关于标准必要专利（SEP）/公平、合理、无歧视（FRAND）原则最新动态的讨论

编者按：德国慕尼黑第一地区法院长期是欧洲最重要最活跃的专利诉讼法院之一，第七民事庭更是全球标准必要专利（SEP）与高技术专利争议审理的重要法庭。作为该庭庭长奥利弗·舍恩博士（Dr. Oliver Schön）长期参与专利侵权、SEP许可及相关纠纷案件审理，其裁判实践和司法观点受到国际知识产权界广泛关注。近年来，随着统一专利法院（UPC）正式运行以及欧洲专利诉讼格局不断演变，德国法院在全球知识产权治理中的影响力进一步提升。在此背景下，华东政法大学知识产权学院教授王艳芳专访奥利弗·舍恩庭长，请其结合德国及欧洲专利司法实践的发展，就当前专利诉讼热点问题、法院审判经验及未来发展趋势分享观察与思考，以期为中国读者理解德国和欧洲知识产权司法实践提供有益参考。

被采访者简介：奥利弗·舍恩（ Oliver Schön），慕尼黑第一地区法院第七民事庭庭长。慕尼黑第一地区法院是西方世界受理专利侵权案件最多的法院。2025 年，该院新收案件超过 330 起。舍恩博士于 2008 年开启专利法相关职业生涯，此后在德国专利体系内担任多个职务，包括借调至联邦最高法院（专利庭）以及联邦专利法院担任研究助理。

采访者简介：王艳芳，华东政法大学知识产权学院教授、博士生导师，原最高人民法院知识产权庭二级高级法官。

（本文拟于《竞争政策研究》2026年第4期刊发）

问题一：

Schön博士，您是慕尼黑第一地区法院第七民事庭的主审法官。我们一直密切关注您在FRAND原则和长臂管辖权方面的判例。最近，特别是4月底至5月初，关于中兴与三星之间的全球性纠纷，贵法院以及中国法院和英国法院在极短时间内相继作出了多项判决。

能否请您就这些判决发表您的看法？

回答：

我将尝试结合其他法院的判决，对本院的判决进行背景说明。当然，在此过程中，我只能参考公开资料。此外，必须强调的是，当涉及跨国公司的专利纠纷时，不同国家的法院通常只处理案件中的某些具体问题。

首先，请允许我阐明应如何看待本院判决及另外两份法院判决的背景。

慕尼黑第一地区法院目前可能是西方国家里专利侵权诉讼最繁忙的法院。2025年，本院的两个专利侵权案件审判庭受理了超过330起新案件。这给我们带来了重大挑战，因为我们给自己设定的目标是，超过95%的案件应在起诉书提交后一年内作出一审判决。

目前，我们在收到起诉书后11至12个月内安排新立案案件的审理，且不区分较小的专利侵权案件与涉及标准必要专利/FRAND问题的重大案件。我们已对内部准备流程进行了优化，以确保能够长期维持这样的时间安排。

作为主审法官，我认为让原告律师知晓我们致力于遵守这一时间安排至关重要。这使律师能够明确地向其客户说明诉讼程序将如何展开。这种程序的可预测性是我们法院的一大特色。

问题二

贵法庭创建了判定专利权人的许可报价是否符合FRAND原则的准则。能否请您对此进行说明？

回答：

我会结合具体背景向您说明。

首先，必须参考德意志联邦共和国已有的判例法，该判例法仅关注当事人的行为，特别是实施者的行为。对于“善意被许可人”的要求设定得非常高，因此，FRAND抗辩在德国专利侵权诉讼法院从未获得支持。

我在2023年接任第七民事庭主审法官时，注意到此类诉讼的性质已经发生变化。涉及明显专利反向劫持的案件变得越来越少，在许多情况下，当事人（有时有充分理由）仅就许可费金额存在争议。问题往往源于专利权人未提交任何许可协议。实施者据此主张，在不知晓其竞争对手支付许可费金额的情况下，不能合理地要求其签订许可协议。在某些案件中，专利权人未提交许可协议的原因不易理解。不过，其中一个原因也是无法预见法院将如何处理许可协议。

这一变化意味着，在我们看来，仅通过协商和解已无法在标准必要专利诉讼中实现公平的结果。因此，早在2023年，我们便开始在FRAND诉讼中进行初步计算。然而，由于判决书中的裁判理由部分被大量遮蔽以保护当事方的保密权益，这些判决内容在很大程度上不能被看到。于是，在2024年下半年，我们决定在起草判决书时，应确保基本原则能结合上下文来理解。

这一决定作出后，有大量案件达成和解，这意味着从2024年9月到2025年，我们缺乏合适的案例来公布我们在标准必要专利诉讼程序中对FRAND评估的审查标准。与此同时，我们的上诉法院——慕尼黑高等地区法院（OLG München）——先就FRAND问题作出一项初步裁决，随后又作出判决，这份判决给法律从业者带来了不确定性。我们认为该判决意味着慕尼黑高等地区法院想将一个特例上升为普遍规则，从而设定了不切实际的标准。

随后，我们在2025年7月针对7 O 64/25号案件（即中兴诉三星案）作出了初步裁决，首次系统性地阐述了我们的审查原则。随后，我们在华硕（ASUS） I案（7 O 5007/25）、华硕II案（7 O 4102/25）和雷诺（RENAULT）案（7 O 7655/25）的判决中进一步阐述了这些原则。最新的“中兴/三星”案判决虽然特殊，但仍适用相关原则。不过，该案判决的起草过程最终证明，即使案情复杂，确立的原则也能带来良好的结果。

问题三

今年年初，德国联邦最高法院发布了FRAND III判决。这是否会对您所确立的法律原则产生影响？

回答：

我们理解联邦最高法院在FRAND III案中的判决意味着，相较于FRAND I案和FRAND II案的判决，审查标准并未发生变化。联邦最高法院采取的方法侧重双方的谈判行为，且迄今为止，尚未就专利权人的要约应如何具体审查作出判决。

因此，下级法院的任务是构建该问题的法律框架并作出初步裁决。这些裁决最终（预计在5至7年内）将提交至联邦最高法院，成为其判决的对象。鉴于案件数量庞大，慕尼黑第一地区法院在这方面发挥了开创性作用。这是一项极具意义的任务，因为它涉及到不同国家法院相互影响的法律领域。

问题四

能否请您简明扼要地概述您审查原告许可报价的原则？

回答：

首先，在专利侵权诉讼中提出FRAND异议，我们是否应当审查专利权人的许可报价。这取决于我们是否认为实施者在根本上具有获取许可的意愿。如果实施者（在欧盟法院（ECJ）“华为/中兴”案判决所要求的谈判框架内）显然无意进行许可谈判，那么我们认为没有理由评估原告的报价。

如果双方之间确实正在就签订许可协议进行谈判，则情况有所不同。在这种情况下，必须确定这些是真正的谈判还是纯粹以谈判为借口。为了确定这一点，我们提出了“外部许可意愿”和“内部许可意愿”的概念。

所谓外部许可意愿，是指实施者并无明显的专利反向劫持行为。我们基于纯粹的形式审查来评估这一点。一般而言，如果被告的报价中无争议部分已被支付，且已提供相当于一年许可费的担保（如适用），则必须审查专利权人的报价。

