了综述。

Several showed that municipal electricity firms in the United States were more efficient even when size and the use of hydroelectric power were controlled for (Hellman 1972; Yunker 1975).

一些研究表明，美国市政所属的电力公司效率更高，尽管它们的发电量和用电量受到政府控制(Hellman 1972; Yunker 1975)。

Overall, the studies of electricity utilities in the United States do not provide support for the assumed superiority of private ownership, although several of the researchers clearly had an ideological bias and tried to substantiate this superiority (see, for example, De Alessi 1980).

总体上，对美国各电力公司的研究表明，私营企业的效率并不见得高，尽管有一些研究人员抱有意识形态偏见，总想证实私营企业在经营效率上有优势（参见De Alessi 1980）。

Gordon (1981) did not find any performance differences when she compared investor-owned and state-owned telephone firms.

Gordon(1981)在对私有和国有的电信企业进行比较研究时，也没有发现两类企业存在什么业绩差异。

Other studies, such as those of fire departments, have found private enterprises to be more efficient (Ahlbrandt 1973; Poole 1983). Most studies in North America have also pointed out that private refuse collection is cheaper. Blankart (1979) reached similar conclusions in a comparison of private and public bus systems.

另外一些研究（主要是消防部门的研究），发现私营企业更有效率(Ahlbrandt 1973; Poole 1983)。大多数针对北美的研究也指出，私营垃圾处理公司的价格更便宜。Blankart(1979)在对公交系统的比较研究时，也得出过类似结论。

Caves and Christensen (1980) studied one of the few cases in which the effects of property rights can be isolated from those of noncompetitive markets and regulation. They studied the Canadian railroad industry, in which there are two large railroads of roughly the same size.

Caves和Christensen(1980)在研究过程中，剔除了非竞争性市场和监管等因素的影响，把所有权的差异单独拿出来比较。他们研究了加拿大的铁路行业，其中有两家铁路公司的规模相仿。这种研究案例非常难得。

One is the privately owned Canadian Pacific and the other is the state-owned Canadian National. Both compete nationally. They reported that contrary to what is predicted in the property rights literature, we find no evidence of inferior efficiency performance by the government-owned railroad.

一家是私营的CP(Canadian Pacific)，另一家则是国有的CN（Canadian National）。他们研究的结果是，与人们的预期相反，没有发现国有铁路的效率更低。

In fact, our evidence indicates that the CN [Canadian National] has achieved larger gains in productivity than the CP [Canadian Pacific] since 1956. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the CN had a level of productivity approximately 90 percent as high as the CP, but this gap has been closed.

事实上，他们的证据表明，自1956年以来，CN在生产率方面比CP提升更多。在20世纪50年代末和60年代初，CN的生产率大约是CP的90%，但如今这个差距几乎没了。

We conclude that in the case of Canadian railroads the beneficial effects of competition have been sufficient to overcome any tendency toward inefficiency resulting from public ownership. (Caves and Christensen 1980, 960-1)

他们的结论是：在加拿大铁路行业，公有制导致的低效率，可以通过创造一个竞争性环境来弥补(Caves and Christensen 1980, 960-1)。

They concluded that "public ownership is not inherently less efficient than private ownership - that the oft-noted inefficiency of government enterprises stems from their isolation from effective competition rather than their public ownership per se" (p. 974).

他们说，“公有制的效率并非天然不如私有制——公有制企业经常表现出效率低下，主要原因是缺乏竞争机制，而不是公有制本身有问题。”（第974页）。

In a later publication, Caves and Christensen continued their investigation with two other authors, this time comparing the economic performance of U.S. and Canadian railroads. They concluded that the degree of economic regulation had a strong influence on the economic performance of North American railroads.

后来，Cave和Christensen以及另外两人继续他们的研究，他们比较了美国和加拿大铁路行业的业绩水平。结论是，监管力度对北美铁路的业绩水平有很大的影响。

"When one controls for the influence of regulation, there is little indication that ownership form influences performance" (in Stanbury and Thompson 1982, 146-7). The substantially less regulated Canadian railroads performed significantly better than the more regulated U.S. railroads in terms of productivity growth rates.

“如果剔除监管因素的影响，没有迹象表明所有制形式会影响业绩”(Stanbury and Thompson 1982, 146-7)。在监管力度较弱的加拿大，其铁路公司的生产率增长指标明显好于监管力度较强的美国铁路公司。

The productivity levels of the two Canadian railroads and their growth rates exceeded those of all U.S. railroads except three small ones.

