徐伟钧：成立国家情报局，日本有何战略野心？

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导语：7月31日，日本政府正式设立“国家情报局”。同日，由日本首相高市早苗担任主席、内阁官房长官木原稔等9名阁僚组成的“国家情报会议”举行首次会议。作为新的情报统合机构，国家情报局负责汇集警察厅、外务省、防卫省、公安调查厅等部门的情报，并拥有综合协调权限，向国家情报会议提供情报。在这一新体制下，战后长期条块分割、分散于不同省厅的日本情报体系，开始由分散走向集中，情报统筹与决策中枢进一步向首相官邸集中。

有分析指出，日本此轮情报系统改革，正与近年来的安全政策调整彼此咬合。从放宽武器出口、扩张防卫产业，到发展远程打击能力，日本正在不断拼接其军事能力链条。此次改革将使情报统筹与军事指挥、远程作战等能力之间的衔接更加紧密。而最新发布的日本《2026防卫白皮书》，则从更高层面勾勒出这一系列调整的战略轮廓。白皮书提出以“综合国力”应对中国，强调整合外交、情报、经济、科技等国家力量，并以日美同盟为核心，织密与“志同国”的多层次安全网络。随着不同安全环节彼此贯通，日本安全政策的影响可能可能向外投射至东海、台海乃至西太平洋的安全格局。

在IPP副研究员徐伟钧看来，国家情报局的设立并非一次普通的行政机构调整，而是日本将外交、防卫、经济安全、网络安全和反间谍等领域纳入统一国家战略框架的关键一步。随着情报资源和行政权力进一步向首相官邸集中，以及反间谍立法、对外情报机构建设和国家情报战略等后续举措陆续推进，日本突破战后体制约束的进程，已经从防卫政策调整和军事能力建设，逐渐深入至国家权力运行的制度架构，其所谓“正常国家化”也呈现出向更具综合动员能力的“安全国家化”转变的趋势。这极有可能强化其对华战略竞争姿态，推动西方情报体系进一步向东亚延伸，从而增加地区战略误判、安全猜疑和危机升级的风险。

本文作者

徐伟钧 博士

华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）副研究员

2026年7月31日，日本国家情报会议及其事务机构国家情报局（National Intelligence Bureau ，NIB）正式启动运行。

该机构由内阁情报调查室升级改组而成，初始规模约730人，国家情报局长的行政级别也得到明显提升。其直接任务，是统合警察厅、外务省、防卫省、公安调查厅等部门分散掌握的情报资源，为首相及内阁提供一体化的情报分析和政策研判支撑。

改革前日本以“内阁情报调查室”（CIRO）为中心的情报协调体系。情报职能分散于外务省、防卫省、警察厅、公安调查厅、财务省等多个部门。

新设立的国家情报局负责汇集警察厅、外务省、防卫省、公安调查厅等部门的情报，拥有综合协调权限，向国家情报会议提供情报。而国家情报会议由首相担任议长。图源：朝日新闻

从表面上看，这似乎只是一次常规的行政机构调整。但如果将其置于近年来日本全面强化安全保障体制的进程中观察，此举实际上是日本将外交、防卫、经济安全、网络安全和反间谍工作纳入统一国家战略框架的关键一步。其意味着，日本政府正在进一步重构国家权力的运行方式，也标志着日本突破战后体制约束的进程，已从防卫政策调整和军事能力建设领域，进一步扩展至国家治理的底层结构层面。

国家情报局的成立，将进一步推进行政权力向首相官邸集中。日本原本的情报体制较为分散，这在客观上限制了单一政治中枢对秘密信息资源的集中掌控。在新体制下，国家情报会议被赋予确定情报重点、评估重大情报事项和要求有关部门提供资料的权力，国家情报局则负责对整个情报共同体的统筹规划与综合协调。

随着情报需求、搜集方向、分析结论与政策运用日益受到首相官邸更强的影响，日本或将出现情报政治化风险，即情报机构逐渐丧失独立评估政策环境的能力，转而根据政治领导人的既定偏好和假设，选择性地开展情报搜集和信息解读。

日本国会于5月通过了关于设立新情报会议的法案。图源：Getty Images

在此基础上，日本的国家治理将进一步呈现泛安全化趋势，推动日本逐渐成为一个“安全国家”。随着安全议题的范畴由传统军事威胁向产业、科研、舆论和社会交往等领域延伸，国家情报机关的活动边界与监管对象也将随之扩张。尤其是在日本持续推进反间谍法、外国代理人登记制度等立法进程的背景下，如果“外国影响”、“不当介入”和“危害国家利益”等概念缺乏明确的法律界定与适用边界，正常的学术交流、媒体活动、商业合作和社会组织交往都可能受到更严苛的审查。