对专利权人报价的审查涉及内部许可意愿。作为该审查的一部分，我们将判定原告的许可报价是否落入FRAND区间。如果原告的报价落入FRAND区间，则实施者没有理由不接受该报价。对于这一点，需要明确的是，我们并非确定一个绝对有效的费率，而仅是确立一个FRAND区间。

问题五

您刚才介绍了基本情况，我们想具体了解您是如何判断原告的报价是否符合FRAND原则的。

回答：

据我们所知，原告的报价通常是基于可比许可协议进行审查的。然后，通过标准化自上而下的计算方法对由此得出的结果进行验证，以确定其是否合理。

问题在于如何准确界定何为“适当的可比许可协议”。对此，我们认为专利权人有权决定提交哪些协议作为可比许可协议。如果未提交与被许可人的协议，应当对此给出合理解释。我们持此观点的理由是：专利权人在协议缔结后，不应受不利条款的约束。另一方面，如果仅提交少量与小规模市场参与者的协议，以此迫使跨国企业接受费率，也不符合FRAND原则。最终，判断可比性是否实际存在，是法官的职责。

在华硕II案和雷诺案的判决中，我们对可比许可协议进行了详尽审查。在华硕II案中，我们认定专利权人推行并执行了一致的许可方案；在雷诺案中，我们通过参考多份可比许可协议确定了该案适用的许可费率。在这两案中，我们采用的评估方法略有不同。而在中兴/三星案判决中，我们得出结论认为不存在合适的可比许可协议。顺便提一下，这正是本院判决与英国判决的主要区别。在英国程序中，有一份未在本院诉讼程序中提交的协议被视为可比许可协议。

问题六

您认为，可比许可协议与自上而下法之间存在何种关系？

回答：

我们认为，自上而下法应用于验证通过可比许可协议得出的结果在总体上是否恰当。就此而言，它是一种合理性检验。

在两种情形下，自上而下法具有特别重要的意义。首先，所请求的费率极低，以至于即使进行自上而下分析（假设所有计算因素均对实施者有利），也得出专利权人的报价符合FRAND原则的结论。我们在华硕I案中遇到了这种情况。其次，不存在可比许可协议，在这种情况下，自上而下法用于确定适当的许可费。我们在中兴/三星案中就遇到了这种情况。

自上而下法的真正问题在于，必须确定一个设备实施特定标准所需支付的金额。对此存在多种计算方法，本庭选择了标准化的单台许可费。在“中兴/三星”案判决中，我们假定每部手机的价格应为170美元，其中8%用于支付所有移动通信标准的使用费。因此，在设备的整个生命周期内，使用其主要功能需支付13.60美元。这就是“累积许可费率”（ARB）。我们认为基于这种方法得出的低费率兼顾了实施者对低许可费率的诉求。

根据这一计算，拥有较大专利组合的权利人有权就其在标准中所占的每个百分点收取0.136 美元的许可费。

我们承认这种方法可能会受到批评。关于如何确定总标准占比或专利组合的价值，确实存在争议空间。

但从我们的角度来看，可以暂时搁置这些争议，因为13.60 美元这个数字非常低，并已经考虑到了这些不确定因素。如果能够提供适当的事实依据，25美元到30美元的累积许可费率也是完全合理的，至少对于高端手机而言是如此。

问题七

在华硕I案和华硕II案的判决中，【为什么】您讨论了SISVEL的Wi-Fi 6专利池以及Access Advance的HEVC专利池的费率。

回答：

这两份判决采取的处理方式略有不同。华硕I案是针对专利池的一项专利提起的诉讼，我们认为该专利池的许可费率未能充分实现专利组合的许可潜力。如果实施者不接受此类报价，则不能将其视为善意被许可人。

华硕II案判决涉及诺基亚的报价，该案中的被告主张诺基亚的报价相较于Access Advance的HEVC专利池报价过高，而HEVC专利池的报价极低，仅需不到1美元即可覆盖约标准的90%，因此其许可潜力并未得到充分挖掘。

我们不清楚专利池费率是如何确定的，但其费率往往极低。就此而言，标准必要专利领域针对专利池费率的首个初步禁令很可能即将颁发。

问题八

能否请您简要向我们说明中兴/三星案的判决？我们很想了解您的处理方式与英国法院和中国法院确定费率的程序有何不同。

回答：

我很乐意讨论这个案件。但请注意，我只能提及庭审听证会上讨论过的内容，或可从已公布的裁判理由中获取的信息。

首先，必须认识到，我们在专利侵权诉讼的框架内审查FRAND抗辩。我们会评估未达成许可协议是原告的责任还是被告的责任。如果满足特定条件，我们将判定原告在庭审听证时给出的报价是否落入FRAND区间内。

我们并不确定严格意义上的许可费率。我们之所以在中兴/三星案判决中就费率问题表明立场，是基于案件双方之间的具体情况。

问题九

在您的处理方法中，哪些因素尤为重要？

回答：

我们采取市场为本的方法。专利权人有权决定对其知识产权授予何种许可。其边界在于必须符合FRAND原则，而专利权人在此方面拥有一定的裁量空间。 FRAND原则界定了这一裁量权的范围。一方面，许可报价必须公平且合理，这意味着，从绝对意义上讲，必须体现专利权人对标准已做出的贡献。另一方面，该报价还必须确保不歧视任何市场参与者。

此外，每个报价都包含时间维度。什么是合理的许可费，在不同时间点无法给出统一答案。那些在公司早期就进行投资的人，可能能够就长期合作协商给出非常有利的条款。此外，还必须考虑通货膨胀调整因素。不过，实施者在许可谈判中的行为也至关重要。换言之，如果一方对获取许可表现出超出合理范围的抵触，这将给专利权人带来额外成本，必须通过更高的许可费予以补偿。

问题十

“超出正常范围的抵触”具体指什么？

回答：

我们已在多份判决中对此进行了论述。我们认为，专利权人和实施者必须能够就重大许可协议的具体条款提出异议。其出发点在于，原则上，专利权人和实施者在谈判过程中存在大致的力量平衡。

乍一看，可能会有不同的看法，因为专利权人可以通过禁令救济对实施者施压。不过，我们认为这种观点忽略了一个重要的经济方面的问题，即实施者通过销售产品来创造收入。换言之，实施者手握资金！而这笔资金只有在实施者主动决定支付时，才会流向专利权人一方。正因如此，实施者在谈判初期往往占据优势。迅速承诺付款往往能确保获得有利的许可条款。

最终诉诸法院的案件，大多是实施者未能有技巧地谈判、未能利用这一优势所致。当实施者在禁令即将作出前夕声称压力过大时，他们忽略了一个事实，即这种局面至少在一定程度上是自身造成的。

在此背景下，我们认为有必要指出，在许可协议纠纷中，提起诉讼寻求禁令是一种合法手段。

现在谈谈费率确定程序！众所周知，任何一方都无法单方面决定哪个法院有权为全球所有销售确定统一的费率。例外情况下可能适用，但顶多也是在相关被告或标准制定组织总部所在地[的法院]。如果实施者无论如何决定发起费率确认的诉讼程序，那么几乎不可避免的后果是，这一判决将影响费率水平。