这两家加拿大铁路公司的生产水平及其增长率都超过了美国的铁路公司，只有三家小型铁路公司除外。

The authors concluded that the "specific explanation for the superior economic performance of the two Canadian railroads must ultimately lie in the area of organizational design and control" (Stanbury and Thompson 1982, 147).

作者的结论是，“加拿大两家铁路公司业绩表现良好，具体原因是其组织和控制方面做得好”(Stanbury and Thompson 1982,147)。

On the other hand, Davies (1971) compared the performance of the two domestic regulated Australian air carriers for the sixteen-year period from 1958-9 to 1973-4.

另一方面，Davies(1971)对两家澳大利亚国内航空公司在16年内的业绩作了比较（1958-1974年）。

He concluded: "The evidence indicates that the private firm [Ansett Airlines], operating under the rules and customs associated with exchangeable private property rights, is more productive than the public enterprise [Trans-Australia Airlines]" (Davies 1977, 226).

他的结论是：“证据表明，私营企业（Ansett航空公司）比国有企业（泛澳航空公司）的生产率更高。” 根据当地的法律和商业惯例，Ansett航空的产权是可以自由转让的。(Davies 1977, 226)。

William A. Jordan (in Stanbury and Thompson 1982, 161-99) claimed that Davies used consolidated figures for Ansett and its four subsidiaries, but only one of these subsidiaries was similar to the state-owned Trans-Australia Airlines in providing interstate trunk operations.

不过他的财务分析有问题。Jordan（Stanbury and Thompson 1982，161-99）称Davies使用了Ansett及其四家子公司的合并报表数据，但其中只有一家子公司的业务与国有的泛澳航空公司相似，两者都从事跨州干线运营。

Based on a more detailed breakdown of the figures, Jordan claimed: "Ownership is not a relevant factor in airline performance where regulatory monopolies exist."

经过分解更多的数据，Jordan称：“在存在监管垄断的情况下，所有制与航空公司业绩无关。”

Davies (1981) also compared Australian private and state-owned banks.

Davies (1981)还对澳大利亚的私有银行和国有银行的业绩进行了比较。

Finsinger (1983a, 1983b) studied the performance of insurance markets in the Federal Republic of Germany, and concluded that SOEs and mutual companies outperformed privately owned joint-stock companies.

Finsinger (1983a, 1983b)研究了德意志联邦共和国保险市场的表现，得出结论：国有保险公司和互助保险公司的表现优于私有的股份制企业。

A number of other studies, mostly of developing countries, concluded that private enterprises perform better than SOEs (Bennet and Johnson 1979; Boardman and Vining 1989).

但其他一些研究（主要针对发展中国家）的结论是，私营企业的表现优于国有企业（Bennet and Johnson 1979; Boardman and Vining 1989）。

Borcherding et al. (1982) summarized the findings of more than fifty studies, forty of which attributed superior results to private firms. Millward (1982, 83), on the other hand, found "no broad support for private enterprise superiority. . . . [T]here seems no general grounds for believing managerial efficiency is less in public firms."

Borcherding等人（1982）综合了50多项研究成果，发现其中40项研究发现私营企业的效率更高。然而，Millward（1982, 83）发现“没有广泛的证据表明私营企业更具优势……似乎也没有足够的理由认为国有企业的管理效率更低。”

所有制之外的因素

All in all, the empirical evidence on the issue of private versus public efficiency has been somewhat ambiguous, and the conclusions reached may have been based more on ideological beliefs than on clear statistical tests.

总之，关于私营企业与国有企业效率问题的实证研究得出的结论是不确定的，因此，各种结论可能更多地是基于意识形态的差异，而不是明确的统计检验。

The early studies of this issue attempted to contrast comparable firms in terms of economic activities carried out, size of firms, and enterprise objectives. Finding pairs that differ only in ownership has turned out to be an arduous task (for a summary, see, for, Aharoni 1986; Borcherding et al. 1982; Millward 1982; Millward and Parker 1983).

对于这个问题，早期研究试图从企业的业务范围、规模和目标等方面进行对比研究，但是要找到除所有制不同、其他方面都一致的两家公司，难度非常之大。（请参阅Aharoni 1986; Borcherding et al. 1982; Millward 1982; Millward and Parker 1983)。

The most obvious gaps in results may be related to the country or level of development (more studies pointing to superior SOE performance were carried out in North America or Europe) and to the level of competition.

