爱尔兰学者：中国形象改善，是“干”出来的

编者按：全球对华认知正在发生重要变化，折射出世界格局深刻演进。爱尔兰都柏林大学教授埃德米尔森·帕拉纳(Edemilson Parana)在参加由中国人民大学重阳金融研究院（人大重阳）主办的“全球认知之变与中国发展未来”国际研讨会时表示，随着多极化加速发展、“全球南方”力量上升，中国在基础设施、制造业、科技和绿色发展等领域的成就更加可感可知。其发言实录内容刊登于9月29日《中国日报》第12版。现将实录中英文内容发布如下：（中文约2400字，预计阅读时间7分钟）

▲英文原文发表于《中国日报》2026年9月29日第12版

美国皮尤研究中心今年7月发布的一项调查显示，近年来人们对中国的看法有所改善。在接受调查的36个国家中，对中国持正面评价者占比普遍上升，但不同国家对中国的认知仍有差异。同较富裕国家相比，新兴经济体对中国的看法更为积极；同时，区域内以及代际之间也存在显著差异。

这里的关键在于，根本不存在一种全球性的对华认知，也就是说不能把“外国”当作一个统一的整体。不同社会群体在国际政治经济中占据着各异的地位，他们会基于各自不同的历史经验、经济利益、安全关切与发展愿景来审视中国。

这是因为，对大国的认知本质上受限于特定的环境和参照物。人们在评价一个国家时，总会与其他参照对象进行对比，并结合更广泛的国际环境来看。

中国的形象之所以在改善，部分原因在于中国自身发展迅速，以及越来越多的人对其经济和技术转型有了直接或间接的切身感受。但与此同时，还有另一部分原因在于，其他主要大国的形象发生了变化，进而影响了人们对中国的看法。

因此，将当前的局势变化简单地定性为“世界正在走向多极化”，未免过于草率。

尤其是从“全球南方”的视角来看，当前局势要复杂得多。它们日益追求更大的自主空间，希望在有效管控相互依存的同时，尽可能维护自身的主权；它们希望尽可能同中国、美国、欧洲以及地区大国开展合作；它们还希望在贸易、基础设施、技术、金融和发展等领域拥有更大的选择权。

从这一视角来看，多极化尽管也伴随着风险，但它仍具有吸引力——并非仅仅因为中国是其中的一极，也因为多个经济和政治权力中心的存在，能够提升其他国家的战略自主性。

多极化不仅事关外交，它还正越来越多地体现在生产网络、技术基础设施、能源系统、金融以及支付安排等方方面面。一个至关重要的事实是：国际秩序在经济与物质层面正日益呈现多元化——尽管这一转型依然不均衡且充满争议。

我近期在中国的亲身经历，让我对这一物质层面的变化有了更为清晰的认识。

在中国备受赞誉的背后，其物质基础是显而易见的，具体体现在基础设施、交通物流、数字支付、制造能力、技术应用，以及令人瞩目的城乡转型等方面。这也就清楚地解释了，为什么其他“全球南方”国家对中国会刮目相看——因为在这些国家，经济发展、基础设施建设、技术升级，以及实现更高程度的经济自主，依然是亟待解决的重大政治议题。

但这又引发了一个更大的社会学问题：一个国家的形象究竟是如何塑造的？以下四个要素值得强调：物质表现、国际行为、比较语境以及直接的切身经历。

媒体宣传和对话沟通固然重要，公共外交亦不可或缺。然而媒体宣传哪怕再天花乱坠，也终究无法掩盖政策缺位与实际成效不足。从长远来看，对任何国家而言，最有力的国际传播方式，或许莫过于付出实际行动。

由此来看，中国在基础设施、工业产能、贸易、技术能力，以及新兴的绿色技术等领域表现不俗，其发展成果外界有目共睹。通过与许多其他发展中国家的经济交往，中国在这些国家眼中已经成为一个实实在在的存在，而不再仅仅是一个遥远抽象的地缘政治概念。

与此同时，在某些依然存在摩擦的领域，我们不应将其自动归咎于沟通的失败。对安全、政治价值观、地区紧张局势或经济依赖的担忧，可能恰恰反映了最真实的意见分歧或利益冲突——无论你是否认同这些担忧。如果负面认知主要源于政策或利益冲突，仅靠加强对话沟通恐怕并不能解决问题。