问题十一

非常感谢您概述了贵法庭判例法的主要原则。我们希望了解您对几个具体问题的看法。首先请谈谈“过往豁免”这一问题。

回答：

我认为“过往豁免”在两个方面具有重要意义。

一方面，它涉及专利权人能否就过去的使用行为主张赔偿，另一个问题则是专利权人是否必须主张赔偿。在考虑和解许可协议时，第二个方面尤为重要。

首先，新技术的使用者在未获得全面许可的情况下进入市场。这种做法是可被接受的，因为特别是在初期阶段，必须将精力和人力用于建立销售体系和开发产品，可能根本没有时间处理许可事宜。

另一方面，专利权人同样资源有限，必须努力争取产品供应商成为被许可人。这引发了一个问题：他们应该制定自己的许可计划，还是加入专利池？后者虽然具有操作更简单的优势，但缺点是产生的许可收入较少。

这种复杂局面可能导致从开始生产到签订许可协议之间存在显著的时间差。从根本上讲，专利权人没有明显理由放弃获取过往销售的补偿。就此而言，专利权人通常没有义务就过往销售放弃补偿或给予折扣。然而，本法庭也认为存在一定限度。其理由在于，实施者已无法将过往销售的许可费转嫁给产品购买者。因此，这实际上始终是一个取决于具体个案的决定。

对于双方已签订许可协议但未就过往部分进行结算的情况，其处理方式必须完全另行评估。

让我举个例子：

若实施者在2015年至2025年间每年销售相同数量的产品，但首份许可协议仅涵盖2020年至2025年且规定费率为10美分，则有人可能主张实际费率为5美分，理由是该费率已包含过往部分。

我们认为这种观点是错误的，因为这不反应实际情况。在这种情况下，通常会将过往的情况搁置一旁，以便为未来铺平道路。这是一个经济决策，必须得到法院的认可。我认为，这一问题尤其体现了德国法院和英国法院之间的最大差异之一。

问题十二

在雷诺案的判决中，您指出FRAND区间非常宽泛，相当于最低报价的三倍。这难道不是一个过于宽泛的框架吗？

回答：

您所问的是雷诺案判决中关于确定FRAND区间的概念。如果我们假设许可费区间在“可想象的最便宜许可”与“可想象的最贵许可”之间可达三倍之差，那么我理解这乍听起来确实显得非常宽泛。在考量这些数字时，必须明确指出这些是极端情况。通常情况下，该区间会窄得多。关键的准则在于许可的规模和范围，以及实施方的行为。

最便宜的许可协议很可能是与一家大型企业续签的、涵盖多项标准的合同，且谈判过程中未出现任何问题。另一方面，最昂贵的许可协议则是双方在不同司法管辖区经过多年争议后达成的，而未能达成协议的主要原因在于实施方。这是因为，在这种情况下，许可费还必须补偿专利权人因此所付出的额外努力。

我想通过中兴/三星案的判决来说明这一点。在该案中，鉴于三星的庞大出货量，我们给予了30%的折扣。但同时，我们也加收了10%的附加费，因为我们认为三星在达成许可协议方面表现出过度的抵触态度。特别是，我们认为向标准化组织ETSI提交【投诉】请求以及在英国发起费率确定程序，是争取合理许可费率过程中不可接受的手段。

问题十三

在雷诺案的裁决中，您指出法院必须基于可比协议确定中位数值。根据确定的中位数值，可能会上调15%。

回答：

完全正确。重点在于确定中位数。我们通过评估可获得的可比许可协议来确定该中位数。在雷诺案中，我们专门审查了与其他汽车制造商的协议，并比较了其他各汽车制造商的车型范围及规模与雷诺的差异。基于此，我们确定了中位数。

需要特别指出的是，在德国，我们并不设定具体费率，而是审查原告的报价是否处于FRAND区间内。我们确定了平均值，随后审查了各方报价的位置。如果实施方的报价与平均值相差甚远，那么专利权人也可以维持略高的报价。因为只有这样，专利权人才能在随后的谈判过程中继续给予折扣。基于这一理解，如果实施方向专利权人采取了具体行动，而专利权人未予回应或未作出适当回应，那么相同的报价可能会丧失其FRAND地位。

然而，我必须在此重申，我们作为合议组，并不认为专利权人的报价过高。相反，通常情况是实施者会竭尽全力压低许可费金额。

问题十四

我们还想了解您如何评估地域调整的要求。

回答：

所谓“地域调整”，是指由于专利权人的专利组合在不同国家或地区具有不同程度的布局，因此对同一产品类别在不同国家或地区适用不同的费率。

地域调整是一种相当简单的手段，能够以数学上透明的方式显著降低索赔金额。这是被告在雷诺案和中兴/三星案判决中的主要论点。这两起案件中的论点有所不同。在雷诺案中，被告主张其在美国的许可费率必须较低，因为该公司未在美国销售汽车；而在中兴/三星案中，被告则主张中兴并未在全球每个国家都充分验证其专利组合，因此费率必须进行地域调整。

我认为，要回答是否应进行地域性调整以及如何调整这一问题，必须清楚许可费的计算依据是什么。据我们所知，这里有两种方法。第一种是基于一方对标准的制定和进一步发展所做出的贡献；第二种是针对全球专利组合的补偿。这种区分有些复杂，因此我想进一步详细说明。

当芯片的生产地或销售地均不存在知识产权时，情况便十分明确。在此类情况下，无法收取许可费。然而，这通常仅适用于专利组合非常小的专利权人。在大多数情况下，专利申请是遍布全球的。

从事研发的公司通常会在其总部所在国持有大部分专利和专利申请，因为优先权申请通常是在那里提交的。随后，申请会提交至最重要的市场。在次要市场，通常仅会提交最重要、最具保护力的专利。否则，为了在世界各地获得相同的许可(收益)，就必须在世界每个国家提交并维持所有专利。

在中兴/三星案中，我们看到中兴在中国持有绝大多数专利（超过3,000族），而在韩国获得授权的专利仅占约12%（超过400族）。在欧洲，获得授权的专利总数约占30%（超过1,000族）。在此背景下，如何计算中兴在移动通信标准中的份额成为争议焦点。在标准中的专利总数约为60,000项，这一事实已无争议。

本法庭认为，该份额应参照中兴的专利总数进行计算。其理由在于，重点在于对标准进一步发展的贡献，而非针对单个专利及专利申请的一揽子许可。

问题十五

这难道不会导致不公平的结果吗？在中兴诉三星案中，就连中兴也进行了地域调整。

回答：

中兴通讯的专家确实也进行了地域调整。但是，该调整主要基于实际销售额。

而合议庭则基于每台170美元的标准化价格进行计算。我们认为，通过采用如此低的数值，已充分体现并考虑了地域差异。

在未来的诉讼中，专利权人可能需要提交其研发费用[的证据]，以便确定特定专利组合的价值。

归根结底，我们的判决正开辟新的领域。目前尚无既定判例法明确规定如何评估许可协议和许可要约。我们预计当事各方将在未来的诉讼中提出新的论点。外国法院的判决也是重要的信息来源。在此基础上，我们将继续发展我们的判例法。

问题十六

您是否对自身采取的方法是否正确存有疑虑？

回答：

慕尼黑第一地区法院采取的方法在逻辑上自洽且透明，并能得出切合实际的结果。但必须承认，这要求法官具备深厚的经济学理解能力。特别是在上诉法院，那里涉及FRAND诉讼的案件数量远少于下级法院，因而尚待观察其是否具备同等水平的经济学专业知识。不过，鉴于这些法院由睿智且经验丰富的法官组成，我对此毫不怀疑。