结果，企业之间存在的业绩差距，可能主要是国别或发展阶段不同导致的，也可能是各自不同的市场竞争程度导致的。例如，北美和欧洲的国企业绩就比较出色。

Thus, Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 426) conclude: "Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence support the view that ownership is most efficient and hence privatization is most suitable in markets where effective (actual and potential) competition prevails." Where SOEs operate in noncompetitive markets, the results and interpretations are less clear.

因此，Vickers和Yarrow(1988, 426)得出结论：“理论分析和实证数据支持这样的观点，即如果一个地方的市场竞争程度高，则所有制才重要，且私有化最适合。”换句话说，如果一个地方的竞争环境差，研究的结论就不太明确。

To Kikeri et al. (1992, 21), however, privatization is "the outcome most likely to produce positive gains. At the very least, the burden of proof is on those who espouse the creation and maintenance of SOEs. The evidence in this book repeatedly points to the conclusion that ownership itself matters" (emphasis in original).

Kikeri等人（1992,21）认为，私有化“对很多人来说都是好事情，至少，举证责任落会在那些支持建立和维护国企的人身上。本书反复强调所有制本身很重要。”

The difference in the tone of the conclusions may be ascribed in part to the ideological beliefs of the researchers. It may also be ascribed to political factors. Any enterprise is nestled within a socioeconomic system whose institutions and rules of play are crucial to understanding its performance.

这些结论相差很大，很大一部分原因是研究人员的意识形态造成的，也有一部分原因是政治因素。任何企业都处于一个社会经济体系中，其制度和运行规则对理解企业的绩效至关重要。

There seems to be growing evidence that although ownership does not matter in theory, governments behave differently when they deal with private investors than when they control SOEs. Perhaps subsidies to private firms are harder to sustain than SOE losses (Boycko et al. 1996).

似乎有越来越多的证据表明，尽管国有还是私有在理论上并不重要，但实践中，政府在与私营投资者打交道的方式，与它们控制国有企业的方式完全不同。或许政府对私企的补贴，要比补贴国企的亏损难得多（Boycko et al. 1996）。

In the last decade or two, there has been an increasing tendency to measure performance by comparing performance before and after privatization. Different studies, however, use different criteria for performance and therefore are not strictly comparable.

在过去的一二十年中，越来越多的人喜欢通过对企业私有化前后进行比较，来衡量它们的业绩变化。然而，不同的研究使用不同的标准，因此严格来说没有可比性。

Most studies emphasize policy variables (Cook and Kirkpatrick 1988; Franks 1993; Galiani and Petrecolla 1996; Goodman and Loveman 1991; Hutchinson 1991; Lieberman 1993; Luders 1993; McDonald 1993; Milman and Lundstedt 1994; Parker and Martin 1993; Perry and Rainey 1988; Pouder 1996; Ramamurti 1996; Ramanadham 1993).

大多数研究强调把政策作为变量（Cook and Kirkpatrick 1988; Franks 1993; Galiani and Petrecolla 1996; Goodman and Loveman 1991; Hutchinson 1991; Lieberman 1993; Luders 1993; McDonald 1993; Milman and Lundstedt 1994; Parker and Martin 1993; Perry and Rainey 1988; Pouder 1996; Ramamurti 1996; Ramanadham 1993)。

Several studies, such as those in Great Britain, have shown that many of the efficiency gains of SOEs were achieved before privatization took place but after it was declared (Bishop and Kay 1988; Megginson et al. 1994). This does not support the hypothesis that the reason for improved performance was a change of ownership.

多项研究表明（例如英国的研究），国企效率的提高是在私有化宣布之后、实施之前实现的(Bishop and Kay 1988; Megginson et al. 1994)，因此，如果说私有化会提高国企的绩效，这个假设并不成立。

Moreover, changes in organizational status do not appear to guarantee improved performance (Parker and Hartley 1991).

此外，组织结构的改变似乎并不能保证业绩的改善（Parker and Hartley 1991）。

Increased levels of performance came from short-term causes, such as higher prices and reductions in the size of the work force, and from longer-term effects, such as more aggressive cost control and a deliberate effort to increase productivity.