不过，就现阶段而言，国家情报局与1945年前的“特高课”仍存在区别。当前国家情报局主要承担情报统合和分析职能，不具有特高警察曾经拥有的直接侦查、拘捕和思想镇压权力。但是，二者之间却存在着值得高度警惕的政治逻辑关联，即国家可能以外部威胁和政权安全为理由，为不断扩大秘密信息搜集行为而辩护，从而使所谓的“国家安全需求”凌驾于个人权利和社会自主空间之上。

如果国家情报局与警察厅、公安调查厅、防卫省等机构建立高度集中的信息共享机制，而未来反间谍立法又进一步扩大可调查和可惩处行为的边界，日本便可能形成一套技术化、网络化的现代监控体系。这种监控未必表现为1945年前那种公开镇压的形式，却可能通过安全审查、人员背景筛查、大数据行为分析和各类行政限制手段，对社会施加更广泛的约束。

1938年（昭和13年），日本警视厅特别高等部审查课的审查工作现场。图源：Wikimedia Commons

此外，国家情报局的设立还具有推动日本进一步嵌入西方情报体系的象征意义。自民党相关政策文件明确援引“五眼联盟”成员的反间谍做法，并强调要强化与“同志国”的情报合作。

尽管日本在短期内正式加入“五眼联盟”的可能性不大，但是其正在主动参照“五眼”国家的保密、反间谍、人员审查和信息共享标准调整自身制度，试图通过制度兼容和功能性参与，逐步取得接近正式成员所享有的情报共享安排。

更值得关注的是，国家情报局的设立只是日本情报体系扩张的第一步。根据自民党提出的整体规划，后续举措还包括设立对外情报机构、建设情报人员培养体系、制定反间谍法律和出台国家情报战略。对外情报机构一旦建立，日本的情报活动将可能由主要依赖盟国供给和被动防范的模式，转向主动在海外收集人力情报和信号情报，以及在认知领域开展影响行动。

情报能力本身并不必然导向战争，但它能为远程精确打击、海外军事部署、秘密行动、认知战和经济制裁提供支撑。在日本同步推进进攻性军事能力建设、扩大武器出口、深化同盟联合作战机制并筹建独立对外情报机构的背景下，国家情报局的设立绝不能被孤立地看待。它表明，日本突破战后体制的路径已经从修改防卫政策和扩大自卫队权限，深入到重构国家权力运行的底层制度架构。日本正在逐步构建起一套能够持续识别威胁、调动资源、控制信息并在境内外采取行动的综合安全体系。

在菲律宾宝威库里利角沙丘举行的“肩并肩”年度联合军事演习中，日本陆上自卫队士兵走在 88 型地对舰导弹发射器前。路透社

因此，国家情报局的设立最重要的象征意义，在于日本所谓的“正常国家化”进程正在转向更具综合动员能力的“安全国家化”。这一趋势的真正风险不在于恢复战前体制，而在于战后长期形成的权力分散、军事克制和对秘密国家机器的警惕正在被逐步削弱。

随着反间谍立法、对外情报机构建设和国家情报战略的相继推进，战后日本对秘密权力扩张、海外军事行动和军备扩张的制度性约束与社会警惕将进一步弱化。这不仅会压缩日本国内的民主监督空间和公民自由边界，也可能进一步强化其对华战略竞争姿态、推动西方情报体系向东亚地区加速延伸，进而加剧区域内战略误判、安全猜疑和危机升级的风险。

2026年5月19日，在位于日本东京的国会议事堂前，日本民众手持标语参加抗议集会，抗议高市政府破坏和平宪法。新华社

徐伟钧 华南理工大学公共政策研究院 副研究员

*以下为英文版，供读者对照参考。发表时内容有所删改。（上下滑动查看）。

On July 31, 2026, Japan's National Intelligence Council and its administrative body, the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), formally commenced operations.

At first glance, this may appear to be a routine administrative reorganisation. However, viewed within the context of Japan's comprehensive strengthening of its national security system in recent years, it constitutes a critical step towards integrating foreign affairs, defence, economic security, cybersecurity, and counter-espionage into a unified national strategic framework. This move indicates that the Japanese government is restructuring the operational mechanisms of state power. It also signals that Japan's efforts to break free from the constraints of the post-war system have expanded beyond defence reforms and military development to the very foundations of national governance.

The establishment of the NIB will further accelerate the centralisation of executive power in the Prime Minister's Office. Japan's previous intelligence system was characterized by institutional fragmentation, which objectively limited the ability of any single political centre to exercise centralized control over classified information resources. Under the new system, the NIB is empowered to determine intelligence priorities, evaluate major intelligence matters, and request information from relevant departments. The NIB is responsible for the overall planning and comprehensive coordination of the entire intelligence community.