问题十七

最后，我们想请您对“长臂管辖权”这一问题发表看法。

回答：

我认为，由于欧盟法院在BSH-Haushaltsgeräte案中的判决，德国国内专利侵权法院的管辖权已显著扩大。在涉及其他成员国领土的专利侵权诉讼中，我们不再需要就无效抗辩去中止诉讼程序。这也向非欧盟国家发出了信号。

管辖权依据源自《布鲁塞尔Ia条例》第4(1)条和第8(1)条。《布鲁塞尔Ia条例》第7条起辅助作用。《卢加诺公约》也相应适用。

一个值得探讨的问题是：根据《布鲁塞尔Ia条例》第8(1)条，总部位于其他欧盟国家的母公司是否可因全球范围内的专利侵权行为被起诉。本法庭认为这应当是可行的。

更关键的问题在于，在跨境诉讼中，如何将相关国家可适用的国内法纳入具体诉讼程序。对于涉及欧盟成员国的诉讼，本庭认为可以广泛依赖法律推定，这是因为《欧洲专利公约》和《执行指令》已使法律框架高度协调统一。对于非欧盟国家，情况则困难得多，最终只能在出现合适案例时才能作出裁决。对于中华人民共和国，值得注意的是，中国法律在20世纪80年代很大程度上借鉴了德国专利法。这或许有助于简化对该外国法的理解。

模块1：德国法院在FRAND费率确定及全球管辖权中的作用

•费率确定：德国国内法院是否仍倾向于仅处理标准必要专利侵权诉讼及禁令事项，而对裁决标准必要专利许可费率纠纷持谨慎态度？未来德国国内法院是否会准备根据具体案件情况确定标准必要专利许可费率？如果是，其地理覆盖范围将如何界定？

•全球管辖权的先决条件：德国国内法院是否认为，只有当当事人明确同意请求法院确定全球许可费率时，法院才对全球标准必要专利许可纠纷具有管辖权？

•单向许可费率与交叉许可全球费率：在今年早些时候的中兴诉三星法兰克福的反垄断案中，法院对全球单向费率进行了粗略计算。这是否意味着德国法院在未来的案件中将更倾向于裁定单向或交叉全球费率/条款？这种倾向是否将与对当事人行为是否符合FRAND原则的评估相关？

模块2：禁令、比例原则及许可意愿的评估

•谈判过错的评估：德国国内法院在评估当事方的谈判过错时，是否仅严格遵循华为/中兴框架，还是在评估谈判意愿时也会考虑双方各自的报价与反报价？

•比例原则与禁令：鉴于近期“三星诉中兴”案（一个标准必要专利权利人未能基于“许可意愿”这一理由获得禁令），在评估是否符合FRAND原则时，德国的比例原则是否会得到充分适用？在德国的标准必要专利侵权案件中，所谓的“认定侵权即等于获得禁令”这一司法原则是否真实存在，还是某些评论者的误解？如果该原则确实存在，它是否已被全面修订？

•不合比例抗辩：您认为在未来的某些标准必要专利案件中，针对禁令提出的“不合比例”抗辩，未来在某些SEP案件中能否成立？

模块 3：临时许可、保证金及管辖权冲突

•对英国临时许可的态度：德国法院如何看待英国的临时许可制度，特别是近期标准必要专利专利权人主动寻求该临时许可的趋势？德国法院未来会考虑引入这种做法吗？

•保证金与英国做法的对比：在德国，要求实施方缴纳保证金的一般标准是什么？您如何看待英国临时许可与德国保证金做法之间的差异？保证金和不可退还的付款是FRAND流程中必要的步骤吗，还是具有“补正先前非善意行为”的效果？

•时机与压力：如果被许可方积极参与谈判且行为得当，但仅因财务压力而未能及时提供保证金（例如，在反要约被拒绝时未能支付保证金，但在诉讼开始后或听证会前不久立即提供），应如何评估其许可的意愿？

•管辖权冲突：您如何看待当前英国法院与统一专利法院/德国法院之间在全球费率确定和临时许可方面存在的冲突？有哪些可能的解决方案可以缓解不同司法管辖区之间的这种冲突？

模块4：交叉许可及其特殊担保要求

•交叉许可的复杂性：为何在FRAND案件中，交叉许可协议特别难以评估？哪些法律或经济学因素使其区别于普通双边许可，交叉许可协议能否真正作为可靠的参照标准？

•互诉案件中的互相担保：当两个标准必要专利权利人相互起诉时，且结果很可能达成由一方作为净付款方的交叉许可协议时，这将如何影响提供FRAND担保及支付部分款项的要求？净收款方是否也应向净付款方提供担保并支付无争议款项？金额应如何确定？

模块5：FRAND方法论、过往豁免及专家证据

•评估FRAND与市场惯例：法院应如何评估许可要约是否真正符合FRAND原则？可比许可协议、市场惯例及经济学专家证据应发挥何种作用？

•拆解历史专利费支付：对历史专利费支付给予折扣是专利权人的义务还是权利？拆解“可比许可协议”与计算新许可的专利费组成有何区别？过往许可费支付应如何拆解——折扣是影响费率，还是影响已支付专利费的历史期间？

•费率计算工具：地域调整系数和隐含的累积许可费率是否是评估要约或可比协议的有用工具？您如何看待博通诉雷诺案（Broadcom v. Renault）？该案中慕尼黑法院提出，FRAND费率区间的最高值为最低值的3倍，或相对于平均值50%的偏离。这一标准仅适用于本案，还是旨在作为一般规则？

•其他因素与欧盟法院指引：静默条款（Standstills）和承诺不起诉条款（Covenants）是否会影响FRAND费率的计算？欧盟法院是否需要就FRAND费率的评估方法提供更系统化的指导？

模块6：审判程序、保密义务及新兴领域

•审判模式，在审查初步禁令申请时：您如何看待过去两年间部分巴西法院（特别是里约热内卢的法院）的趋势，即在授予初步禁令前要求提供专家支持的、关于符合FRAND原则的积极验证？这一做法在2025年“Sun Patent Trust诉长城汽车”案中得到了进一步完善，该案中法官将初步评估程序分立，分别委任了两名独立的中立专家：一名技术专家负责评估专利的必要性和侵权，另一名经济学专家则负责独立核实是否符合FRAND原则的问题。

•审判程序与保密性：能否概述德国法院审理标准必要专利案件的一般程序，特别是法院如何促进保密信息（如可比许可协议）的交换？

•透明度的限制：法院在FRAND纠纷中现实上能要求多少透明度？关于保密谈判存在哪些挑战？有限的透明度是否会增加确保裁决一致性的难度？当德国法院在标准必要专利侵权诉讼中援引第三方许可协议时，是否采用与英国法院在费率确定程序中相同的透明度标准？

•新兴领域与替代性纠纷解决机制：在缺乏可比协议样本、以及诸如累积许可费率这类自上而下法核心数据的新兴领域（例如流媒体），德国法院如何应对费率计算的挑战？对于标准必要专利纠纷，您对仲裁裁决与法院诉讼有何看法？