业绩水平的提高，可能是因为短期因素，如，产品价格上涨，裁员，也可能是由于长期因素，如更激进的成本控制，努力提高生产率。

It seems too early to predict the long term impact of privatization. There are, however, growing signs that privatization has reduced the opportunistic behavior of government (Levy and Spiller 1994).

因此，从长期看，私有化会带来什么影响，现在作判断还为时过早。然而，越来越多的迹象表明，私有化确实可以减少政府的机会主义行为（Levy and Spiller 1994)。

Theoretically, these changes could have come about without privatization. Unfortunately they did not, except when ownership was maintained and a management contract was used.

从理论上讲，如果不搞私有化，政府也可以减少国企的机会主义行为。不幸的是，这种情况没有出现，除非在国企实行管理契约化才能实现。

Experience seems to indicate that promises and threats between state organs and SOEs are seen as less credible than those between the state and private investors. Governments are also less disciplined in using their sovereign rights vis-a-vis SOEs.

经验表明，政府对私人投资者的承诺或威胁能说到做到，但对国企就不一样了。政府对国企进行执法也不那么严厉。

Despite theoretical arguments, the relations between governments and SOEs tend to be much less transparent than the relations with private enterprises.

政府与国企之间的关系往往远不如政府与民企那样透明，尽管这个问题存在争议。

Galal et al. (1994) analyzed twelve divestiture cases from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and the United Kingdom (three telecommunications firms, four airlines, two electricity companies, a container terminal, a truck transport company, and a lottery).

Galal等人(1994)分析了来自智利、马来西亚、墨西哥和英国的12起国有资产剥离案例，其中包括3家电信公司、4家航空公司、2家电力公司、1家集装箱码头、1家卡车运输公司和1家彩票公司。

Their study measured the effects of divestiture on the producers, consumers, workers, government, and competitors over time to capture dynamic effects.

他们评估了资产剥离对生产商、消费者、工人、政府和竞争对手的影响。

It isolated the effects of ownership from other factors by asking: What would have happened without divestiture? The study claimed that divestiture improved world and domestic welfare in eleven of the twelve cases.

研究过程中，他们设计的问题是：如果没有资产剥离，会发生什么？他们把所有权的影响与其他因素隔离开来。研究称，上述12起产权改革案例中，有11家改善了国内外的效益。

The gains came primarily from improved productivity, increased investment, and better pricing, and they occurred in both competitive and monopoly markets. It is too early to predict whether these results are sustainable.

这些效益主要来自生产率的提高、投资的增加和更合理的定价，无论是在竞争市场还是垄断市场。不过，现在还无法判定这种结果能否持续。

Again, more often than not, increases in the efficiency of privatized enterprises could be traced to one-time adjustments caused by sharp increases in sales prices or a drastic reduction of the labor force.

同样，私有化企业效率的提高往往是产品价格急剧上涨或大幅裁员造成的，这些手段都是一次性的。

It is possible that managers, freed from government restrictions, reduced the payroll and raised prices, so the positive results were the consequence of a shakeup rather than a change of ownership.

有一种可能情况是，国企私有化后，管理人员可以不受政府限制而减少员工的工资，并提高产品价格，因此，绩效的提高是重组的结果，而不仅仅是所有权的变更。

Moreover, to ask what would have happened without divestiture is to assume that institutional and regulatory changes were possible only because of the change of ownership.

此外，他们在研究中设问：如果没有资产剥离会发生什么？显然，他们其实是假设了只有所有权的变更才可能导致制度和监管的变化。

The World Bank carried out a detailed study showing that the retention of state ownership together with contracting management to a global private firm was successful when the government gave the private management the freedom to run the business.

世界银行进行了一项研究表明，政府在保留国有制的同时，与全球化的私营公司签订管理合约，对国企实行契约化管理，给予管理公司自由管理的权利，这种情况下国企同样能经营成功。

Conversely, "all but one of the borderline or unsuccessful contracts limited management authority over labor" (World Bank 1995, 143). There may also have been some neglect of long-term needs (Fells and Lucas 1992).

然而，“除了极少数情况，所有合同都限制了管理层对劳工行使权利”（World Bank 1995,143）。此外，私有化企业的长期需求也经常被忽视（Fells and Lucas 1992)。

The studies cited, therefore, seem to call for a conclusion of a different sort. The success of an enterprise and its economic (or social) performance depend more on the quality of its management and on its discretion to adapt strategy to a changing environment than on ownership (see Aharoni 1981a; Ogden and Watson 1996).