Moving toward a 'security state'

As intelligence requirements, collection priorities, analytical conclusions, and policy applications become increasingly subject to the influence of the Prime Minister's Office, Japan may face a growing risk of intelligence politicisation. Intelligence agencies may become less capable of independently assessing the policy environment and instead selectively collect and interpret information in accordance with the established preferences and assumptions of political leaders.

On this basis, Japan's system of governance will increasingly be securitized, driving the country into a "security state." This risk is particularly significant as Japan continues to advance legislation concerning counter-espionage and a foreign agent registration system. If concepts such as "foreign influence," "improper interference," and "harm to the national interest" lack clear legal definitions and boundaries of application, normal academic exchanges, media activities, business cooperation, and interactions among social organizations could become subject to stricter scrutiny.

At the present stage, the NIB still differs from the "Special Higher Police" that operated before 1945. The NIB primarily undertakes the functions of intelligence integration and analysis, and does not possess the powers of direct investigation, arrest, and ideological repression once exercised by the Special Higher Police. Nevertheless, there exists a political logic linking the two that warrants serious vigilance: the state may invoke external threats and regime security to justify the continuous expansion of secret information collection, thereby allowing the purported imperatives of national security to take precedence over individual rights and the autonomy of society.

Should the NIB establish a highly centralised information-sharing mechanism with the National Police Agency, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, and the Ministry of Defence, while future counter-espionage legislation further broadens the scope of conduct subject to investigation and punishment, Japan could develop a modern surveillance system characterised by technological sophistication and digital interconnectivity. Such surveillance may not take the form of the overt repression characteristic of the pre-1945 period. Rather, it may impose more extensive constraints on society through security-clearance procedures, personnel background screening, big data behavioural analysis, and various administrative restrictions.

From a defensive posture to a proactive security strategy

The establishment of the NIB also carries symbolic significance in facilitating Japan's deeper integration into Western intelligence networks. A relevant policy document issued by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) explicitly refers to the counter-espionage practices of "Five Eyes" members and emphasises the need to strengthen intelligence cooperation with "like-minded countries."

Although Japan is unlikely to become a formal member of the "Five Eyes" in the short term, it is actively restructuring its own institutions with reference to the secrecy protection, counter-espionage, personnel-vetting, and information-sharing standards of "Five Eyes" countries. Through institutional compatibility and functional participation, Japan seeks to gradually attain intelligence-sharing arrangements approaching those enjoyed by formal members.

Moreover, the establishment of the NIB represents only the first step in Japan's broader expansion of its intelligence system. According to the overall plans advanced by the LDP, subsequent measures will include the establishment of an external intelligence agency, the development of a training system for intelligence personnel, the enactment of counter-espionage legislation, and the formulation of a national intelligence strategy. Once an external intelligence agency is established, Japan's intelligence activities may shift from their traditional dependence on intelligence supplied by allies and a predominantly defensive posture toward the active overseas collection of human intelligence and signals intelligence, as well as influence operations in the cognitive domain.

Intelligence capabilities do not in themselves inevitably lead to war, but they can provide support for long-range precision strikes, overseas military deployments, covert operations, cognitive warfare, and economic sanctions. At a time when Japan is simultaneously developing more offensive military capabilities, expanding arms exports, deepening mechanisms for joint allied operations, and preparing to establish an independent external intelligence agency, the creation of the NIB cannot be viewed in isolation.

It demonstrates that Japan's efforts to move beyond the post-war framework have progressed from revising defence policy and expanding the authority of the Self-Defence Forces to restructuring the underlying institutional architecture through which state power operates. Japan is gradually constructing a comprehensive security system capable of continuously identifying threats, mobilising resources, controlling information, and taking actions both domestically and abroad.

Therefore, the greatest symbolic significance of the NIB lies in the transformation of Japan's purported "state normalization" into a process of "security-state formation" with greater capacity for comprehensive mobilisation. The real risk lies not in Japan having already restored its pre-war system. Rather, it lies in the gradual erosion of the dispersion of power, military restraint, and vigilance towards the secretive state machinery that developed during the post-war period.

As counter-espionage legislation, the establishment of an external intelligence agency, and the formulation of a national intelligence strategy proceed, the institutional constraints and societal vigilance that have historically limited the expansion of secret state power, overseas military operations, and military expansion in post-war Japan will be further weakened. This will not only narrow the space for democratic oversight and civil liberties within Japan, but also further reinforce its posture of strategic competition toward China, accelerate the expansion of Western intelligence networks into East Asia, thereby heightening the risks of strategic miscalculations, security mistrust and the escalation of crises within the region.

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