模块7：许可层级、统一专利法院的长臂管辖权及平行诉讼

•许可层级与供应链：标准必要专利许可应在价值链的哪个层级授予？该层级是否影响专利使用费率？许可层级的选择会为专利权人带来哪些机遇与风险？法院如何处理商业自由与FRAND义务之间的紧张关系？当在德国销售的设备中装配了某外国零部件制造商的组件时，该零部件制造商在德国需承担何种程度的侵权责任？

•统一专利法院的扩张与竞争：您如何看待统一专利法院在BSH案后扩大其“长臂管辖权”的趋势？这种趋势是否可能延伸至标准必要专利领域？关于Onesta在德国就一项美国专利起诉宝马一案，德国法院是否会类推适用欧盟法院在BSH案中的判决规则？您如何看待德国国内法院与统一专利法院德国分院之间的竞争关系？统一专利法院可能会如何影响在欧洲的标准必要专利纠纷？

附：英文稿

A discussion on recent developments in the field of SEP/FRAND

Question:

Dr. Schön, you are the presiding judge of the 7th Civil Chamber of the Munich I Regional Court. We follow your case law on the topics of FRAND and long-arm jurisdiction with interest. Recently, specifically in late April/early May, there were several decisions issued within a very short period of time by your court and courts in the People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom in the global dispute between ZTE and Samsung.

Could you share your views on these various decisions?

Answer:

I would like to try to contextualize our judgments in relation to the decisions of the other courts. In doing so, I can, of course, only refer to publicly available sources. It is also important to emphasize that in patent disputes involving international companies, courts in different countries have always dealt with specific partial aspects of a case.

Let me first define the context in which our decisions and the decisions of the other two courts should be viewed.

The Munich I Regional Court is currently probably the busiest patent infringement court in the Western world. In 2025, our two patent infringement divisions received over 330 new cases. This presents us with major challenges, because we have set ourselves the goal that over 95% of cases should conclude with a written first-instance decision within one year of the complaint being filed.

Currently, we schedule proceedings for newly filed cases 11 to 12 months after the complaint is received, and we do not distinguish between smaller patent infringement cases and major cases involving SEP/FRAND issues. We have optimized our internal preparation processes insofar as to enable us to maintain this timeframe on a permanent basis.

As presiding judge, it is important to me that plaintiffs’ counsel know that we are committed to adhering to this timeframe. This allows attorneys to advise their clients with certainty about how a proceeding will unfold. This predictability of procedure is an important aspect that distinguishes our court.

Question:

Your Chamber has developed principles for determining whether a patent holder’s offer is FRAND or not. Could you perhaps explain that?

Answer:

I would like to explain this to you in context.

As a starting point, one must consider the established case law in the Federal Republic of Germany, which has focused solely on the conduct of the parties, particularly the implementer. The requirements for a willing licensee were set very high, and as a result, the FRAND defense was never successful before German patent infringement courts.

When I took over as presiding judge of the 7th Civil Chamber in 2023, I found that the nature of the proceedings had changed. Cases involving an obvious hold-out have become rarer, and in many instances, the parties—sometimes with good reason—disputed only the amount of the license. Often, the problem stemmed from the fact that the patent holders had not submitted any license agreements. The implementers then argued that they could not reasonably be expected to enter into a license agreement without knowing what their competitors were paying. In some cases, the reasons why the patent holders did not provide license agreements were not readily understandable. However, one reason was also that it was not foreseeable how courts would handle license agreements.

This development meant that, in our view, it was no longer possible to achieve a fair outcome in SEP proceedings solely through negotiated settlements. As early as 2023, we therefore began making initial calculations in FRAND proceedings. However, these decisions went largely unnoticed because the reasoning in the judgments was redacted in large parts to protect the parties’ confidentiality interests. In the second half of 2024, we then resolved to draft our judgments in such a way that the underlying principles could be read in context.

After we made this decision, there was a very large series of settlements, which meant that from September 2024 and well into 2025, we had no suitable cases to publish our standard of review for the FRAND assessment in SEP proceedings. At the same time, our appellate court—the Munich Higher Regional Court (OLG München)—first issued a preliminary ruling and then a judgment on FRAND, which led to uncertainty among legal practitioners. We interpret the decision to mean that the Munich Higher Regional Court generalized an exceptional case and thereby set unrealistic standards.

We then issued a preliminary opinion in case 7 O 64/25—i.e., ZTE v. Samsung—in July 2025, in which we presented our principles in a comprehensive form for the first time. We then further elaborated on these principles in the decisions ASUS I (7 O 5007/25), ASUS II (7 O 4102/25), and RENAULT (7 O 7655/25). The most recent decision, ZTE/Samsung, concerns a special case in which the principles were nevertheless applied. Ultimately, however, the drafting of this decision demonstrated that the developed concept can lead to good results even in complex case scenarios.

Question:

At the beginning of the year, the Federal Court of Justice issued the FRAND III decision. Does this have an impact on the legal principles you have developed?

Answer:

We understand the Federal Court of Justice’s decision in FRAND III to mean that the standard of review has not changed compared to the FRAND I and FRAND II decisions. The Federal Court of Justice follows an approach that focuses on the parties’ conduct of negotiations, and so far, no decision has been made on exactly how a patent holder’s offer should be reviewed.

It is therefore the task of the lower courts to develop the legal framework for this issue and to issue initial rulings. These rulings will eventually, likely in 5 to 7 years, reach the Federal Court of Justice and become the subject of its decisions. The Munich Regional Court I has taken on a pioneering role in this regard due to the actual volume of cases. This is an interesting task because it involves an area of law in which courts from different countries influence one another.

Question:

Can you outline your principles for reviewing the plaintiff’s license offers in a brief and concise manner?

Answer:

The starting point is the question of whether we should address the patent holder’s offer in the context of a FRAND objection raised in patent infringement proceedings. And this depends on whether we view the implementer as fundamentally willing to license. If an implementer—within the framework of the negotiation process required by the ECJ decision in Huawei/ZTE—is clearly not interested in negotiating a license, then we see no reason to evaluate a plaintiff’s offer.

The situation is different if negotiations regarding the conclusion of a license agreement are actually taking place between the parties. In that case, it must be determined whether these are genuine negotiations or merely pretextual negotiations. To determine this, we have developed the concept of external and internal willingness to license.

By external willingness to license, we mean that the implementer is not engaging in an obvious hold-out. We assess this on the basis of a purely formal review. As a general rule, if the undisputed portion of the defendant’s offer has been paid and, if applicable, security in the amount of a one-year license has been provided, a review of the patent holder’s offer is required.

The review of the patent holder’s offer concerns the internal willingness to license. As part of this review, we determine whether the plaintiff’s license offer falls within the FRAND range or not. If the plaintiff’s offer falls within the range, then the implementer has no reason not to accept the offer. In this regard, it is important to understand that we do not determine an absolutely valid rate, but only ever establish a FRAND range.

Question:

You have now presented the principles, and we would like to know exactly how you determine whether the plaintiff’s offer is FRAND.

Answer:

As we understand it, the plaintiff’s offer is generally reviewed based on comparable license agreements. The result obtained in this way is then verified using a standardized top-down calculation to determine whether it is reasonable.