因此，上述研究应该得一些出不同的结论。企业要取得成功和取得良好的业绩，更多地是要依靠他的管理水平的提高，以及根据不断变化的环境来调整自己的战略，而不是仅仅是靠所有权改革（see Aharoni 1981a; Ogden and Watson 1996）。

Moreover, the transformation of social and economic systems depends on the institutions operating in each society and on the way they operate. It may also depend on the social and moral habits that differentiate institutions, such as the degree of social solidarity of the culture (Fukuyama 1995).

此外，社会和经济的转型，取决于社会制度及其运作模式。它也可能取决于制度之外的道德习惯，例如，社会的团结，文化的统一(Fukuyama 1995)。

The ineluctable fact is that most SOEs in developing countries have had a dismal economic performance, at least in strict economic terms, and that most electorates and civil servants have lost faith in the capacity of SOEs to achieve superior economic results.

不可避免的事实是，从经济角度看，大多数发展中国家的国企都有经营惨淡，选民和政府人员对国企的经营能力失去了信心。

The failure of the Soviet Union taught the world quite chilling lessons about the limitations of a centralized economic system in a globally interdependent world. Proponents of SOEs found themselves very much on the defensive.

苏联的垮台给世人上了可怕的一课：在一个相互依存的世界，中央集权体制是有很大局限性的。这也让国企的支持者的感到十分被动。

Yet those who rightly attacked government intervention and dirigiste policies seem to have reached much too sweeping conclusions. The performance of SOEs has been disconcerting, but much of the success after privatization seems to be a result of the freedom from restraints regarding the labor force, investment, and prices.

然而，对于那些抨击政府干预和管制政策的人，他们得出的结论过于笼统。国企的业绩固然不佳，但私有化的成功，很大程度上却是因为私有化企业的劳动力、投资和价格不再受到政府的限制。

In other words, performance improved because the environment and the rules of the game changed, not because ownership changed.

换句话说，私有化企业业绩的提升是因为环境和游戏规则的变化，而不是所有权的变化。

老吴点评

文中的核心观点是，企业绩效的好坏不是取决于所有制形式，而是取决于经营环境。换句话说，如果有完善的经营管理机制和外部竞争环境，国企同样也能搞好。

回到国内，中国也一直在争论国企产权改革问题，在15年前，出现了“郎顾之争”。周其仁、张维迎等经济学家认为国企存在所有者缺位问题，对国企进行小修小补没用，必须进行产权改革。出售国企股权成为当时主要的改革形式。但郎 咸平等人认为，国企要搞好，关键是要增强职业经理人的信托责任，这也是本文作者的观点。

老吴认为，国企与私企的所有权激励效果是不一样的。实践证明，我国国企曾经搞过权让利、承包经营等方式，虽然在短期内取得一定效果，但长期来看，还是要落到产权改革上来，所谓的“信托责任”以及强化管理很难成为硬约束。

当然，产权改革并不意味着要“一卖了之”，私有化也不是“一私就灵”。正如文中所述，很多企业在私有化之后，表面上取得了立竿见影的财务效果。但实际上，这些财务业绩是靠一次性裁员或产品提价带来的，企业自身的经营能力未必真的得到了改善。

混合所有制也是一种产权改革。老吴不由想起了中国联通的混改。媒体鼓噪联通在混改之后业绩立即得到了大幅提升。但实际上，联通的负债率下降，2018年利润增长858%，都是引入社会资本产生的直接效果，而且是“一次性”的，企业经营能力的提升需要较长的时间，混改不可能“一混就灵”。详情可参考老吴的《中国联通Q1净利润增长23%，国企混改真的“一混就灵”吗？》。

老吴认为国企改革要成功，就必须涉及到产权改革，通过产权改革倒逼国企转换经营机制。混合所有制改革比较适合中国国情，改革中一方面要加强混改企业的治理，比如建立外部董事制度和对职业经理人实施契约化管理。同时，还要加强市场化建设和法治建设，为混改企业创造一个良好的营商环境。

总之，产权改革不一定必然带来企业经营能力的提升，但不进行产权改革，仅靠完善市场制度，创造竞争环境，国企也很难实现内部经营机制的转变。只有双管齐下，内外结合，国企改革才能获得成功。

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