那么，当前的转变会一直持续吗？要回答这个问题，首先要对“结构性力量”和“周期性力量”这个概念加以区分。

中国在全球生产和贸易网络中处于中心地位，其工业与科技实力强大，再加上“全球南方”的经济与政治分量日益增长，以及旧的单极国际秩序逐步瓦解，这些结构性力量不容小觑，且可能对中国有利。然而，公众认知同样会受到特定国家政府的政策、战争事件、外交危机、经济形势以及某些具体外交决策的影响，这些因素往往变化更快。

因此，全球认知的碎片化与多元化或将继续。在未来的新兴世界，各国把多种发展模式、多个合作伙伴、多个权力中心进行相互比较，可能将成为常态。

英文原文

Rising appeal

Edemilson Paraná

A survey released by the Pew Research Center in July found that views of China had improved in recent years, with favorable opinions gaining ground across many of the 36 countries surveyed.

But the different perceptions among countries are as important as this overall trend. Views of China remain more positive in emerging economies than in the wealthier countries, and there are also important differences within regions and across generations.

The point here is that there is no such thing as a single global perception of China.

There are different societies, occupying different positions in the international political economy, and looking at China through different historical experiences, economic interests, security concerns and development aspirations.

And this is because perceptions of major powers are, in essence, situated and relational. Countries are evaluated in comparison with alternatives and in relation to the wider international environment.

China's image is improving partly because China itself has developed so fast, and because more people have direct or indirect experience of its economic and technological transformation. But something else is happening as well: perceptions of China are being affected by changes in perceptions of other major powers.

For this reason, it would be too hasty to frame the current shift simply or directly as a movement toward a multipolar world.

Particularly from the perspective of the Global South, something more complex is happening. What they increasingly seek is greater room for agency. They want to manage interdependence effectively while preserving as much sovereignty as possible.

They want the possibility of cooperating with China, the US, Europe and regional powers. They want more options in trade, infrastructure, technology, finance and development.

From this perspective, although also risky, multipolarity can be attractive not simply because one of the poles is China, but because the existence of several centers of economic and political power can increase the strategic autonomy of other countries.

Multipolarity is not only a diplomatic phenomenon. It is increasingly visible in production networks, technological infrastructures, energy systems, finance, payment arrangements and so on.

The significant fact, then, is that the international order is becoming economically and materially more plural — even if this transformation remains uneven and contested.

My recent experience in China has made this material dimension particularly visible to me.

The material basis of China's reputation — infrastructure, transportation, logistics, digital payments, manufacturing capacity, technological adoption and the impressive scale of urban and rural transformation — is evident.

This helps make clear why China may be perceived differently in other Global South countries, where development, infrastructure, technological upgrading and greater economic autonomy remain urgent political questions.

But this raises a broader sociological question: How is the image of a country actually formed?

Four elements can be emphasized: material performance, international conduct, comparative context and direct lived experience.

Communication and media certainly matter. Public diplomacy also matters. But communication cannot permanently compensate for policies and outcomes. In the long run, perhaps the most powerful form of international communication available to any country is simply what that country actually does.

In this respect, China has done well in sectors where its development has become materially visible to others, such as infrastructure, industrial capacity, trade, technological capability and, increasingly, green technologies. Its economic relations with many other developing countries have also made China a concrete presence rather than just a distant geopolitical abstraction.

At the same time, in areas where friction persists, it should not automatically be treated as a failure of communication. Concerns about security, political values, regional tensions or economic dependence can represent real disagreements or conflicting interests — whether one agrees with those concerns or not. If a negative perception originates mainly in policy or conflicting interests, better communication alone cannot resolve it.

So, will the current shift persist? Here, a distinction needs to be made between structural and cyclical forces.

The structural forces are significant and may favor China: its centrality to global production and trade, its industrial and technological capabilities, the growing economic and political weight of the Global South and the gradual erosion of a unipolar international order.

However, perceptions are also affected by specific governments, wars, diplomatic crises, economic conditions and particular foreign-policy decisions. These can change much faster.

For that reason, the fragmentation and growing diversity of global perceptions may persist. The emerging world is likely to be one in which societies increasingly compare multiple models, multiple partners and multiple centers of power.