The problem lies in determining exactly what constitutes appropriate comparable license agreements. In this regard, we are of the opinion that the patent holder can determine which agreements to submit as comparable license agreements. If agreements with licensees are not submitted, this must generally be justified. The reason for this understanding is that we believe a patent holder should not be bound by unfavorable agreements once they have been concluded. On the other hand, however, it is also not FRAND if only a few agreements with small market participants are submitted in order to enforce a rate against a global corporation. Ultimately, it is the task of the judges to decide whether comparability actually exists.

In the ASUS II and RENAULT decisions, we examined the comparable licenses in great detail. In ASUS II, we found that the patent holder pursues and enforces a uniform licensing program. In RENAULT, we determined the license rate appropriate in this case by using several comparable license agreements. In this respect, slightly different assessment methods were applied. In the ZTE/Samsung decision, we concluded that there are no suitable comparable license agreements. Incidentally, this is the main difference to the decision in the United Kingdom. There, an agreement that was not introduced in our proceedings was considered a comparable license agreement.

Question:

In your view, what is the relationship between comparable license agreements and the top-down approach?

Answer:

In our view, the top-down approach should serve to verify whether the result obtained through comparable license agreements is appropriate overall. In this respect, it is a reasonableness test.

The top-down approach can take on particular significance in two scenarios. First, when the requested rate is so low that even a top-down analysis—assuming all calculation factors are set in favor of the implementer—leads to the conclusion that the patent holder’s offer is FRAND. We encountered this scenario in ASUS I. Second, when there are no comparable license agreements. In that case, the top-down approach serves to determine an appropriate license fee. We encountered this scenario in ZTE/SAMSUNG.

The real problem with the top-down approach is that one must determine the amount to be paid for the use of a specific standard in a device. There are various calculation methods in this regard, and our Chamber has opted for a standardized per-unit price. In the ZTE/SAMSUNG decision, we assumed that a price of $170 should be applied to a mobile phone, of which 8% is to be paid for the use of all mobile communication standards. As a result, this amounts to US$13.60 for the use of the device’s main functionality over the entire lifetime of the device. This is the AGGREGATE ROYALTY BURDEN (ARB). We believe this is a very low estimate that strongly accommodates the implementers’ interest in a low licensing rate.

Based on this calculation, the owner of a larger portfolio is therefore entitled to a royalty of $0.136 for every percentage point they hold in the standard.

We recognize that this approach can be criticized. There is room for debate regarding how the share of the total standard is determined or how valuable the portfolio is.

From our perspective, however, this can be left aside because the US$13.60 figure is very low and already accounts for these uncertainties. An ARB of US$25 to US$30 could likely also be well justified with appropriate factual arguments, at least when it comes to higher-end mobile phones.

Question:

In the ASUS I and ASUS II decisions, you addressed the rates of the SISVEL Wi-Fi 6 pool and the HEVC pool from Access Advance. Could you please say more about that?

Answer:

The two decisions address slightly different directions. In ASUS I, a member of the patent pool filed a lawsuit, and we argued that the pool rate did not fully exploit the portfolio’s licensing potential. If such an offer is not accepted by the implementer, the implementer cannot be considered a willing licensee.

The ASUS II decision concerned Nokia’s offer, and in that case, the defendant argued that the offer was too high compared to the HEVC pool from Access Advance. The background is that the pool offer is very inexpensive. Less than $1 is required to cover approximately 90% of the standard. Thus, the licensing potential is not fully exploited.

We do not know how pool rates are determined. However, there is a tendency for them to be very low. In this respect, it is likely that the first preliminary injunctions in the SEP sector could be issued with regard to pool rates.

Question:

Can you briefly explain the ZTE/Samsung decision to us? We would be interested to know how your approach differs from the rate-setting procedures in the United Kingdom and the People’s Republic of China.

Answer:

I’m happy to discuss the proceedings. However, it’s important for you to be aware that I’m only referring to the parts that were discussed during the oral hearing or that can be found in the published grounds for the judgment.

First, it is important to realize that we examine the FRAND defense within the context of our patent infringement proceedings. We assess whether the absence of a license agreement lies within the sphere of the plaintiffs or within the sphere of the defendants. If certain conditions are met, then we determine whether the plaintiffs’ offer at the time of the oral hearing falls within a FRAND range or not.

We do not determine a license rate in a strict sense. The fact that we took a position on the rate in the ZTE/SAMSUNG decision was due to the specific circumstances between the parties.

Question:

Which factors are of particular importance to your approach?

Answer:

We take a market-based approach. It is up to the patent holder to determine what kind of license they wish to grant for their intellectual property rights. The boundary is the requirement to act in accordance with FRAND principles, and the patent holder has some leeway. FRAND addresses how this leeway is defined. On the one hand, an offer must be fair and reasonable. By this we mean that, in absolute terms, it must reflect what the patent holder has contributed to the standard. On the other hand, the offer must also be such that no market participants are discriminated against.

Furthermore, every offer has a time component. What constitutes a reasonable license fee cannot be answered the same way at every point in time. Those who invest in a company very early on may be able to negotiate very favorable terms for a long period of time. Furthermore, inflation adjustments must be taken into account. However, the behavior of an implementer during license negotiations is also significant. In other words: If a party resists obtaining a license beyond the normal extent, this results in additional costs for the patent holder, which must be compensated by a higher license fee.

Question:

What do you mean by “resisting beyond the normal extent”?

Answer:

We have already addressed this in several decisions. We assume that patent holders and implementers must be able to dispute the specific terms of a major license agreement. The starting point is the consideration that, in principle, there is a rough balance of power between patent holders and implementers during negotiations.

At first glance, one might see this differently, because patent holders can exert pressure on implementers through injunctive relief. However, we believe that such a view overlooks an important economic aspect, namely that implementers sell their products and thereby generate revenue. In other words: They have the money! And that money only shifts to the patent holders’ side if the implementer actively decides to pay. That is why implementers have the advantage, especially at the start of negotiations. A quick promise to pay can often secure favorable terms.

The cases that go to court are mostly those where the implementers did not negotiate skillfully and failed to take advantage of this leverage. When, shortly before an injunction is issued, implementers now say that the pressure is too great, they overlook the fact that this is, at least in part, a self-inflicted situation.

Against this background, we consider it appropriate to state that the option to file a lawsuit seeking an injunction is a legitimate cause of action in disputes over a license agreement.

Now to rate-setting proceedings! It is clear to everyone that no party can unilaterally determine which court is competent to set a global rate for all worldwide sales. Exceptions might apply, at most, where the respective defendant or the standard-setting organization is headquartered. If an implementer nevertheless decides to initiate a rate-setting proceeding, then an almost inevitable consequence is that this decision will affect the level of the rates.

Question:

Thank you very much for outlining the main principles of your Chamber’s case law. We would like to know your views on a few specific points. We would like to start with the topic of “past release.”

Answer:

I believe that “past release” is significant in two respects.

On the one hand, it concerns whether a patent holder can claim compensation for past use, and the other question is whether they must claim it. The second aspect is particularly important when considering comparable license agreements.

The starting point is that users of new technologies enter the market without having obtained comprehensive licensing. This is permissible because, especially in the early stages, energy and staff must be used for building sales structures and developing products. There may simply be no time left to deal with licensing.

On the other hand, there are the patent holders, who also have limited resources and must strive to secure product suppliers as licensees. This raises the question of whether they should set up their own licensing program or join a patent pool. The latter would have the advantage of being simpler, but the disadvantage of generating less licensing revenue.

