北大经院 | 讲座预告（6.4-6.5）

来源：北京大学经济学院

北大经院工作坊第1305场

微观理论经济学工作坊

主持老师：（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇（北大国发院）胡岠

参与老师：（北大经院）胡涛（北大国发院）汪浩、邢亦青（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁

时间：2026年6月4日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院305会议室

Talk 1

主题：Dynamic Pricing with Network-Induced Stickiness

主讲人：

Qiteng Sun（Ph.D. Candidate, National School of Development, Peking University）

主讲人简介：

Qiteng Sun is a Ph.D. candidate of economics at National School of Development, Peking University. His research interests include social and economic networks, and industrial organization.

摘要：

We study dynamic pricing with network-induced stickiness, where consumers’ prior adoption decisions increase their future willingness to stay with the same firm or product. Unlike standard network externalities, which affect current-period utility, network-induced stickiness operates across periods through prior shared adoption within consumers’ social networks. A two-period monopoly model shows that the firm may optimally set a low first-period price to build an initial user base, then extract surplus from sticky consumers. When the network effect is sufficiently strong, introductory or even negative pricing can be optimal. We also consider extensions to duopoly competition and richer network structures, aiming to clarify how delayed network effects shape firms’ intertemporal pricing strategies and social welfare.

Talk 2

主题： Price Competition under Platform Traffic Design

主讲人：

Xingye Li（Ph.D. Candidate, National School of Development, Peking University）

主讲人简介：

Xingye Li is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the National School of Development, Peking University. Her research interests include information economics and industrial organization.

摘要：

The set of firms consumers consider largely determines the pattern of price competition and, consequently, market welfare. This paper studies a platform market in which firms sell a homogeneous product and consumers are ex ante homogeneous across firms, while the platform endogenously creates heterogeneity in the firms consumers consider. The platform chooses the initial allocation of consumer traffic, and a fixed path-flow algorithm determines the sequence of firms consumers may visit. Together, the traffic allocation and the search algorithm generate different distributions of firms considered by consumers and thereby alter the equilibrium pattern of price competition. In the three-firm case, we show that the consumer-surplus-maximizing traffic allocation is proportional to the eigenvector centrality of the search-reach network. This allocation offsets the asymmetry induced by the search algorithm by equalizing firms’ captive-to-reach ratios. By contrast, the industry-profit-maximizing allocation is generally more asymmetric and, in some cases, assigns all initial traffic to a single firm in order to amplify the asymmetry generated by the search algorithm.

北大经院学术午餐会第210期

以数治税：理论与实践

主讲人：

孙鲲鹏（中央财经大学财政税务学院教授）

主持老师：

高明（北京大学经济学院长聘副教授）

时间：

2026年6月5日（周五）

10:00-11:30

地点：

北京大学经济学院107会议室

主讲人简介：

中央财经大学财政税务学院教授、博士生导师、副院长，入选国家级青年人才计划。清华大学经济管理学院博士，曾挂任北京市财政局财源中心副主任。主要关注数字智能技术条件下的财税治理研究，论文发表在《经济研究》《管理世界》《世界经济》《经济学（季刊）》《金融研究》等学术期刊。主持国家社会科学基金、国家自然科学基金项目。资政报告获得党中央和国务院领导批示，以及中办、国办采纳。“全国高校黄大年式教师团队”、教育部新时代原创性教材项目成员。

摘要：

“以数治税”是推进税收治理现代化的关键抓手。本文以征纳信息不对称为逻辑起点，结合组织信息处理理论与数据价值链理论，构建了涵盖数据来源、数据传输、数据分析和数据治理四个维度的“以数治税”分析框架，系统阐释数字化税收治理如何通过拓展信息边界、降低流转成本、形成治理洞察和保障数据可信，将数据优势转化为征管能力。在此基础上，本文利用税收征管国际调查数据集和典型国家实践开展国际比较，并进一步基于政策文本数据库和政府采购合同数据，分析我国“以数治税”政策呈现的阶段性格局。最后，本文基于全国企业微观调查数据和税务微博评论情感数据进行经验检验，关注了“以数治税”对企业税收遵从水平、企业间税负结构、纳税人满意度的多维影响。

供稿：科研与博士后办公室

美编：雨田

责编：度量、雨禾、初夏