This complex situation can result in a significant time lag between the start of production and the conclusion of a license agreement. There is fundamentally no apparent reason why the patent holder should forgo compensation for past sales. In this respect, there is generally no obligation to waive compensation for past sales or to grant discounts. However, the Chamber also believes that there are limits. The rationale is that the implementer is no longer able to pass on license fees to the purchasers of the products for past sales. In fact, this is therefore always a decision that depends on the case-by-case analysis.

The question of how to handle situations where parties have entered into a license agreement in which the past has not been settled must be assessed entirely differently.

Let me give you an example:

If the implementer sells the same number of products each year from 2015 to 2025, but the first license agreement was concluded from 2020 to 2025 and provides for a rate of 10 cents, then one could argue that the actual rate is 5 cents because the past has also been covered.

However, we consider such a view to be incorrect because it does not reflect reality. In such situations, the past is typically set aside to pave the way for the future. This is an economic decision that must be accepted by the courts. I believe that this issue in particular represents one of the greatest differences between the courts in Germany and the United Kingdom.

Question:

In the RENAULT decision, you stated that the FRAND range is very broad and amounts to three times the lowest offer. Isn’t that a much too broad range?

Answer:

You are asking about the concept of determining the FRAND range as set out in the Renault decision, and I can understand that it sounds very broad at first if we assume that the licensing range between the cheapest conceivable license and the most expensive conceivable license can be three times as much. When considering these figures, it must be made clear that these are extreme positions. As a rule, the range will be much narrower. The key criteria are the size and scope of the license and the behavior of the implementer.

The cheapest license will likely be a contract renewal with a very large company covering multiple standards, where there were no issues whatsoever during negotiations. The most expensive license, on the other hand, is one concluded after years of disputes between parties in various jurisdictions, where the primary reason for the lack of agreement lies with the implementer. This is because, in such a case, the license must also compensate the patent holder for the additional effort.

I would like to illustrate this using the ZTE/SAMSUNG decision. In that case, we applied a 30% discount due to SAMSUNG’s high volume of units. However, we also applied a 10% surcharge because, in our view, Samsung is resisting the conclusion of a license to an excessive degree. In particular, we consider filing a request with the standardization body ETSI and initiating the rate-setting proceedings in the United Kingdom to be unacceptable means in the fight for a reasonable license rate.

Question:

In the RENAULT decision, you stated that the court must determine a mean value based on comparable agreements. Based on the mean value found, an increase of 15% is possible.

Answer:

Exactly. The focus is on determining the median value. We determine this median value by evaluating comparable license agreements, where available. In the RENAULT decision, we specifically examined the agreements with other automakers and then compared the model range and the size of the individual other automakers with Renault. Based on that, we then determined a median value.

It is important to note that in Germany we do not set rates, but rather examine whether the plaintiff’s offer falls within the FRAND range. We determined the mean value and then examined where the parties’ offers place. If the implementer’s offer is very far from the average value, then the patent holder may also maintain a slightly higher offer. For only then can the patent holder still grant discounts during the course of subsequent negotiations. As a consequence of this understanding, the same offer may lose its FRAND status if the implementer takes concrete steps toward the patent holder and the latter does not respond or does not respond appropriately.

However, I must also reiterate at this point that we, as the Chamber, do not have the impression that the patent holders’ offers are too high. Rather, it is usually the case that the implementers try by all means to drive down the amount of the license payments.

Question:

We would also like to know how you assess the requirement for geographical adjustment.

Answer:

By “geographical adjustment,” we mean the application of different rates for the same product category in different countries or regions because the patent holder’s portfolio is validated to varying degrees.

Geographical adjustment is a fairly simple means of significantly reducing claims in a mathematically transparent manner. It was the defendants’ main argument in the RENAULT and ZTE/SAMSUNG decisions. The arguments differed in the two cases. In RENAULT, it was argued that the license rate for the defendant had to be lower because the company did not sell passenger cars in the U.S., and in ZTE/SAMSUNG, it was claimed that an adjustment was necessary because ZTE had not fully validated the portfolio in every country in the world.

I believe that to answer the question of whether and how a geographical adjustment should be made, one must be aware of what forms the basis for calculating a royalty. As far as we can tell, there are two approaches here. First, a party’s contribution to the development and further development of the standard, and second, compensation for the global portfolio of patents. This distinction is somewhat complicated, so I would like to explain it in more detail.

The situation is clear-cut when there are no intellectual property rights either at the location where the chipset is manufactured or at the point of sale. In such cases, no license fees can be charged. However, this generally applies only to holders of very small patent portfolios. In most cases, patent applications are filed across the globe.

Companies engaged in development will have the majority of their patents and patent applications in the countries where they are headquartered, because that is where the priority-establishing applications are filed. Subsequently, applications are filed in the most important markets. In less important markets, only the most important and strongest patents will be filed. Otherwise, it would be necessary to file and maintain all patents in every country in the world to obtain the same license everywhere.

In the ZTE/SAMSUNG case, we had the situation where ZTE held most patents in the People’s Republic of China (over 3,000) and only about 12% (over 400) of the patents were validated in the Republic of Korea. In Europe, a total of approximately 30% (over 1,000) of the patents were validated. Against this backdrop, the question arose as to how ZTE’s share of the mobile communications standard should be calculated. It was undisputed that the total number of patents in the standard amounts to approximately 60,000.

The Chamber is of the view that the share is calculated by referring to the total number of ZTE’s patents. The rationale is that the focus is on the contribution to the further development of the standard, rather than on a pool license for the individual patents and patent applications.

Question:

Doesn’t this lead to unfair results? In the ZTE v. Samsung case, even ZTE made a geographical adjustment.

Answer:

It is true that ZTE’s expert also made a geographical adjustment. However, that adjustment was largely based on actual sales.

The Chamber, on the other hand, bases its calculation on a standardized per-unit price of US$170. And we believe that by applying such a low value, geographical differences are sufficiently captured and taken into account.

It may be necessary in future proceedings for patent holders to also present their research and development expenses in order to determine the value of a specific portfolio.

Ultimately, we are entering new ground with our decisions. There is no established case law yet on exactly how to evaluate license agreements and license offers. We expect that the parties will present new arguments in future proceedings. Decisions by foreign courts are also an important source of information. Building on this, we will continue to develop our case law.

Question:

Do you actually have any doubts as to whether your approach is correct?

Answer:

The approach taken by the Munich Regional Court I is logically consistent and transparent, and leads to realistic outcomes. However, it must also be recognized that a great deal of economic understanding is required of the judges. Particularly in the higher courts, where there are far fewer FRAND proceedings, it remains to be seen whether a comparable level of economic expertise is present there. Since those courts are staffed by intelligent and experienced judges, however, I have no doubts.

Question:

Finally, we would like to ask you for your assessment of the topic of “long-arm jurisdiction.”

Answer:

I believe that the jurisdiction of the German national patent infringement courts has expanded significantly because of the European Court of Justice’s BSH-Hausgeräte decision. In patent infringement proceedings involving the territory of other member states, we no longer need to stay the proceedings with respect to the invalidity defense. This also sends a signal to non-European countries.

Jurisdiction is derived from Art. 4(1) and Art. 8(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Art. 7 of the Brussels Ia Regulation plays a subordinate role. The Lugano Convention applies accordingly.

An interesting question will be whether, under Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, parent companies headquartered in other European countries can be sued for a worldwide patent infringement. Our Chamber is of the view that this should be possible.

The more important question is how, in cross-border proceedings, the applicable national law of the respective state is incorporated into the specific proceedings. In proceedings concerning Member States of the European Union, our Chamber believes we can rely extensively on presumptions because the legal framework is highly harmonized by the European Patent Convention and the Enforcement Directive. For non-European states, this is far more difficult and can ultimately only be decided once suitable cases arise. With regard to the People’s Republic of China, it may be of interest

that Chinese law was heavily modeled on German patent law in the 1980s. This may help simplify access to that foreign law.

Question:

Thank you very much for your remarks.

Module 1: German Courts' Role in FRAND Rate Setting and Global Jurisdiction

•Rate Setting:Do German national courts still tend to handle only SEP infringement actions and injunction matters, while being reluctant to adjudicate SEP royalty rate disputes? Will German national courts be prepared to determine SEP licensing rates on a case-by-case basis in the future? If so, what would be the geographic scope of coverage?

•Global Jurisdiction Precondition:Do German national courts hold that they have jurisdiction over global SEP licensing disputes only where the parties have explicitly agreed to request the court to determine global royalty rates?

•One-way vs. Cross Global Rates:In the ZTE v. Samsung Frankfurt antitrust case earlier this year, the court made a rough calculation of the global one-way rate. Does this mean German courts will in future cases be more inclined to decide on one-way or cross global rates/terms? Will such a tendency be linked to the assessment of whether the parties’ conduct complies with FRAND?

Module 2: Injunctions, the Proportionality Principle, and Assessment of Willingness

•Negotiating Fault Assessment:Do German national courts assess the parties’ negotiating fault solely by strictly following the Huawei/ZTE framework, or do they also take into account the parties’ respective offers and counteroffers when evaluating willingness?

•Proportionality and Injunctions:In light of the recent Samsung v. ZTE case (where an SEP holder failed to obtain an injunction based on willingness), will the German principle of proportionality be fully applied when assessing FRAND compliance? In German SEP infringement cases, does the so-called “infringement found = injunction” judicial principle truly exist, or is it a misunderstanding on the part of some commentators? If it exists, has this principle been comprehensively revised?

•Disproportionality Objection:Do you think the disproportionality objection

against an injunction could be successful in certain SEP cases in the future?

Module 3: Interim Licenses, Security Deposits, and Jurisdictional Clashes

•Attitude Toward UK Interim Licenses:What are the views of German courts regarding the UK interim license regime, especially the recent trend where SEP holders proactively seek it? Will German courts consider introducing this approach in the future?

•Security Deposits vs. UK Approach:What are the general criteria for requiring an implementer to post a security deposit in Germany, and what is your opinion regarding the differences between the UK interim license and the German security deposit approach? Are security deposits and non-refundable payments necessary steps in the FRAND process, or do they have the effect of “curing prior unwillingness”?

•Timing and Pressure:If the licensee actively participated in the negotiations and acted correctly but failed to provide a security deposit in a timely manner solely due to financial pressure (e.g., failing to pay a security deposit when the counteroffer was rejected, but providing it immediately after litigation commences or shortly before the hearing), how should willingness be assessed?

•Jurisdictional Tension:What is your view on the current tension between UK courts and the UPC/German courts regarding global rate setting and interim licenses? What would be the possible solutions to mitigate such tension between the different jurisdictions?

Module 4: Cross-Licensing and its Special Security Requirements

•Complexity of Cross-Licenses:Why are cross-license agreements particularly difficult to assess in FRAND cases? What legal or economic factors distinguish them from ordinary bilateral licenses, and can they truly serve as reliable comparables?

•Mutual Security in Mutual Suits:In a situation where two SEP holders sue each other and the outcome is likely to be a cross-license agreement with one party acting as the net payer, how does this affect the requirement to provide FRAND security and make a partial payment? Should the net payee also provide security and make an undisputed payment to the net payer, and how should the amount be determined?

Module 5: FRAND Methodology, Past Releases, and Expert Evidence

•Evaluating FRAND & Market Practice:How should courts evaluate whether a license offer is truly FRAND?What role should comparable licenses, market practice, and economic expert evidence play?

•Unpacking Past Royalty Payments:Is a discount for past royalty payments an obligation or a right of the patent holder? Is there any difference between unpacking a “comparable license” and calculating the royalty component for a new license? How should past royalty payments be unpacked—do discounts affect the rate, or do they affect the past time period for which royalties have been paid?

•Rate Calculation Tools:Are geographic adjustment factors and an implied ARB useful tools for assessing offers or comparables? What is your take on the Broadcom v. Renault case, in which the Munich Court proposed that the highest permissible value of a FRAND range is three times the lowest value, or a 50% deviation from the mean? Does this apply only to this case, or is it intended as a general rule?

•Other Factors & ECJ Guidance:Do standstills and covenants have an impact on the calculation of the FRAND rate? Is there a need for more structured guidance from the European Court of Justice on how FRAND rates should be assessed?

Module 6: Trial Procedure, Confidentiality, and Emerging Sectors

•Trial Models, in reviewing the preliminary injunction application:What is your opinion onthe trend amongsome Brazilian courts(specifically those in Rio de Janeiro) over the past two years of requiring a positive, expert-backed verification of FRAND compliancebeforegranting a preliminary injunction?This practice was further refined in the 2025 Sun Patent Trust v. Great Wall Motor case, where the judge bifurcated the preliminary assessment by appointing two separate neutral experts: a technical expert to evaluate patent essentiality and infringement, and an economic expert to independently verify the FRAND compliance issue.

•Trial Procedures and Confidentiality:Could you outline the general SEP trial procedure in German courts, particularly how they facilitate the exchange of confidential information (such as comparable licenses)?

•Transparency Limits:How much transparency can courts realistically require in FRAND disputes, and what are the challenges regarding confidential negotiations? Does limited transparency make it harder to ensure consistent outcomes? When German courts refer to third-party licensing agreements in SEP infringement actions, do they apply the same transparency standards as those adopted by UK courts in the rate-setting process?

•Emerging Sectors & ADR:How do German courts address rate calculation challenges in emerging sectors (e.g., streaming media) that lack comparable samples and top-down core data like ARB? What are your views on arbitration awards versus court litigation for SEP disputes?

Module 7: Licensing Levels, UPC Long-Arm Jurisdiction, and Parallel Litigation

•Licensing Level & Supply Chain:At what level in the value chain should SEP licenses be granted, and does the level affect the royalty rate?What opportunities and risks does the choice of licensing level create for patent holders?How do courts approach the tension between business freedom and FRAND obligations? To what extent is a foreign component manufacturer liable for infringement in Germany due to devices sold in Germany equipped with those components?

•UPC Expansion & Competition:How do you view the trend of the UPC expanding its long-arm jurisdiction following the BSH case, and is it likely to extend to the SEP field? Regarding Onesta suing BMW in Germany for a U.S. patent, will German courts apply the CJEU rules in the BSH case by analogy? How do you view the competitive relationship between German national courts and the German local divisions of the UPC? How might the UPC influence SEP disputes in Europe?

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